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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the construction of ordinariness in the accounts of
perpetrators of gross human rights violations, who commit their actions in the context of a
system. A review of the literature that conceived of perpetrators in this way was undertaken.
This was done whilst exploring the social constructionist paradigm, which formed the
theoretical backbone to the study. Discourse analysis was the methodology adopted for the
two analyses that were undertaken in the thesis. The first was the analysis of the literature
review, which was undertaken in order to see how ordinariness was constructed in the
literature. The second analysis was that of the transcript of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) Amnesty hearing of the applicant Daniel Petrus Siebert, into the death of
Steve Biko.
The analyses indicate that there is much similiarity in the ways in which ordinariness
is constructed in the local context, and the ways in which it is constructed in the literature .
Ordinariness in the context of gross human rights violations is produced through
constructions of the perpetrator and the system within which the acts were committed, as
passive and active respectively. The construction of the system as the epitome of the evil that
is perpetrated enables the humanity or ordinariness of the perpetrator to be kept intact.
Ordinariness in the South African context, is based on racist constructions of good whiteness,
and bad blackness. Further, in the local political context, the TRC provides the conditions of
possibility for the production of ordinariness, and ensures that perpetrators and others who
benefited during the apartheid regime, continue to do so, as issues of accountability and
responsibility are not adequately addressed.
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It was suggested to me that I consider this thesis a "thought experiment". It certainly
seemed that it was, especially during the early stages when the direction and goal of the research
were unclear, and there were many interesting questions with few answers, in an area of research
relatively uncharted. The seeds for this project were planted years ago, when as an under-graduate
student ofEnglish, I was introduced to the writing and life of Steve Biko. His work created a
huge impression, and resulted in a lasting interest. Years later in choosing a research topic, I
combined my interest in the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South
Africa, with that of Steve Biko in choosing a subject matter and topic, and so began my journey.
The change from the apartheid regime to a democracy in South Africa, and the formation
of the TRC, presented a wealth of research opportunities. How would we as a nation deal with
the past? And, how would those who had committed heinous deeds in the upholding of the
apartheid state, account for themselves and their actions? These questions led me to obtaining the
transcripts of the amnesty hearings into the death in detention of Steve Biko, where five
applicants applied for amnesty. Upon reading and reading the transcripts, I was strongly
confronted with the way in which the perpetrators attempted to construct themselves as "ordinary
men". Time and time again, the transcripts revealed that they felt little responsibility for their
actions. Instead, they indicated that those who gave the orders were responsible, and that they
were only "ordinary men" who were simply following orders.
The sequence of the chapters represents more or less, the path that I followed in
undertaking this thesis. In reading the transcripts, and noting the ways that the perpetrators
accounted for their actions, I reviewed the literature on perpetrators of gross human rights
violations and how they were conceived as ordinary. I looked at when the link between
ordinariness and the perpetration of gross human rights violations first occurred, and why
perpetrators were seen as ordinary. This literature is reviewed in chapter two. Much of the
literature that is examined in chapter two is not from the South African context. Therefore, there
is an examination of the comparability of the international literature to the South African situation.
This thesis attempts to add to the small but growing literature/research into the area of
perpetrators of gross human rights violations relating to the South African context.
Following a quite uncritical examination of this literature, I then questioned this
conception of perpetrators as "ordinary men", armed with a knowledge of social constructionist
theory. Cfnrpter three therefore explores the theoretical foundation of the study. This section
examines the social constructionist framework, as well as the social constructionist account of the
self, or selthood. This is examined in order to ground the deconstruction ofthe "ordinary man",
which is based on a particular notion of the self. This is followed by a re-reading, or
deconstruction of the literature reviewed in chapter two. Here, there is an exploration of how
ordinariness is constructed in relation to perpetrators of gross human rights violations. The
concept of"ordinariness" may be constructed in a number of different ways. In chapter three, I
examine how "ordinariness" becomes compatible with perpetrating gross human rights violations.
In chapter four, I explore the methodology that was used in the thesis as a whole, as well
as the methodology of the two analyses that were undertaken (i.e. the analysis of the literature
review, and the analysis of the transcript) . There is also mention of how and why the account of
one of the five perpetrators was chosen as the main focus of study. This is followed by the
analysis of the transcript, i.e. the TRC amnesty hearing ofDaniel Petrus Siebert into the death of
Steve Biko. The analysis deals with the ways in which ordinariness is constructed by Siebert in the
text . It draws these together, using the analytic tools outlined by, amongst others, Positioning
Theory as proposed by Harre and van Langenhove (1999), and Parker (1992). Chapter five
contains the results, conclusion and recommendations. The latter chapter also sees an examination
of a critique of the thesis.
Before moving on to chapter two, it is important to provide some introduction to a few
key components that are of significance to the thesis. Firstly, I will provide a summary of the life
of Steve Biko, and the philosophy that he espoused. Thereafter, there will be a brieflook at the
inquest that followed his death in 1978. Lastly, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is
discussed, detailing the events that resulted in its formation, as well as the work that it undertook.
2
1.2 STEPHEN BANTU BIKD
On December 18th 1946, Stephen Bantu Biko was born in King Williams Town in the
Eastern Cape province of South Africa. The youngest of three children, he was born into a family
of ordinary means; his father was a government-employed clerk, and his mother a domestic
worker (Juckes, 1995).
In Biko's family, education was seen as an important foundation upon which to build and
better one's life. Juckes (1995) states that although there is little information about his early
years, the evidence suggests that his political awareness began during his latter school years, and
flourished only after he entered university in 1966. In that year he entered the black section of the
University of Natal, Durban, to pursue a career in medicine, and initially performed quite well.
(Woods, 1978). Although Biko desired to complete his education, his experiences of the
increased tightening of the security legislation led him in another direction . He initiallybelonged
to the National Union of Students of South Africa (NUSAS), but his experiences with the
organization led him to reject the notion of multi-racial cooperation as a means to an integrated
society. Specifically, he felt that the non-racial principles of the organization were a farce because
decisions were ultimately taken by white liberals in the organization.
In 1968, therefore, he formed the South African Students' Organization (SASO), and was
its first president. He traveled around the country where he visited black campuses putting
forward the philosophy of black consciousness (BC) (Bernstein, 1978). 'Black' was defined as all
people classified as 'non-white' according to the apartheid system, and therefore included
'Africans' as well as ' coloureds' and 'Indians'. Upon completing his third year of university he
was expelled for his political activities, and was harassed and put under constant surveillance by
the security police. However, that same year he formed the Black Peoples' Convention which was
an umbrella body for groups sharing BC ideology (Bernstein, 1978).
BC finds its origins in the ideas and activities which emerged in the early 1970' s in South
Africa, in order to unite black people against apartheid. The BC movement descended from the
banned organizations of 1960, the African National Congress (ANC), and the Pan-Africanist
Congress (PAC) (Bernstein, 1978). One of the primary aims ofBC was for blacks to conquer
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their feelings of inferiority which was a product of centuries of colonialization and apartheid, and
inculcate black pride (Dell, 1996). It represented more than an attitude; it represented a way of
life, with the basic tenet that black people should reject all value systems which sought to make
them foreigners in their own country, and reduce their dignity (Bernstein, 1978). It also involved
an awareness of the political and economic power that black people wielded in the country. The
BC movement maintained that it was not a political movement seeking revolutionary change, but
a social movement which concerned itself with psychological emancipation (Biko, 1978). Juckes
(1995) states that although the BC leaders did not seek to change society directly, they were
aware that through raising consciousness, they were starting a revolutionary process . Of special
emphasis was that liberation from psychological oppression was the first step to liberation (Dell,
1996). Biko's (1978) words sum up how he conceived the problems faced by black people:
I think basically Black Consciousness refers itself to the black man and to his situation, and I think the black man is
subjected to two forces in this country. He is first of all oppressed by an external world through institutionalized
machinery, through laws that restrict him from doing certain things, through heavy work conditions, through poor pay,
...and secondly, and this we regard as the most important , the black man in himself has developed a certain state of
alienation, he rejects himself, precisely because he attaches the meaning white to all that is good... (p. 100).
Biko worked for the Black Community Programmes (BCP) in Durban in 1972, and in the
same year, one of the BCP's projects, the Black Review, which analyzed political trends, was
banned. In February of 1973, Biko, along with other officials of SASO and BPC, were served
with banning orders (Bernstein, 1978; Biko, 1978). Banning orders served as a means of severely
restricting the activities and lives of those upon whom they were served . Biko therefore, was
banned from all the organizations in which he had been involved, and was restricted to King
William's Town for the next five years. He was also as a result of the banning order prohibited
from being at any meeting, the latter being defined as when the banned person talks to two people
together (Bernstein, 1978; Woods, 1980). According to Bernstein (1978), the restrictions placed
on Biko only increased his determination to work amongst his people . In 1975 he formed the
Zimele Trust Fund to help political prisoners and their families, and the Ginsberg Educational
Trust for assisting black students.
In 1975, Biko was arrested and held for 137 days without trial, when the government
became even stricter on 'black militants' and took many into detention. In 1976, even though
Biko could not attend the BPC congress, he was elected Honorary President of the organization.
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Bemstein (1978) states that even with all the restrictions placed upon him, he was politically
active, and his prestige remained high amongst young activists . She further states that after the
Soweto riots in 1976, the leaders of Soweto demanded that the govemment negotiate with the
country's future black leaders - Nelson Mandela (head of the ANC), Robert Sobukwe (head of
the PAC), and Steve Biko .
Following his earlier detention, Biko was arrested and detained on numerous occasions .
According to Meredith (1999), over a three year period, he was arrested and detained twenty-nine
times. The reasons behind the arrests and detentions included the alleged breaching of his banning
orders as well as obstructing the course ofjustice in persuading witnesses in a political trial to
change their evidence. In August of 1976, following numerous anti-apartheid demonstrations
resulting from the Soweto massacres, Biko was held in solitary confinement for 101 days
(Bemstein, 1978). His banning orders prevented him from publishing any statement or account of
his detention. Further arrests followed in March and July of 1977. Ultimately, for all his arrests
and detentions, Biko was never convicted of any crime while he was alive, and was never arrested
for inciting violence, nor accused of it (Meredith, 1999; Pauw, 1991). Bemstein (1978) states that
it was only after the death ofBiko that the police put forward these allegations .
Finally, on the is" of August of 1977 Biko was arrested again, together with a fellow
activist, Peter Jones, (Meredith, 1999; Pogrund, 2000). They were stopped at a roadblock outside
Grahamstown and taken into custody. On Tuesday, 13th September 1977, South Africans were
told that Steve Biko had died whilst in detention.
1.3 THE INQUEST
The next day, Jimmy Kruger, the minister ofjustice, stated that Biko had died from a
hunger strike (Pogrund, 2000; Woods, 1980). The post-mortem however, revealed that Biko had
sustained brain damage (Pogrund, 2000) . An inquest into the death ofBiko began on the 14th of
November 1977, and was held at the Old Synagogue in Pretoria, famous for being the venue of
the Treason Trial in the 1950's where 156 people were acquitted, and where Winnie Mandela and
21 other activists were acquitted and immediately redetained (Bizos, 1998). According to Bizos
(1998), the five police officers who were involved in Biko's interrogation during the day, stuck to
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their story that a scuffle ensued after Biko had 'gone berserk' upon being confronted with
damning evidence against him. The scuffle resulted in Biko 'bumping his head', and this was
probably where he sustained his injury. The five police officers were Major Snyman, Captain
Siebert, Warrant Officer Marx, Warrant Officer Beneke, and Sergeant Niewoudt.
In addition to their testimony the police officers provided the 'evidence' that they held
against Biko, and the prosecution pointed out that all of it was dated after Biko's death. The
police officers also alleged that Biko had 'confessed' to drafting a pamphlet which called for arson
and murder upon those who did not heed his appeal to commemorate the exiled, jailed and dead.
Moreover, they alleged that Biko' s 'confession' was achieved without the use of any physical
force by any security force members. Colonel Goosen, who was the head of the unit at the time,
was also questioned, and he confirmed the story of the other officers. However, according to
Bizos (1998), the stories of the officers contained many inconsistencies, in addition to not being
able to account for the injuries that Biko sustained, which were documented following the post-
mortem. In addition, the two doctors who had certified that Biko was not injured while still in the
police cells in Port Elizabeth, Dr. Tucker and Dr. Lang, were also questioned. Their testimony
revealed that they were of the opinion that Biko had been injured, but they failed to disagree with
the security police who stated that Biko was feigning illness, and was not to be sent to hospital
(Bizos, 1998; Pogrund, 2000). Ultimately, the prosecuting attorney, was able to show that the
doctors ethical standards were subordinated to the interests of the security police (Asmal, Asmal
& Roberts, 1996).
Although the prosecuting attorneys felt that they had provided ample proof that crimes
had been committed, including culpable homicide or manslaughter, perjury, and attempts to defeat
the ends ofjustice, the magistrate did not concur with this, and his judgement indicated otherwise
(Bizos, 1998). He stated that the cause or likely cause of death was a head injury which caused
extensive brain damage, and which was probably sustained on the morning of the 7tlt of September
1977, when Biko was involved in a scuffle with security branch members. The magistrate found
that the evidence did not prove that Biko' s death was brought about by any act or omission,
involving any offence on the part of any person (Bizos, 1998; Pauw, 1991).
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Biko's mother, his wife and his sons, sued the government for wrongful injury on the part
of the police, and neglect on the part of the doctors concerned (Bizos, 1998). The case was
eventually settled, and Biko's family, who were battling somewhat financially, expressed the wish
that the money be donated to a community project, because it was blood money, and would not
bring Biko back (Bizos, 1998). The security establishment which had robbed South Africa of a
great leader, walked away untouched by the law for their involvement in Biko' s death.
The next chapter of this story, forms the context of this thesis - i.e. when the five police
officers who were involved in the interrogation of Steve Biko, applied to the TRC Amnesty
Committee for amnesty for the death of Steve Biko.
1.4 THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Steve Biko was amongst thousands of others who died during the apartheid regime, as a
result of the political conflict in the country. Some, like Biko, died at the hands of the security
police, and their deaths went unpunished by the apartheid state. Others died without their families
ever knowing how or why they were killed. The change in dispensation from an apartheid
government to a government of national unity in South Africa, provided the opportunity to deal
with this violent and painful past.
According to van Zyl (1997), the negotiated settlement between the liberation movements
and the former government meant that neither side could claim victory. Prosecution of those who
had enforced the apartheid regime was therefore not an option as it would have jeopardized a
lasting and peaceful settlement (Asmal et ai, 1996; van Zyl, 1997; TRC Final Report (TRC FR)
1998, vol. 1 eh. 1). It would also have been difficult to accomplish because so much evidence
relied on the accounts of the perpetrators, and much evidence had been destroyed (Tutu, 1999).
While some countries such as Germany and Rwanda, used prosecution to deal with former human
rights violators, since 1980 the concept of a truth commission gained prominence as a mechanism
for elucidating history and addressing past human rights violations (Hamber and Kibble, 1999;
Rosenberg, 1999). In South Africa, what was needed was a way of dealing with the past which
would neither conceal the many gross human rights violations that had occurred, nor threaten to
destroy South Africa's new democracy (van Zyl, 1997; TRC FR, 1998, vol. 1, eh. 1). The TRC
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was such an initiative. The overarching task assigned to the Commission by Parliament was the
promotion of national unity and reconciliation (TRC FR, 1998, vol. 1, eh. 5). Amongst its many
aims were the following, which are modified from the TRC FR (1998):
• To seek the truth, record it and make it known to the public, involving the establishment of as
complete a picture as possible of the gross violations of human rights which were committed
from March 1960 (which was when the ANC and PAC were banned, and the Sharpville
massacre occurred), to April 1994 (which was when Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the
first president of the new South Africa) (cf Asmal et ai, 1996; Jeffrey, 1999; Tutu, 1999)
• To facilitate the granting of amnesty to those who made full disclosure of all the relevant facts
relating to acts of gross human rights violations associated with a political objective
• To establish and make known the fate or whereabouts of deceased victims, and to restore the
civil dignity ofvictims by giving them an opportunity to relate the accounts of the violations
ofwhich they were victims/ which they suffered
The question of amnesty proved a challenging issue, and provided a major source of
conflict in public debate (TRC FR, 1998, vol. 1, eh. 5). According to the latter report, the
decision to grant amnesty was part of the negotiated political settlement in the government of
national unity. Some saw a contradiction between the work of the Human Rights Violations
Committee, which devoted itself to acknowledging the painful experiences ofvictims of gross
human rights violations, and the work of the Amnesty Committee, which freed many perpetrators
of the same violations from prosecution on the basis of full disclosure (TRC FR, 1998, vol. 1, eh.
5).
It is necessary in the context of this thesis, to examine how and why amnesty would be
granted, since the subject matter of the thesis is that of an amnesty hearing of the TRC. While the
TRC acknowledged that the granting of amnesty was a difficult, sensitive, and agonizing issue, it
represented a balancing act between the need for justice to victims, and the need for reconciliation
for the future of the country (TRC FR, 1998, vol. I, ch. 5). A blanket amnesty for undisclosed
deeds was rejected (Asmal et ai, 1996; Tutu, 1999; TRC FR, 1998, vol. 1. Ch. 4). According to
the TRC FR (1998, vol. 1,.eh. 5), the interim Constitution postamble stipulated that, "In order to
advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts and
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offences with political objectives and committed in the course of conflicts of the past (par. 53, p.
8). Amnesty would be granted on the following conditions according to the TRC FR (1998, vol.
1, eh. 5) - the applicant was to apply for amnesty for each offence committed and applications
had to be made within the time frame laid down in legislation. Amnesty would only be granted
upon full disclosure of crimes, and amnesty hearings would take place in public, save for special
circumstances. Amnesty would be granted on the basis of a set of objective criteria, and the nature
and context of the offences had to be declared. Where amnesty applications were unsuccessful or
not made at all, the way was then open for the prosecuting authority to decide upon whether there
were sufficient grounds for criminal prosecution.
The TRC has already published its Final Report, although the work of its Amnesty
Committee is at present continuing . In the concluding chapter of the thesis, there is a brief
examination of what this particular case, and thesis, indicates about the TRC and its work. I
examine briefly, some criticisms of the TRC, and explore the outcome of the amnesty appeal by
the perpetrators who applied for amnesty with regards to the death of Steve Biko.
A final point of this chapter involves the definitions of a few terms which are used quite
extensively in the thesis. These definitions are quoted from the TRC FR (1998) . The first term,
"gross violations of human rights" refers to the "killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment,
and the attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or procurement to commit such
acts" (vol. 1, eh. 2, p. 29) . The term "perpetrator" is defined as "all persons found by the
Commission to have committed gross violations of human rights" (vol. 1, eh. 4, p. 59). Further, in
order to qualify for amnesty, it was necessary for the act/s for which the individual applied for
amnesty to be associated with a political objective. In defining the term "perpetrator", the TRC
FR (1998, vol. 1, eh. 4) acknowledges that this definition does not discriminate between the
number and kinds of acts committed, as well as the reasons or context of these acts . In the
context of this thesis the use of the word "perpetrator", in addition to the definition noted above,
refers to individuals who committed gross human rights violations, and formed part of a system,
such as the state police or security force during the apartheid regime. It is differentiated from
individuals who may commit violent acts against others in an individual capacity, where they are
not acting on behalf of a state or any other organization.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE BANALITY OF EVIL
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, there is a review of the literature on the "ordinariness" of perpetrators of
gross human rights violations. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first two sections,
falling under the heading "The banality of evil", developed out of the thesis that the "ordinariness"
of perpetrators hinges upon the relationship of the "ordinary man"* and the system within which
he works. The first part explores the "ordinariness" of perpetrators from an individualistic
perspective, and the second looks at the role that the system plays in molding the "ordinary man"
into a perpetrator of gross human rights violations.
It needs to be mentioned that the majority of the literature on the "ordinariness" of
perpetrators is that which arose out of studies and reports of the holocaust in Germany. There is a
wealth of information and research on the Nazi holocaust, especially when compared to other
similar events in history. For example, the genocide of the Armenians in Turkey, or that of the
Tutsis in Rwanda, have been documented and researched, but to a much lesser degree . The gross
human rights violations perpetrated by the apartheid state in South Africa, has been brought to the
fore especially by the TRC. However, the TRC is a relatively recent historical event, and reports
and commentaries on the psychology of perpetrators are only beginning to emerge. It may be
noted that much of the literature reviewed on the Nazi holocaust appeared decades after the
actual perpetration of the holocaust. The third section in this chapter explores the relevance and
comparability of the literature reviewed from the German holocaust to the South African
perspective.
2.2 THE BANALITY OF EVIL
Linking ordinariness to evil has its roots in the Nuremberg trials, where the Nuremberg defendants
put on trial, were subjected to psychiatric and psychological testing. As will be shown, the finding
that most of the Nuremberg defendants were "normal", was not really well received or highlighted
• Masculine pronouns will be used throughout the thesis in reference to perpetrators, as in the majority of cases, perpetrators
are men.
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by the media. It was only when Hannah Arendt reported on the trial of AdolfEichmann, a Nazi
war criminal, where she coined the phrase "the banality of evil" that there was much debate and
criticism regarding linking ordinariness to the perpetration of gross human rights violations.
Arendt reported on the trial for the newspaper "The New Yorker", and later compiled what she
observed into a book, sub-titled "A Report on the Banality ofEvil".
2.2.1 The Individual
The emphasis in this section will be to view perpetrators of gross human rights violations
as "multi-dimensional and rounded individuals" (TRC FR, 1998, vol. 5, eh. 7). There are, and
have been, numerous ways ofunderstanding these kinds of perpetrators (e.g. as intrinsically evil).
This is one way of conceptualizing them and draws on research from the Nazi holocaust and more
recent sources . This conceptualization sees them as "ordinary men", who, in the context of a
hierarchical system/bureaucracy are capable of committing horrendous acts .
AdolfEichmann was a Nazi SS Officer who was kidnapped in Argentina and brought to
trial in Jerusalem in 1960 for crimes against the Jewish people during the holocaust. For Arendt,
unlike most other commentators or journalists reporting on Eichmann's trial, it was important to
"[listen] to him as he appeared to her in the courtroom: as a person who was conveying the
meaning of his experiences to others by speaking about himself' (Bergen, 1998, p. xii,). She
speaks ofhim as a "man of flesh and blood with an individual history" (Arendt, 1994, p. 285).
Arendt found that the person she had come to listen to, was not a "monster" at all, but an
"ordinary man", who, under more favourable circumstances, might never have appeared before
any criminal court. Arendt understood Eichmann as an "ordinary man" whose capacity for evil
was brought about by the bureaucratic system that was the Nazi movement. She conceptualized
the evil acts that he perpetrated as hinging on the relationship between his "ordinariness" and his
being part of a hierarchical system.
Her ideas were not well received. Her book became the centre of controversy, the object
of an organized campaign, and she was treated with considerable scorn and calumny (Arendt,
1994; Milgram, 1974). She was accused of de-emphasizing the murder of the Jews by trying to




events in history, she was looking to formulate causes that could only amount to mitigation of the
guilt of the Nazis (Bergen, 1998, p. xi). Nonetheless, her unique conceptualization marked a
starting point in highlighting the linking of"ordinariness"t'banality" with evil, with specific
relation to crimes that are committed within the context of a bureaucratic system. (She found that
of all the commentators/journalists reporting on the Eichmann trial, only two other journalists
reached "astonishingly similar conclusions to [her] own" (Arendt, 1994, p. 281) . Over time
however, her hypothesis has gained more credibility. This is the focus of this chapter.
2.2.1.1 PsychiatriclPsychological Normality
One of the strongest arguments for the "ordinariness" of perpetrators, is that many or
most of them, were either found to fall within psychiatric/psychological norms of normality, or it
is inferred that they would fall within these norms. Research suggested that perpetrators were not
"abnormal", and a relatively small percentage showed signs of psychological pathology.
The book by Zimmler, Harrower, RitzIer and Archer (1995) explores the psychological
investigation of some of the Nazi war criminals. In the case of AdolfEichmann, he had been
portrayed as a depraved killer responsible for the deaths of millions. However, psychological tests
conducted on him, showed that the protocol did not fit. There was no sign of any
psychopathology, and the profile indicated quite the opposite. It reflected an ordinary and rather
untroubled person (Zimmler et al, 1995). Other psychological test data that is reviewed by these
authors is that of the Nazi criminals tried at Nuremberg. They were all assessed and the results
showed a similar pattern. There was little evidence of sadism or viciousness, or any psychological
abnormality. Upon reviewing these results, the authors question whether the rank-and-file officers
who undertook the actual killings (for those in the higher echelons never participated in the actual
killings), showed any signs of psychological abnormality. However, they found that "many
ordinary people became involved in atrocities who did not demonstrate any particular inclination
toward violence" (p. 117). On the whole, the results of both groups indicated these were not
disturbed, highly abnormal individuals (Zimmler et al, 1995) .
Early on in her book, Arendt (1994) states that half a dozen psychiatrists had certified
Eichmann as a "normal" man. According to Arendt, had he been a perverted or sadistic person, or
one obsessed with "the insatiable urge to kill" (1994, p. 26) as the prosecuting attorney attested at
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the time in one of the local newspapers, he would have belonged in an insane asylum. Similiarly,
Du Preez (1994) states that genocide and other forms of political violence cannot be explained in
terms ofpsychological abnormality because "it has never been necessary to empty the lunatic
asylums in order to recruit people for pogroms or genocides or holy wars" (p. 90).
Kren and Rappoport (1980) found that there were few SS (Schutzstafel, the security
echelon of the Nazi regime) men who fit the criteria for psychological abnormality, and that
rather, the majority would have easily passed a psychiatric test of normality. The authors also
highlight that this observation "fits the general trend of testimony by survivors indicating that in
most of the camps, there was usually one, or at most a few, SS men known for their intense
outbursts of sadistic cruelty" (1980, p. 70). The consensus was that most perpetrators were
"normal people". A similar point is put forward by Foster (1987), in his work on detention and
torture in the South African context. In exploring the psychology of torturers, Foster (1987)
states that it is a widely held hypothesis that torturers must be grossly disturbed personalities.
However, the evidence suggests that this is not the case: "the relative proportion of such
abnormal personalities is not likely to be very substantial" and evidence indicates that "torturers
are not particularly abnormal. They are far more likely to be quite ordinary people in an
extraordinary, abnormal situation" (Foster, 1987, p. 167).
In the TRC FR (1998 , vol. 5, ch. 7), the authors state that the bulk of international
literature on atrocities and perpetrators shows that the violence was not perpetrated by severely
abnormal people, and that testimonies submitted to the TRC also suggest that psychological
abnormality was not a primary cause of atrocities - "Instead, most commentators have
emphasized the ordinary, rather unexceptional character of perpetrators, typified in Hanna
Arendt's celebrated phrase, 'the banality of evil', or in Browning's term 'ordinary men'" (TRC
FR, 1998, vol. 5, eh. 7, p. 285) . Meredith (1999) looks at the killing record of the famed
apartheid assassin, Eugene de Kock. De Kock was involved in at least seventy killings between
1983 and 1993. Meredith (1999) states that contrary to what people assumed, tests that de Kock
underwent showed no signs of a psychopathic personality .
Further support for the "normality" of perpetrators comes from a study conducted by
Milgram that was published in 1974. In trying to come to terms with the evil acts perpetrated
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during the Nazi holocaust, he questioned how it was possible for people who were as civilized as
any people in the world to act so cruelly (Landau, 1998). He devised an experiment to investigate
the response of ordinary people to immoral orders. A subject came into his laboratory and, in the
context of participating in a learning experiment, was asked to give increasingly severe electric
shocks to another subject (who, unknown to the former, was a confederate and did not actually
receive the shocks). Milgram (1974) contended that the random choice of subjects meant that
most, if not all, part icipants would probably fall into a "normal" group in the psychiatric sense.
The first group that he studied were drawn from a Yale undergraduate sample, and a further
group from every stratum of the New Haven community in the United States. Also, when the
experiment was repeated in other parts of the world such as Italy, South Africa and Australia, the
results were the same (Milgram, 1974).
Before conducting the experiment, Milgram (1974) asked a number ofgroups of people,
including psychologists, psychiatrists, and lay people, how they thought people would behave in
this particular scenario. They predicted that "virtually all subjects will refuse to obey the
experimenter; only a pathological fringe, not exceeding one or two percent" would proceed to the
end of the shockboard (Milgram, 1974, p. 31) . The results however, completely contradicted this:
Despite the fact that many subjects experience stress, and protest to the experimenter, a substantial portion continue
to the last shock on the generator. .. [they] obeyed the experimenter no matter how vehement the pleading of the
person being shocked, no matter how painful the shocks seemed to be, and no matter how much the victim pleaded to
be let out (Milgram, 1974, p. 5).
One of the conclusions that Milgram (1974) came to was that inhumanity was a matter of
social relationships . Milgram (1974) proved his hypothesis that cruelty is not committed by cruel
individuals, but by ordinary men and women trying to acquit themselves of their ordinary duties
(Bauman, 1989).
Bauman (1989) quotes an experiment conducted by Zimbardo, Banks & Haney (1973)
which adds further weight to Milgram's study. Zimbardo et al (1973) also used so-called
"normal" individuals (these were carefully selected college age males who had been randomly
selected and carefully screened against any sign of abnormality). They were divided into two
groups, that of prisoners and prison guards. Both sides were given symbolic trappings of their
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position such as the right clothing and uniforms (Bauman, 1989). Impersonality was the rule and
petty regulations were encouragedto humiliate the prisoners. The group was thereafter left to
their own devices. The results far surpassed the experimenters' expectations. The "prison guards"
enforced severely humiliating and submissive behaviour onto the "prisoners". A cyclical pattern
developed, where the more submissive the prisoners became, the more this seemed to encourage
the guards to display and enforce their superiority:
The guards forced the prisoners to chant filthy songs, to defecate in buckets which they did not allow them to empty,
to clean toilets with bare hands ; the more they did it, they more they acted as if they were convinced of the non-
human nature of the prisoners, and the less they felt constrained in inventing and administering measures of an ever-
more appalling degree of inhumanity (Bauman , 1989, p. 167).
The "sudden transmogrification" (Bauman, 1989, p. 167) of"normal" young men into
such "monsters" proved truly horrifying. The experiment was initially planned for a fortnight, but
was stopped after one week due to the fear that the prisoners might suffer irreparable damage to
body and mind. Some observers who were baffled by the results, suggested that perhaps there
was, in most people, if not all ofus, a "little SS man waiting to come out"; yet another observer,
Arnitai Etzioni, suggested that the ' latent Eichmann' hidden in ordinary men" had been discovered
(Bauman, 1989, p:'167).
The literature reviewed suggests unequivocally that the majority of perpetrators would
easily have passed, or did pass, psychiatric tests of normality, and could not be considered
abnormal or pathological.
2.2.1.2 Normal societal values/norms
The literature on the "ordinariness" of perpetrators suggests that the average perpetrator
was "normal" insofar as he had a "normal"/healthy outlook towards his family and friends.
Further, he held desirable societal values and morals. For example, Arendt (1994) states that with
Eichmann, it was clearly not a case oflegal, let alone moral insanity. One psychiatrist who
interviewed and conducted psychiatric tests on Eichmann, claimed that Eichmann's whole
outlook, which included his attitude towards his wife and children, mother and father, brothers,
sisters and friends, was "not only normal, but most desirable" (Arendt, 1994, p. 25-6).
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Arendt (1994) states that Eichmann had always been a law-abiding citizen. She also brings
to light the paradox of"normality" in Eichmann's case when she argues that the prosecution and
the judges understood Eichmann's sometimes inconsistent stories as an indication that he was a
liar. They assumed that Eichmann, like all "normal people" must have been aware of the criminal
nature of his acts. Eichmann was normal, states Arendt, insofar as he was no exception within the
Third Reich, where only "exceptions" could be expected to react normally (1994, p. 26-7) . "The
trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were not
perverted or sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal" (Arendt, 1994,
p. 276) . As Bergen puts it, one gets the uneasy feeling "that to be loyal to some experience of the
real is to live perhaps in a world where, because everyone is mad, nobody is" (1998, p. 34).
:- ...
Further evidence ofEichmann's "normality" is provided by others who interacted with
him. Before dealing with the extermination of the Jews, Eichmann had been involved in the
expulsion of Jews from Germany . In order to achieve this he negotiated with various Jewish
groups, including emissaries from Palestine, the German Zionists and the Jewish Agency for
Palestine. The emissaries had come to enlist help for the illegal immigration of Jews into Palestine
and both the Gestapo and the SS were helpful. It was here that they negotiated with Eichrriann in
Vienna and their reports were that he was "polite" and "not the shouting type" (Arendt , 1994, p.
60-61). Further, they stated that he even provided farms and facilities for them so that they were
able to set up vocational training camps for prospective immigrants.
Eichmann had also organized a special train and Nazi escorts to escort Jews headed for
Zionist training farms in Yugoslavia, to see them safely across the border. At another time he
expelled a group of nuns from a convent to provide a training farm for young Jews. Arendt quotes
the historians the Kimches (1954) who stated that one of the most paradoxical aspects of the
entire Nazi regime is that the man who went down in history as one of the arch murderers of
Jewish people (i.e. Eichmann), started of as an active worker in the rescue of Jews from Europe.
Other sources of support for this hypothesis include Bauman's (1989) book "Modernity
and the Holocaust" where he looks at what sociology as a discipline can teach us about the
holocaust and vice versa . Bauman (1989) argues that the perpetrators of the holocaust could have
been any individuals in any society. With specific reference to Eichmann, Bauman (1989, p. 19)
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states that "it is common knowledge ... that initial attempts to interpret the holocaust as an
outrage committed by born criminals, sadists, .. .or otherwise morally defective individuals failed
to find any confirmation in the facts of the case", and that "their refutation by historical research is
today all but final". The holocaust perpetrators were in "no way evil, they behaved much like all
ofus ... [t]hey had wives they loved, children they cosseted, friends they helped and comforted in
case of distress" (Bauman, 1989, p. 151). It seems unthinkable says Bauman, that these same
people shot, gassed, or presided over the shooting and gassing of hundreds of thousands of
people including women and children. Bauman asks, "How could people like you and me do it"
(1989, p. 151)? He pinpoints the fears that we all have, by stating that what frightens us about the
holocaust is not that this could be done to us, but the idea that we could do it (1989, p. 151).
Other authors more recently have pointed to the "normality" of perpetrators of gross
human rights violations . Volume 5 chapter 7 in the TRC FR (1998) deals with "Causes, Motives
and Perspectives ofPerpetrators" . The authors quote the National Party submission to the TRC
dated the 21st of August 1996 which states that "the majority of those who served in the security
forces during the conflict were honorable, dedicated and professional. .. men and women" (TRC
FR, 1998, vol. 5, eh. 7, p. 281).
Desmond Tutu was the chairperson of the TRC in South Africa. In his book "No future
without forgiveness" (1999) he explores some of his experiences of his job as chair of the TRC.
Based on his experiences with the perpetrators that he encountered, he states that each and every
individual has the capacity for evil provided the right circumstances and influences. He adds that it
is impossible to predict whether if we were subjected to the same influences, we would not turn
out as the perpetrators did. He states later on in his book that "those guilty of those abuses were
quite ordinary folk ... they are to all intents and purposes normal people like you and me" (1999, p.
110).
Goldhagen (1996) argues sirniliarly that the Germans in the police battalions were "by
their prior institutional affiliation, their social background, and, with some minor differences, even
by their degree of ideological preparation, ordinary members of German society" (p. 277) .
Botwinick (1996) also states that it is inaccurate to conceive the perpetrators of the Nazi
holocaust as "savage animals outside the parameters of society", and that rather research has
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shown that "evil comes in as great a variety of packaging as does the rest of humanity" (p. 72).
This view is supported by a number of authors who suggest that perpetrators come from all walks
oflife, irrespective of class, profession, status or intellect (cf Bauman, 1989; Friedlander, 1995;
Hilberg, 1991; Milgram, 1974).
2.2.1.3 Ideological Inclinations
While some authors have showed that perpetrators did not hold fanatical beliefs, others
have indicated that perpetrators conceived their actions as those which were undertaken in the
pursuit of a higher ideal. In Eichmann's case, Arendt is clear that "there was no insane hatred of
Jews of fanatical anti-Semitism or indoctrination of any kind"iI994, p. 26). Rather, he stated
"private reasons" for not being a Jew hater. Eichmann's stepmother had Jewish relations, and
Eichmann helped his family when they needed him, as was the case of one such couple whom he
helped to emigrate to Switzerland . Although he had close friends who were anti-Semites, he
stated that he had no hatred for Jews, nor did he harbour any ill-feeling towards his victims.
According to Bauman (1989), contrary to what one may expect, ideologically over-
zealous individuals were actually barred/discharged from units that were close to the scene of
actual killings. The people who perpetrated the killings were not fanatics. Bauman states that "the
SS counted on organizational routine, not on individual zeal" (1989, p. 20). In addition, it is clear
that the nature of the Nazi movement precluded any special training or selection of personnel:
The German perpetrator was not a special kind of German, Anymember of the Order Police could be a guard at a
ghetto or on a train. Every lawyer in the Reich Security Main Office was presumed to be suitable for leadership in the
mobile killing units (Hilberg, 1983, in Bauman, 1989; p. 21).
Bauman is clear that what was needed was not fanatics but objective people who could
follow orders.
By contrast, Staub (1989), suggests that perpetrators frequently cite their intention as
being to "create a better world", and therefore "suffer" their actions in order to achieve this higher
good. The actions that they may be willing to overlook may include destroying the lives of others,
but the perpetrators justify this by seeing them as necessary to achieve the higher ideal. The
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Armenian genocide in Turkey was based on the idea that it served the noble cause ofwiping out
~/.'>-',. ~ -
the Armenians, who were seen as constituting a barrier to the Ottoman Empire's progress in
civilization for centuries (Staub, 1989). Staub (1989) also points to this factor in the Cambodian
genocide where perpetrators (some ofwhom were children) even killed their parents, because
they believed that this would serve the higher ideals of the group, although it is clear that other
factors also played a part in these actions. Staub (1989) also quotes from the autobiography of
Rudolph Hess, the commandant of Auschwitz, who wrote it while waiting to be hanged. He
stated that he believed killing millions of Jews was a service to his country (Staub, 1989).
Goldhagen (1996) states that the genocide in Germany would not have been possible had
it not been for the antisemitic beliefs about Jews. He states that it is this that is the reason why so
many "ordinary" Germans were willing to kill and brutalize Jews . He states that these ideas were
pervasive throughout Germany, and had been for decades, and induced the Germans to kill.
On the whole, the evidence suggests that perpetrators are ordinary in the sense that they
espouse nationalistic ideologies.
2.2.1.4 A case in point
Another source of information regarding the normality of perpetrators is illustrated in a
chapter of the book "A path to genocide: Essays on launching the final solution" by Christopher
Browning (1992). The chapter is entitled "One day in Jozefow: Initiation to mass murder" . It is
based entirely on the judicial records that resulted from two investigations ofReserve Police
Battalion 101 which operated during the holocaust, and was responsible for "ghetto-clearing" i.e.
killing of all Jews in a particular ghetto (in certain instances all the able-bodied males were
removed from the ghetto group and transported to labour camps, which left women and children,
as well as the sick and elderly men who were to be killed). Based on the judicial records of the
investigation, Browning (1992) constructs a narrative of "One day in Jozefow", with his aim
being, to understand or explain what happened when so-called "ordinary" men were first asked to
kill hundreds of people, mostly at point blank range.
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Browning (1992) examines various aspects of the Reserve Police Battalion 101. Although
he does not give the exact size of the battalion, he does states that in the judicial inquiry, no less
than 210 members of this battalion were interrogated (Browning, 1992). He looks at the makeup
of the battalion beginning with the commander, then the rank and file, and lastly the men that
made up the remainder of the battalion (i.e. the foot soldiers). He shows that the battalion was
made up of men from different socio-economic backgrounds, and their ages ranged from 27 to 53
years. Many were older, married, family men. There was a wide variety in terms of professions in
the group: included were skilled labourers, dock workers, seamen, machine operators, and
waiters . The number of independent artisans was small; there were about ten middle-class
professionals, including two druggists and one teacher.
A large number of the group that Browning studied had known political standards and
moral norms other than those of the Nazis. "Most came from Hamburg, which was one of the
least Nazified cities in Germany, and the majority came from a social class that in its political
nature had been anti-Nazi" (Browning, 1992). As Browning aptly illustrates : .
[t]hese men would not seem to have been a very promising group from which to recruit mass murderers of the
holocaust. Yet this unit was to be extraordinarily active both in clearing ghettos and in massacring Jews outright
during the blitzkrieg against Polish Jewry (1992, p. 173).
Browning then goes on to describe the first ghetto-clearing operation that this group
undertook, which occurred in the Polish town of Jozefow. What made this first experience of
theirs unique was that they were actually given a choice as to whether they wanted to back out of
the killing. The Jews were first rounded up in the market place - those too frail or sick to walk
there, as well as infants and anybody offering resistance or attempting to run away or hide were to
be shot on the spot (Browning, 1992). While most of the battalion were willing to shoot the
elderly and sick, they shied away from shooting infants for the most part, despite their orders. The
rest were taken to nearby woods and shot on the spot, usually at point blank range.
At different stages in the "extermination" process, the men were sometimes given the
option of not carrying out this task. Some did take up the offer, and were assigned other duties.
Some were scoffed at for shirking their duties. Others began intentionally shooting past their
victims, and were then excused and given other tasks to carry out. Browning (1992) discovered
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that for the most part, those men who did not partake in the executions were left alone, and not
included in further killings, and that the consequences of their non-participation in the killings was
not grave. However, the majority of the battalion followed their superiors' orders and massacred
1500 Jews in Jozefow that day.
In trying to understand why they did so, and why did not take the option of not being
involved in the killing, Browning (1992) states that theories of special selection, indoctrination
and ideological motivation do not satisfy the criteria here. These men were not carefully selected
for their "suitability" to mass murder. Also, they were no murderers whom Browning calls "desk
murderers", who simply give the orders for people to be killed and are far removed from the
actual killing scene. Rather, these men were confronted with the reality of their actions in the
starkest way (Browning, 1992). Browning found that most felt that they had had little choice:
Faced with the testimony of others, they did not contest that [the major) had made the offer but repeatedly claimed
that they had not heard that part of his speech or could not remember it. A few who had admitted that they had been
given the choice and yet failed to opt out were quite blunt. One said that he did not want to be considered a coward
by his comrades. Another - more aware of what truly required courage - said quite simply: "I was cowardly" .. . Many
were helpless to explain the situation in which they had found themselves in 1942 (Browning, 1992, p. 181).
Interestingly, of those who had opted not to participate in the killing, some reflected the
view that because they were not career policeman, and had jobs to fall back on at home, it was no
consequence to them if their jobs as policemen did not prosper.
2.2.2 The System
As has been stated already, the perpetrators that are the focus of this thesis are those who
operated within the context of a system, often a bureaucratic system. Having explored the
perpetrators from an individualistic point of view, it is necessary to examine the other half of the
equation, i.e., the role and mechanisms of the system in molding such perpetrators. The different
concepts under discussion here are not common to all perpetrators of gross human rights
violations. Different perpetrators may show inclinations towards some or most of those presented.
The issue ofthe role of the system in the perpetration ofgross human rights violations, is quite
significant. Authors have pointed out that had it not been for the system in which they worked,
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the perpetrators may have never committed such heinous acts, and that it was the system which
provided the context for the perpetration ofgross human rights violations.
2.2.2.1 Obedience & Duty
A significant component of systems which perpetrate violence, is the hierarchical division
oflabour. The individuals in the system have to follow the orders of their superior to maintain the
smooth functioning of the unit. This ensures the obedience of members, as if the individual is seen
as not carrying out his job, it could lead to his dismissal. It is not surprising therefore that
perpetrators have shown themselves to be obedient, devoted, sacrificing, and dutiful individuals.
In their eyes, actions are judged according to how they fulfill their job criteria, although this may
not necessarily be an explicit decision-making process. The issue of performing one's duty is very
often used as a justification by many perpetrators who are asked to justify their inhumane actions.
The previous section that dealt with the "normality" of perpetrators illustrated how so-
called "ordinary" people were able to commit the most heinous acts because they were ordered to
do so. Although there are many other issues at stake as to why this occurs, the shocking nature of
the simple act of obedience to orders of superiors, even, and especially when, these are contrary
to societal norms of not killing or harming others, comes through with stark reality (Milgram,
1974). The significance of this aspect is reflected in the fact that in those instances where a choice
was to be made in selecting individuals to participate in killings and such related acts, individuals
who were considered obedient and dutiful, were chosen over those who showed fanatical beliefs
(Arendt, 1994; Staub, 1989) .
The SS was the organization that was most responsible for the Nazi genocide. "The SS
men were the direct perpetrators, ... [and] were self-selected or selected by the authorities and
trained for obedience, violence and brutality" (Staub, 1989, p. 128). The over-riding criterion for
selection was obedience to duty. Those who showed fanatical or sadistic tendencies were weeded
out (Arendt, 1994). There was clearly a preference for those who would follow orders in a
disciplined and organized fashion, and discipline and loyalty were fostered and encouraged
(Hilberg, 1985). Bauman (1989, p. 90) states that "[t]horough, comprehensive, exhaustive murder
required the replacement of the mob with a bureaucracy, the replacement of shared rage with
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obedience to authority ... the requisite bureaucracy. .. would govern the actions of its members
not by arousing passions but by organizing routines". Staub (1989) expresses the view that the
tragedy of the holocaust is that loyalty and obedience were exalted over individual moral
responsibility.
Eichmann had, at a number of different stages, expressed his abhorrence for violence.
When he first heard of the Final Solution, he was shocked at the violent nature of it, yet he was
willing to put aside his own feelings, and be an obedient servant to his Fuhrer. Arendt quotes
Eichmann saying that his, and the obedience of others like him, was like the "obedience of
corpses" (p. 135). He even goes so far as to say that his obedience was "abused" by his superiors,
further illustrating the passive role that he saw himself in (Arendt, 1994, p. 175).
The experiments ofMilgram (1974) and Zimbardo et at (1973) illustrate how "ordinary"
people become obedient, even if there is limited authority. Milgram (1974) referred to it as
entering an "agentic mode", where the individual relinquishes individual responsibility and acts as
an agent of authority. He also states that the inhumane policies of the Nazi holocaust may have
originated in the mind of a single person, but could only have been carried out on a massive scale
if a very large number of people obeyed orders.
In the 'case in point', presented at the end of section one, which deals with Browning's
(1992) narrative account of"One day in Jozefow", one sees how the men ofPolice Battalion 101
obeyed their orders and killed 1500 Jews. This, even though they were "ordinary men", who had
probably never been confronted with killing before (most were civilians who had not entered the
army or the SS), and who were confronted in the most immediate and gruesome way, with the
actual brutality and horror of their actions. Most of the men followed the orders of their
superior/s, even though at different stages in the killing they had the opportunity and were given
the choice to be assigned to different duties. This is further supported by Mommsen (1991) who
states that, in relation to the pogroms that were carried out on the Jews, the Storm Troopers,
when criticized for their brutal actions, justified their behaviour with the need to obey orders.
Research on SS men found that they had strong authoritarian principles, more so than
regular German soldiers (Staub, 1989). Similiarly, when examining the Armenian genocide by the
23
Turks that occurred in 1916, Staub (1989) found that there was deep respect for authority, and
that the officers gained support because of the unquestioning military obedience of their troops.
Staub (1989) also likens the psychology of perpetrators to torturers in the context of political
warfare. Staub's (1989) view is that when torture is not part of the broad societal process,
obedience to authority becomes more important. He quotes the example of the military coup in
Argentina, where military personnel who engaged in torture did not need special training in
obedience. The military training itself, which stressed and valued obedience highly, was sufficient
to produce torturers.
According to Fein (1979) the norm of obedience to authority and doing one's duty
inexorably leads to following orders, unless there is a collective definition as the authority being
illegitimate. In the case of the German holocaust, the legitimacy of the government was accepted
by the majority of the population, and there were few voices of protest. This made it therefore
easy/easier to obey orders that superiors gave, even if they contradicted the moral values of
individual perpetrators. Fein (1979) further states that Milgram's (1974) experiment is an apt
illustration of how the norm of obedience leads individuals to inflict harm on others, when role
models defying the experimenter were lacking. Therefore the issue of obedience is tied to,
amongst other variables, that of a lack of oppositional or resistant voices .
The system which perpetrators show loyalty to, ensures this loyalty by promoting and
enforcing obedience. Milgram (1974) states that the "person who, with inner conviction, loathes
stealing, killing, and assault may find himself performing these acts with relative ease when
commanded by authority" (p. xi).
2.2.2.2 Free-floating responsibility
The bureaucratic nature of many systems that are involved in the perpetration of gross
human rights violations result in a "free-floating" responsibility. Bauman (1989) states that
bureaucratic systems, through their functional division of labour, substitute technical for moral
responsibility. The individuals in the system each have their tasks to accomplish, and the ultimate
goal becomes one of performing one's task well. Moral standards become irrelevant for the
success of the bureaucratic operation. The instinct ofworkmanship focuses on the performing
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well the job at hand. In the bureaucracy, this is achieved through a distancing from the ultimate
outcome of the operation, and morality then boils down to the commandment to be a good,
efficient and diligent worker (Bauman, 1989). It therefore becomes difficult to pin down who is
responsible for what in the bureaucratic system, and one can say that responsibility is free-floating
(Bauman, 1989).
Eichmann's case is an apt example here. Arendt (1994) discusses one of the important
debates at the trial, which centred around what Eichmann was actually responsible for. He had
never killed anyone during the entire period of his career - what he had done was transport people
to their deaths. Moreover, he had no choice regarding who was placed on the list of deportees or
who would be selected for death or labour camps. The former was the responsibility of the Jewish
councils who drew up the lists of the deportees, and the latter was the decision of the SS doctors
who received the deportees. Eichmann, therefore, had no authority over who would die and who
would live (Arendt, 1994). As she states, "The question was whether Eichmann had lied when he
said: 'I never killed a Jew, or for that matter, I never killed a non-Jew... I never gave an order to
kill a Jew, nor an order to kill a non-Jew'" (1994, p. 215). She sums up the issue quite well when
she states that the prosecution, unable to understand a mass murderer who had never killed, were
constantly trying to prove individual murder.
Staub (1989) points out that responsibility can be subverted through the assumption that
leaders assume the ultimate responsibility of acts. He states that Himmler told the SS that he and
the Fuhrer would assume all the responsibility for their actions. In Argentina, superior officers
signed release forms to relinquish the responsibility of the direct perpetrators of kidnappings.
These actions propagate and reinforce the idea that the individual perpetrator is not responsible
for his actions.
The agentic mode that Milgram (1974) described referred to the idea that it is not what
subjects do, but whom they are doing it for that counts. The experiments by Milgram (1974)
reveal the notion of shifting responsibility in its purest form (Bauman, 1989). In the agentic mode,
the individual relies on the definition of the situation that is provided by the authority figure. All
members of an organization become convinced that their individual actions are the responsibility
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of another, and responsibility becomes free-floating. Bauman concludes that "the organization as a
whole is an instrument to obliterate responsibility" (1989, p. 163).
2.2.2.3 Zeal in conducting duties
Bauman (1989) expresses the view that the use ofviolence is at its most effective when its
means are subjected to solely "instrumental-rational" criteria, which serves to remove or
dissociate it from moral evaluations. Perpetrators then become concerned with how well they
conduct their duties, where doing their duties well is rated highly. By and large, people who work
in systems where there is a functional division of labour, want to excel at their particular task; they
want to do their work well. Contrary to what one may expect, therefore, some perpetrators were
not only dedicated and loyal, but they performed their often horrific actions with pride and with
the utmost of zeal. In the TRC FR (1998, vol. 1, eh. 7) the authors note that violent actions were
undertaken with pride . They quote a former senior security force member Major Craig Williamson
who stated that the successes of certain forces in conducting their operations produced praise,
pride and relief from pressure. The authors state:
Even a self-confessed torturer such as Captain Jeffrey Benzien admitted to pride in his work when cross-examined by
Mr. Tony Yengeni (ANC) whom he had tortured ... saying, in respect of a particular torture method, that "1 applied it
well and with caution" (p. 263).
People such as Eugene de Kock, were praised, promoted, and received awards for their
violent activities. These amongst other factors often resulted in pride in being able to do one's job
well.
In Eichmann's case, his own initial reaction of horror to the Final Solution, was partly
dispelled when he saw how other members of the Civil Service reacted to being told of it. Instead
of reacting with shock and horror, they expressed opinions and offered suggestions and concrete
propositions (Arendt, 1994)! Further, he saw that these same men "were vying and fighting with
each other for the honour of taking the lead in these ... matters" (Arendt, 1994, p. 114). This is
yet another reflection of how perpetrators were eager and willing to get to the task at hand.
Arendt (1994) further states that "the most potent factor in the soothing of his own conscience
was the simple fact that he could see no one, no one at all, who was actually against the Final
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Solution" (p. 116), and further that "his conscience was further set at rest when he saw the zeal
and eagerness with which "good society" everywhere reacted as he did" (p. 126).
Eichmann himself is described by Arendt (1994) as one who did his work with a zeal far
beyond the call of duty. At another stage in her book Arendt (1994) states that the different
organs of the SS were "in fierce competition with one another . .. [with] their ambition ... to kill as
many Jews as possible . .. [t]his competitive spirit . . . inspired in each man a great loyalty to his
own outfit" (p. 71). A Nazi at Nuremberg, who "worked" at Belzec reported his superior as
saying that "we should bury bronze tablets saying that it was we, we who had the courage to
carry out this gigantic task" (Staub, 1989, p. 84). Whereas one might imagine that perpetrators
abhorred the tasks and duties that they felt they were obligated to undertake, perhaps the numbing
of their emotions and the distancing that occurred between perpetrator and victim, enabled them
to experience pride in relation to their often horrendous acts.
2.2.2.4 Loss of individuality
Another of the features of perpetrators which may be seen as a result of their obedience
and striving to fulfill their duties, is a loss of individualism. Bergen (1998) points out that
twentieth century mass movements involved their members to the complete loss of individual
claims and ambition, and were successful in permanently extinguishing individual identity.
Although one can agree with his claim of the extinguishing of the individual identity, it is
questionable whether the people in the system lose their sense of ambition. This may be realized
perhaps, in different terms, where the drive to succeed at one's job, and to be promoted and
exonerated, becomes the real driving force behind the individual's actions.
Bergen (1998) further shows that being an SS officer was not merely ajob but was
something that became part of the officer's identity for life. His understanding of the concept of
identity and individualism, centres on the fact, that in Eichmann's case, being an SS officer with
all that that entailed behaviourally and psychologically - had been his identity, and it had
succeeded in extinguishing the identity that made him unique as a person, and his ability to think
for himself. Eichmann's identity was anchored to his role as an SS officer. Bergen (1998) points
out that when he spoke on the stand in Jerusalem, it was as if no time at all had passed between
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the fifteen years that he had transported millions of Jews to their deaths. He further states that
what Arendt (1994) finds so disturbing about the Nazi regime is that by destroying "the political",
it serves to erode individuality, and the very idea of the individual.
Kuper (1981) argues that when mass killings take place in the context of a system, there is
usually a dehumanization of the "other". This serves to make the atrocities that are committed, as
those against a collective, and is thereby a denial of individuality. The victims are cast in an
instrumental role, and are denied human individuality and significance. Perpetrators and victims
both, respond to each other in terms of their group identities, and in doing so, their individual
identities become insignificant. Perpetrators become instruments in the system who are able to
simply conduct their duties , without becoming emotionally involved. Bergen (1998) observes that
total conformism destroys the very capacity for experience.
In the TRC FR (1998 , vol. 5, eh. 7), the authors examine the issue of obedience, and how
this results in a loss of individualism. They quote from the testimony of a Mr. John Deegan who
describes the strict conditions under which he was trained, and how he, and those he was trained
with, learnt that if anyone member committed an offense, the whole platoon was punished. The
result of this as he puts it, was that "individualism was out" (TRC FR, 1998, vol 5, ch. 7, p. 287).
What he refers to here is the loss of a sense of his being a unique individual with his own
responsibilities and experiences. Rather he became part of a collective, which served to erode his
individual identity.
2.2.2.5 Language as a mechanism of the system
That language is simply a transparent, value-free medium of communication, has long been
refuted. Language and ideology are inextricably linked - language does things . It constructs
people as objects, as superior or inferior; language enables people to dehumanize others. It allows
people to create an-other group as different, as the "other"; it enables the promotion of an "us"
and "them" value system, which consequentially perpetuates, supports and justifies inhumane and
cruel actions against a group of people.
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Dehumanizing victims is done by removing them from one's "moral universe", so that the
usual rules of morality do not apply to them. Staub (1989) quotes Duster (1971) who states that
"[t]he most general condition for guilt-free massacre is the denial of humanity to the victim. You
call the victim names like 'gooks', 'dinks', 'niggers', 'pinkos' and 'japs'" (p. 61) . In the case of
the Cambodian genocide for example, there were deep class divisions. The aristocracy showed its
devaluation for the ' commoners' by referring to them with words such as 'dog', 'detestable' and
' stinking brute' (Bauman, 1989, p. 196).
Language enables people to devalue others, and the more that the "other" is devalued, the
easier it is to inflict harm upon them. Staub (1989) points out that in those countries where anti-
Semitism was strong, the Nazis were able to kill more Jews, whereas in those areas where the
Jews were treated less as objects of social differentiation, the government was less likely to hand
over the Jewish population to the Nazis. Further, the Jews were made to be the scapegoats of
whatever was wrong in Germany at the time. Therefore the ideal of the Nazi government was to
"purify the nation" (Bergen, 1998, p. 18), in other words, to rid the nation of dirt, impurity and
germ; all of which Jewishness came to embody (Hilberg, 1985). The change in rhetoric from that
of the ' Jewish question ' to the conjunction of 'Jews and lice' that was coined, provided yet
another step to the ultimate goal of 'disinfecting' Germany of the Jews through the use of
'disinfecting chemicals' (Bauman, 1989; Hilberg, 1985). Kuper (1981) refers to this when he says
that hostile stereotypes are projected onto the victims. This was why Hitler, and the National
Socialism that he espoused, was not seen as the source of terror, but as the salvation from terror
(Bergen, 1998). "Purifying the nation" necessitated killing all the Jews .
As Bauman points out "To eradicate a 'race' it is essential to kill the children" (1989,
p.90). This is only possible if the 'race' or group as such are removed from the perpetrators' (and
the bystanders') moral universe, and language and rhetoric are integral to this process . Bauman, in
illustrating the extent to which the dehumanizing process was successful in the Holocaust, quotes
Peter Marsh who stated that "[s]tanding by the fence of Auschwitz, looking at these emaciated
skeletons with shrunken skin and hollowed eyes - who could believe that these were really
people" (1989, p. 102)? This point is reinforced by Goldhagen (1996) who quotes a member ofa
police battalion who, in responding to the question of how he and his comrades conceived the
Jews, stated that "[t]he category of human being was not applicable" (p. 280).
29
A similar ideology developed in South Africa. Racism as an ideological doctrine,
"provided the central grounds for the systematic exclusion, segregation and denigration of the
black majority" (TRC FR, vol. 5, eh. 7, p. 282). For the ruling whites, blacks were produced as
the "other", and essentially different, and this was used to justify policies which promulgated
separate development. Blacks were believed to be slower and intellectually inferior, and therefore
only suited to certain kinds ofjobs. It therefore became easier to mistreat black people because
they were considered inferior or subhuman. In addition, other seemingly less significant words
used to describe blacks in South Africa, such as 'the masses', only serve to convey a sense of the
inhumanity, insignificance and expendability of individual people. One such impact of this
ideology on the actions of perpetrators is pointed out by the authors of the TRC FR (1998, vol. 5,
eh. 7) who state that , in torture situations black people were more brutalized than white people.
The use of euphemistic language is another way in which it becomes easier to perpetrate
gross human rights violations . This applies to perpetrators of killings, and more so to "desk
murderers" (Browning, 1992) for whom it becomes easier to deny the reality of their actions if
these are couched in non-violent or scientific terms. Therefore they were able to destroy thousand
of people by sitting at their desks, where they composed memoranda, drew up blueprints and
talked on the telephone (Browning, 1992). Arendt, for example, states that the SS used language
which was meant to reflect "objectivity" - "talking about concentration camps in terms of
"administration" and about extermination camps in terms of "economy"", was typical of the SS
mentality (1994, p. 69). At the trial, Eichmann's lawyer created a stir when he referred to killing
as a "medical matter" (Arendt , 1994, p. 69). In Argentina, the use of euphemistic language mean
that a torture chamber was called an "intensive therapy room" ; those to be killed were referred to
as "transferees" or said to have "gotten [their] ticket" (Staub, 1989, p. 227) . Pauw (1991) points
to the euphemistic language used by the security establishment of the apartheid regime. He states
that words such as "eliminate" and "annihilate" indicated that an individual was to be killed.
Bauman (1989) refers to this as "dehumanizing the objects ofbureaucratic
operation.. .[and] express[ing] these objects in purely technical, ethically neutral terms" (p. 102).
He states that when humans are reduced to quality-free measurements, they lose their
distinctiveness, and this language safeguards its referents from ethical evaluation - "In fact this,
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language is unfit for normative-moral statements" (1989, p. 103).
2.2.2.6 Distancing the victim and perpetrator through technology
When each person in the system is responsible for one part of the total action, it is difficult
to see how that particular action is responsible for gross injustices. During the early days of the
holocaust, killings were done usually at point-blank range. Even though attempts were made to
increase the distance between the killer and the victim, those in power realized that the starkness
of the act made it almost impossible to overlook the connection between the pulling of the trigger,
and the death of the victim. These methods were therefore considered "primitive and inefficient"
(Bauman, 1989, p. 26). Other killing methods were therefore sought which would not only
facilitate the killings on a more rapid basis, but would "optically [and thereby psychologically]
separate the killers from their victims" (Bauman, 1989, p. 26) . Himmler, when confronted with
the complaints and terrible psychological damage to his men of killing women and children,
ordered the scientists and doctors to find killing methods that would be "more humane" for his
executioners. (Browning, 1992, 1998; Hilberg, 1985). The search successfully came up with
mobile gas vans, and gas chambers, where the killer was reduced to a "sanitation officer" whose
job was to off-load a sack of "disinfecting chemicals" through the roof of a building, essentially a
gas chamber, which he was not asked to visit (Bauman, p. 26) . Bauman refers to these actions and
their resultant effects as "moral sleeping pills" which are a skilled utilization of the bureaucracy
and the technology, that produce a "natural invisibility of casual connections in a complex system
of interaction" (1989, p. 26) .
Bauman (1989) further highlights the latter issue, when he examines the study conducted
by Milgram (1974). He states that the most striking among Milgram's findings is the inverse ratio
of readiness to cruelty and proximity to the victim. He points out that it is difficult to harm a
person that we touch. It is very easy to be cruel to a person we neither see or hear. Milgram
(1974) concluded that in modern society others stand between each of us and the final destructive
act to which we contribute (Bauman, 1989). It is easier to cause suffering when there is an
rational organization of action. Milgram (1974) also illustrated that when the person being
shocked in the experiments was made separate from the subject, the subject and the experimenter
were joined closer together, and the victim became isolated, and, objectified. Therefore, he
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concluded that the effect of physical and psychical distance is further enhanced by the collective
nature 'of damaging action,
2.2.2.7 Steps along a continuum of destruction
Milgram's (1974) experiment also helps to illustrate the difficulties involved in removing
one's self from a situation such as that which he concocted for his experiment Bauman (1989)
discuses this concept which he terms the "sucking power" (p. 157) of the system, by saying that
once an individual is part of a system, the initial stages or actions may seem harmless. Sequential
actions, however, make the individual bound to their actions, and opting out becomes increasingly
difficult The key to the whole process, is that initial steps require little moral torments and are
easily taken, but once taken, they have already bound the individual to their actions. Staub (1989)
points out that even seemingly small actions such as using a required greeting such as "Reil
Hitler", can make further destructive actions possible. This is especially significant in light of the
fact that there is no clearly delineated line of morality, Rather, the sequential actions that suck the
person into the system, bring with them a gradual "continuum of destruction". Milgram (1974)
stated that sequential actions are among the main binding factors to the situation. In the case of
Milgram's (1974) experiment, by the time subjects are ready to start the experiment, they have
already bound themselves in such a way to make refusal to comply difficult - the have already
agreed to participate and taken money. The first few shocks are minor ones, and relatively
harmless. Each shock is progressively more powerful, but only slightly more so than the last one.
Therefore, the subject is not really aware of when s/he crossed a line. Bauman quotes Sabini and
Silver who state that "It is easy to see that there must be a line, it is not so easy to see where that
line ought to be" (1989, p. 158). Bauman states that the trap is that when one decides to remove
one 's self from the experiment, the difficulty is that by not administering the next shock, which is
only slightly greater than the previous one, there is some realization that the previous one was
also not acceptable. Re states that the trap is a paradox, "one cannot get clean without blackening
oneself' (1989, p. 158).
Browning (1992) refers to this same issue when he states that the commitment of the
perpetrators of the holocaust meant that each action flowed from the last; each came naturally
from the previous conception of the Jewish question, such that there was no "sudden crisis of
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conscience, no traumatic agonizing, no consciousness of crossing an abyss" (p. 143). He states
that for the Nazi bureaucrats, there were incremental steps to mass murder, not a quantum leap,
because they had already committed themselves to a political movement, to a career, and to a
task. Their entanglement was such that they were too implicated by their prior actions to extricate
themselves.
2.2.3 Conclusion
The main focus of this chapter has been an examination of the "banality of evil", where it
was explored from an individual and system perspective. The perpetration of gross human rights
violations is conceived of as being a product of the individual "ordinary" perpetrator, and the
system which employs various mechanisms in order to, amongst other things, bind the individual
into a continuum of destruction, and shift, or make free-floating, the responsibility for acts
committed. In the next, and last section of this chapter, there is an exploration of the South
African historical context which surrounded the committing of gross human rights violations by
those employed by the apartheid state. This is compared to the literature explored already in this
section, in order to assess the comparability of the literature reviewed to the South African
situation.
2.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION
The majority of the literature reviewed in this chapter is that which has emerged out of the
Nazi holocaust. Amongst others, there have been references to the Rwandan genocide and the
Turkish genocide of the Armenians, as well as the South African situation . In this section
however, because the literature is skewed towards the Nazi holocaust, I will engage in a
comparison between the political situation in Germany prior to, and during World War Il, and the
political situation in South Africa prior to the downfall of apartheid. The comparison of the
literature is undertaken to assess the applicability of research on German perpetrators to that of
perpetrators in the South African context. As this is a massive undertaking, this section provides
merely a skeletal picture . While it is easier to place a time frame on the German situation that is
relevant here, to do the same for the South African context is more difficult, because although
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apartheid was brought into legislation in 1948, other legislation and racist practices in South
Africa began a long time ago .
2.3.1 Similiarities in political context
Bloom (1998) compares the situation in Nazi Germany to that of apartheid South Africa.
The following paragraph sums up his comparison. He states that South Africa and Germany
shared:
collective attitudes, a self-justifying ideology and similar racist policies and practices. The 1935 racist Nuremberg
laws and the legal framework of apartheid have much in common. For example, both deprived groups of basic civil and human
rights and effectively excluded them from citizenship, reducing them to mere subjects ; both prohibited friendships, marriage or
sexual relat ionships between groups; both reserved education and training , jobs and professions to specific groups; and both
determined where groups could live and restricted their rights to meet or worship together. And just as the Nazis were obsessed
with the problem of who was a Jew, so were apartheid officials obsessed with the multiple problems of which 'group'
individuals of uncertain 'racial' identity should belong to. Not surprisingly from the early 1930's (and even in the late 1990's)
many ' white' political, social and religious leaders were actively pro-Nazi . .. Apart from the Nazi attempts to annihilate
groups, there is little to distinguish the two racist practices and ideologies (p. 189).
Asmal et al (1996) argue similiarly that there is a direct parallel between the apartheid
policies and those imposed upon the German Jews by the Nazis between 1933 and the early stages
of the war. The Nazi policies deprived the Jews of civil and legal protections and rights, and
excluded them from virtually all spheres of social, economic and cultural life (Botwinick, 1996).
Later, broad attempts were made to physically remove them from Germany. In 1935 the
Nuremberg laws deprived the Jews of citizenship, and converted their status to that of"subjects".
Asmal et al (1996) state that they were excluded from public office, the civil service, journalism,
radio, and other spheres of public life. There was a formal ban in 1938 that excluded the Jews
from law, medicine and business in general. The result of such legislation and practices meant that
in 1936 half the German Jews were without livelihood. Comparably, the unemployment levels of
the predominantly Aryan population during the period 1933-37, fell from six million to one
million.
According to Asmal et al (1996) there was a similar disparity in the employment levels
between black and white South Africans, and other areas of social life. Legislation in South Africa
prevented 'blacks' from, amongst other things, choosing where they wished to live, intermarrying
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those of other 'races', entering particular areas of public and social life, and receiving an
education from particular institutions (Asmal et aI, 1996). However, where the discrimination of
the Jews in Nazi Germany was more-or-less restricted to the 1930's and 1940's, racism in South
Africa was introduced in 1652 (TRC FR, 1998, vol. 1, ch. 1). According to the TRC FR (1998,
vol. 1, eh, 1) racism was part of South African society since 1652, but it was only in the twentieth
century that racist practices were intensified, refined, and legislated upon.
Legislation in this sense involved amongst numerous others, the implementation of
detention without trial, which had a central place in the system of state security (Foster, 1987). It
was this legislation which permitted the detention without trial of Steve Biko, and it was in
detention that Biko died. Such legislation came in the face of organized black resistance to
apartheid, and was amongst numerous measures of state repression in the face of militant black
resistance (Foster, 1987).
2.3.2 Perpetrators & the system to which they belonged
In order to maintain apartheid, the government used a variety of 'legal' and illegal
methods. The 'legal' methods included legislation, such as that mentioned above. In addition, the
state employed a security force which was responsible for maintaining 'law and order' in the
country. Those who were employed by the security forces were paid employees who volunteered
to be a part of the security establishment. This differed slightly from the situation in Nazi
Germany. Although there were many SS men who joined the SS voluntarily, there were certain
forces which were recruited, such as the police battalions referred to in the work ofBrowning
(1992, 1998) and Goldhagen (1996) .
The bureaucratic system that was in place in Germany was much more visible and clearly
defined, with a clearly defined leader in Hitler. The South African situation was different because
there was no one Fuhrer: there were different heads of state during the apartheid regime.
Although evidence suggested that the security system and government in South Africa were
clearly bureaucratic, submissions to the TRC seemed to belie this structuring. Specifically, leaders
of the country such as President F W de Klerk, and his predecessor, President P W Botha, in
responding to the large number ofgross human rights violations committed by the security police,
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denied having ever ordered such activities, and denied having any knowledge of such activities.
Evidence heard at the TRC however, contradicts their statements. Security force members
repeatedly indicated that there was a chain of command, and that superiors not only knew of the
activities that were undertaken by these officers, but that these were done on the orders of
superiors. Other differences between Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa include the way
that the oppressed were dealt with. In Nazi Germany, the goal was to make Germany Judenjrein.
In order to achieve this goal, measures were first employed to evacuate the Jews from Germany.
Later, extermination of the Jews was seen as the Final Solution in order to achieve this goal. In
South Africa, black labour was an essential component of the commercial life of the country, and
questions of how to deal with the blacks, were therefore influenced by this factor. Homelands
were therefore established, and 'group areas' in order to segregate society along racial lines, and
to keep the best areas for whites. However, although a 'genocide' did not occur in South Africa,
many who opposed the apartheid state, ofwhich the majority were black, were killed. Those
killed included children, as in the 1976 June 16th massacre in Soweto, as well as thousands of
other men and women.
In Nazi Germany, the Jews initially co-operated with the Germans in the evacuation of
their people (Arendt, 1994). However, when extermination began, the Jews could offer little
resistance, because they had not been expecting such measures, and had little time to mobilize
themselves . In South Africa, resistance to apartheid took various forms. From 1960 onwards, the
increased tightening of security, as reflected in the increased use of legislation amongst other
methods, is only one indication of the strength of the mounting resistance to apartheid. This
resistance intensified in the 1980's even with the increasing legislation. Covert and illegal methods
were employed by the apartheid state because it could not deal with the force of black resistance
(Liebenberg, 1994).
Based on these comparisons between the contexts of the two countries, it is possible to
argue that the perpetrators who upheld the apartheid state, worked in relatively similar
circumstances to those of the German perpetrators of the holocaust. There is sufficient similiarity
in circumstances and context to warrant a comparison, and to allow for the applicability of the
research on the Nazi perpetrators to their counterparts in apartheid South Africa.
36
CHAPTER THREE: THEORY &
DECONSTRUCTING THE "ORDINARY MAN"
As stated in chapter one, the process of reviewing the literature on the "ordinary man"
was done while simultaneously exploring and investigating the theoretical foundations of a social
constructionist approach. In reviewing the literature, and with the transcripts in hand, I had a
choice regarding how the thesis would progress. Would the thesis serve as a link between the
literature and the local context with particular local nuances, or would it strike a critical stance on
the way that "ordinariness" was being constructed in both the literature and the transcript? I chose
the latter option, specifically in order to elucidate the political effects or implications of this way
of constructing perpetrators in South Africa (discussed under section 3.2.1) .
3.1 THEORY
But why this approach? What is social constructionism and what makes it valuable,
engaging and useful in the context of this thesis? In the section on theory, I explore the tenets of
social constructionism, as well as the social constructionist account of the self, or how the self is
produced in language.
3.1.1. Introduction to social constructionism
The focus of psychology has traditionally been the study of the individual. Traditional or
mainstream psychology holds that human behaviour may be explained or understood by examining
the intrapsychic domain of the individual, because it is thought that this domain is the key to
understanding the individual (Rose, 1996; Shotter, 1993b). A good example of this is the study of
attitudes. Attitudes, one of the oldest theoretical concepts in psychology, are conceptualized as
views that people hold about different phenomena, which reside in the mind, and can be studied
independently through the use of attitudinal tests/scales (Billig, 1996; Potter and Wetherell,
1987) . Further, there is the inference that by studying a particular attitude, one can predict or
explain behaviour related to that attitude (Potter, 1996).
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This may not seem strange, in light of the fact that in today's times we see ourselves as
individuals, with dreams, desires, feelings, and emotions (Gergen, 1999). The idea of being
individuals connotes notions of rights, freedoms and choices (Rose, 1996). How else can we see
ourselves, but as individuals? The notion of the 'individual' is only one way in which the self may
be conceptualized, is historically and culturally specific, and serves particular ideological purposes
(Rose, 1993; Sampson, 1989). It is significant to explore this notion for the thesis, as the
"ordinary man" construction rests on the notion of the "individual".
3.1.2 Overview of social constructionism
Over the last fifteen years or so, a new wave of approaches has emerged, with a radically
different emphasis from that of traditional psychology. Included among these approaches are
'discourse analysis', 'critical psychology', 'deconstruction' and 'post-structuralism' . The common
ground to all these approaches is what is referred to as 'social constructionism', which according
to Burr (1995), is a theoretical orientation that underpins these new orientations, and which offers
critical alternatives to mainstream conceptualizations. The approach is not specific to psychology,
and has informed a variety of other disciplines such as literary criticism, anthropology, sociology,
and political and cultural studies. There are different types of approaches that reside under the
umbrella of social constructionism, and there are differences between them as well as similiarities.
Burr (1995, p. 2) states that "what links them together is a kind of 'family resemblance'''. Social
constructionism stems from the notion that our worlds are constructed, and that the process of
their manufacture (or construction), often remain obscure (potter and Wetherell, 1987). It
therefore devotes itself to the ways in which what is taken to be objective knowledge is generated,
transformed and suppressed, by exploring and exposing the rhetorical and literary devices through
which meaning is achieved and rendered compelling (Gergen, 1997). It may be useful then to
explore a few key theoretical features of a social constructionist approach, which are adapted
from Gergen (1985):
3.1.2.1 A critical view of knowledge
This critical stance challenges the view that conventional knowledge is based upon an
objective, unbiased observation ofthe world (potter, 1996; Shotter, 1993a), and therefore stands
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in opposition to positivism and empiricism in the social sciences (Durrheim, 1997; McKenna and
Kessler, 1985). Social constructionism asks us to suspend the belief that commonly accepted
words and categories receive their warrant through observation, and invites one to question the
'objective' basis of conventional knowledge (Gergen, 1985; Potter, 1996). It proposes that there
is no single, knowable reality (Gergen, 1997). The words and categories that are used to refer to
things are arbitrary categories and not necessarily real divisions, but those that we, as humans,
have imposed (Shweder and Miller, 1985). For example during the holocaust in Germany, the
persecution of the Jews was conceived as the only solution to the Jewish problem, and a
necessary means to keep Germany pure from Jewish contamination (Goldhagen, 1997).
Subsequent to the end of World War II, the actions of the Germans were conceived as a crime
against humanity. The actions of the Germans were placed in an entirely different and new light,
which highlights the view that knowledge and definitions of reality evolve and change over time.
Social constructionist investigations have illustrated that the 'objective' criteria for identifying
behaviours, events or entities, are either highly circumscribed by culture, history or social context,
or altogether nonexistent (Gergen, 1985).
3.1.2.2 Knowledge is historically and culturally situated, and is sustained by social
processes
Following from the first point, one can see that different ways of understanding the world
are products of historically situated interchanges among people (Gergen, 1985). The above
example regarding the way in which the Final Solution of the Jews was conceived of by the
Germans, and how this shifted after World War 11, reflects the historical and cultural basis of
knowledge. This applies to discourses that permeate many other aspects of our lives. Ultimately,
human activity is often understood in ways that sustain particular social, moral, political and
economic institutions for particular ideological purposes (Gergen, 1985) .
The social constructionist stance is that knowledge of the world does not come from the
natural world but is constructed between people. "It is through the daily interactions between
people in the course of social life that our versions of knowledge become fabricated" (Burr, 1995,
p. 4). It is for this reason that language is of such importance. In social interaction, shared
versions of knowledge are constructed. The notion of"truth" therefore, is not the product of a
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rigorous and objective observation of the world, but represents the interactions in which people
are constantly engaged with each other, where certain versions of reality gain more credibility
than others, and are taken as the "truth" (Rose, 1993). It is dependent upon the vicissitudes of
social processes such as communication, negotiation, conflict and rhetoric (Gergen, 1985). Potter
(1996) argues that there is no neat separation between the tropes of fiction and fact, and that the
resources for building plausible fictions are the same resources that are used to build credible
'facts' . He further states that this raises interesting questions about the relationship between these
literary representations and practices in realms such as the courtroom, where the focus is the
uncovering of the "truth" .
Similiarly, research has shown that when entities (such as the self and emotion) are put
under social constructionist investigation, they cease to function as facts, and the way that they
are realigned according to changing social circumstances, shows their embeddedness in history
and culture (Gergen, 1997). Shotter (1993b, p. 20) states that there is a shift from exploring what
goes on in the heads of individuals, to an interest in the (largely social) nature of their
surroundings, to a questioning of the 'construction' of our experiences of the world "which find
their 'warrants' in locally constituted situations and circumstances" ,
3.1.2.3 The construction of knowledge impacts upon the possibilities of social action
Our knowledge of the world impacts upon the actions that we can or cannot take . Gergen
(1985) states that the ways in which the world is constructed is of critical significance in social
life, as it is integrally connected to a host of other activities that people engage in. For example, in
apartheid South Africa, people were classified according to certain racial categories. This
classification impacted upon the rights of the people of the country and the actionsthat they were
allowed to take . So-called 'white' people were accorded the rights of citizens, and allowed to
vote. So-called 'non-white' or 'black' people, were not allowed to vote, and their inferior status
was further expressed through their having to carry the 'dompas' or face criminal prosecution.
The classification system, in this case apartheid, which was based on racist constructions of
difference and inferiority, had real consequences in the lives of the people of the country . In this
way, constructions of the world allow and permit certain actions, and exclude others.
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3.1.2.4 Further differences between social constructionism and mainstream
psychology
It is apparent that social constructionism differs quite radically from traditional or
mainstream psychology in a number of respects. It is anti-essentialist. According to this view, the
social world is a product of social processes, and this means that there are no 'essences' inside
people that make them what they are. This is in contrast to psychoanalysis for example, which is
based on a pre-given universal content of biological instincts of the individual (Billig, 1999).
Social constructionism is also anti-realist and maintains that all forms of knowledge are
historically and culturally relative (Edwards and Potter, 1992). There is therefore no single "truth"
that can be discovered (Durrheim, 1997). As Burr (1995) points out, the search for "truth" has
been at the foundation of social science from the start, and social constructionism therefore
heralds a radically different model of what it means to do social science. According to the social
constructionist view, the theories ofmainstream psychology are also culturally and historically
specific and cannot be taken as once-and-for-all descriptions of human nature.
One of the most important differences between social constructionism and traditional
psychology is the way that language is conceptualized. Language in most psychological
approaches is considered a value-free medium of communication, and is taken for granted as a
referential-representational system or code of meaningful signs (Potter, 1996; Shotter, 1993a;
Wetherell and Potter, 1988). Gergen and Semin (1990) state that cognitive paradigms, which
dominate psychology at present, hold that the role of language represents a secondary or
derivative process, in that it conveys knowledge but does not constitute knowledge itself One of
the central arguments of constructionist metatheory is that language is not mimetic, in that it fails
to function as a transparent, independent map or picture of the world (Burman, 1991; Gergen,
1997). Language is a pre-condition for thought, and this contrasts to mainstream psychological
approaches which maintain that thought precedes language (Billig, 1996). The studying of
language and everyday interactions is emphasized, because when people talk, the world gets
constructed. Language has a constructive and performative role (Gergen, 1997; Wetherell and
Potter, 1988). This shift in the way that language is conceptualized, and therefore how social
interaction is seen, diverts the focus of understanding behaviour from the intrapsychic to the social
domain. The social realm, where the social world is constructed, is therefore the focus .
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3.1.3 Merits of doing social constructionist research
A key focus of social constructionism is on discourse and discourse analysis (which is the
analytic method used in this thesis) . According to Parker (1992, p. 5) a discourse can be defined
as "a system of statements which constructs an object" . Parker further states that discourse
research "strikes a critical distance from language" (1992, p. 3). This is because discourse not
only describes the social world, but categorizes it, and serves to bring different phenomena into
sight (parker, 1992). Discourses are found in textual material, i.e. "we find discourses at work in
texts", where a text refers to "delimited tissues of meaning reproduced in any form that can be
given an interpretive gloss" (Parker 1992, p. 6). Examples of text therefore include any aspect of
the world that has been given meaning, such as speech, the written word, which includes books
and newspaper articles , and visual images such as advertisements, art and architecture.
Discourse analysis has as its aim, the deconstruction of discourses, which is achieved
through analyzing textual material. According to Burr (1995) , deconstruction refers to attempts
to take apart texts to see how they are constructed in ways which present particular images of
people and their actions. While there are different strands of deconstruction, the process usually
involves an examination of the text in particular ways. One method of deconstruction is to reveal
the 'hidden' or repressed contradictions in a text, and to illustrate how a text draws the reader in
to accepting the assumptions that lie therein. Another form invites the researcher to analyze the
linguistic devices that make accounts justifiable (e.g. Billig, 1990). Yet another form which Burr
(1995) terms the' analysis of discourses', involves analyzing textual material in order to examine
prevailing discourses, e.g., of"ordinariness", and to bring to the fore the identity and power
implications that lie therein. This latter type of discourse analysis, which I adopt in this thesis, is in
line with Parker's (1992) view that discourses produce and reproduce power relations, and have
ideological effects .
Discourse analysis, and social constructionism, are often political activities due to their
emphasis on how power and ideology are played out in discourse. There is an emphasis on
deconstructing discourses which sanction oppression, and an examination of how particular
discourses sustain particular narratives in order to justify the past and the present (Parker, 1992).
These oppressive discourses serve the interests of the powerful, and silence others . For example,
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Stygall (1994) examines a court case where an American logging company sought a restraining
order to prevent a group ofHaida Indians from interfering with their logging operation, on a
particular island that was the ancestral home of the tribe. When appearing in court, the Haida
Indians represented themselves even though there were attempts to convince them otherwise.
Stygall (1994) notes that for the Indians, translating their claims into legal language would make
them unrecognizable as Haida practice. As it happened, they used their own methods of conflict
resolution to present their case, which included amongst other things, donning particular forms of
tribal dress, explanations of their totems, and using oral poetry and song. This stemmed from their
belief in resolving land disputes through negotiation, participation and consent, rather than
adjudication (Stygall, 1994). However, Stygall (1994) states that their language was not relevant
in the context of the courtroom, and this example serves as an illustration of the way in which
legal discourse sustains its power by silencing any voice that does not adhere to its specific
demands . The power of the legal discourse and legal institutions is maintained and supported
through rendering invalid or inadmissible any conflicting or contrasting practice.
Gergen (1997) points out that various constructionist scholars have demonstrated the
ways in which existing psychological accounts (and the practices which they sustain) lend
themselves to different forms of social control, whether these be governmental control, destroying
democratic foundations, or sustaining the patriarchal order. In this vein, de la Rey (1997) argues
that historically, psychology maintained and supported the apartheid system of oppression in
South Africa. During the apartheid era, the criteria for evaluating research conducted by the
Human Sciences Research Council was based on whether the findings supported apartheid politics
(de la Rey, 1997). Gergen (1997) argues that a psychology that merely contributes to the status
quo has little to offer, and becomes an 'elfin voice' in a mighty chorus. Rather, constructionist
scholarship is keen to participate in a profession that augments culture's resources to expand and
enrich psychology's potential in order to play a more vital role in society.
Whereas Gergen (1997) refers to oppressive psychological practices, Rose (1996) argues
that the profession of psychology, by fostering and legitimizing particular definitions of individuals
and society, produces particular kinds of subjects. The productive power of psychological
knowledge (in producing self-governing subjects, for example) is intrinsically linked to the broad
issue ofgovernance in liberal societies, and has particular moral and political consequences (Rose,
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1996). Rose (1996) proposes therefore that we need to investigate the ways in which psychology,
is infused into particular practices and institutions in society, which limits the ways in which the
individual can act and experience himself The merits ofadopting a social constructionist
approach, are that it allows for and is suited to such kinds of inquiry.
One of social constructionism's strengths is its reflexivity. Reflexivity has multiple
meanings in constructionist writing, and the reference here is to the more widely used meaning.
According to Potter and Wetherell (1987), it refers to the idea that the critical stance that social
constructionism proposes with regards to realism, it also proposes with regards to itself, i.e. social
constructionism itself is not exempt from deconstruction and critique. Potter and Wetherell (1987,
p. 182) state that one should acknowledge that "one's own language is constructing a version of
the world" . This means that there is more honesty in recognizing that one's own work is not
immune from the social psychological processes being studied (Burman, 1991; Potter and
Wetherell, 1987). Ultimately, reflexivity has to do with aiding accountability, and highlighting
questions of power relations (Burman, 1991).
One way in which this is achieved, and this is encouraged in social constructionist work, is
by making explicit one's own social, political and moral standpoint which serves to ground the
research, instead of claiming neutrality. Because there are multiple realities that exist in the world,
the researcher does not have the responsibility of depicting an objective reality. Rather, s/he is
encouraged to display an awareness of her/his own view, and acknowledge the role that it plays in
the way in which the research is conducted and reported. For as Potter and Wetherell (1987, p.
182) state, "talk has the property of being both about actions, and at the same time part a/those
things" .
3.1.4 A critical look at social constructionism
Criticisms leveled at the social constructionist approach fall into two main categories. The
first has to do with the issue of relativism, and the second, primarily with that of reflexivity.
According to Burr (1995), the basic theoretical foundations upon which the approach rests
are relativism and the constructed nature of reality. In undermining "truth" claims, and asserting
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that there are only competing discourses, all discourses, or "readings" of a particular text, are
rendered equally valid (Burman, 1990, 1991). Therefore the relativism of the approach makes the
notion of asserting that a particular group is oppressed, particularly difficult (Burman, 1990). A
researcher cannot claim to reveal a "truth" that lies within the text, and must acknowledge that
hislher research findings are open to other, equally valid readings (Burr, 1995). According to
Parker and Burman (1993), the problem of the status of the researcher's interpretation of a text,
has not been resolved .
Similiarly, Abrams and Hogg (1990) argue that Parker's (1992) list of features for
identifying discourses, contains an implicit assumption that discourse analysts are qualified to
identify and help marginalized groups. This leaves the decision regarding which groups need to be
given "voice", or empowered, upon the discourse analyst. While Burr (1995) argues that most of
those to whom social constructionism appeals to, are those that hold broadly left-wing or liberal
views, there seems to be no reason why social constructionism could not equally serve right-wing
interests .
The role of the speaker in the writings of some social constructionists is undermined. The
focus on the way in which pieces of text are seen as of interest only because they hold "clues" to
the discourses that are operating through them, neglects the active role of the speaker in
constructing his/her world . Abrams and Hogg (1990) also argue that Parker's (1992) stating that
"discourses are realized in texts" ignores the interpretive role of the researcher. Further, the
identification of discourses may easily become little more than the labeling of everyday 'common-
sense' categories of events as discourses (Burr, 1995)~ This is problematic because each existing
object/entity, can therefore spawn an associated discourse, and the result would be a discovery of
discourse for every common-sense category that is used.
Reflexivity also refers to the equal status of the accounts of the researcher and the
participants in any discourse analytic study (Burr, 1995). Discourse analysts need to find a way to
build into their research, opportunities for participants to comment on their accounts and those of
the researcher. Sherrard (1991) states that discourse analysts do not often meet this criterion in
their research, and Parker and Burman (1993) argue that even attempts to include the participants
more fully in the analysis does not escape the problem ofthe power relations between the
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researcher and the participants. Further, Sherrard (1991) points out that often researchers do not
take into sufficient consideration their own participation in, for example, interviews, and how they
are shaped by this participation. "They fail to examine explicitly their role in the production of the
discourse they are analyzing" (Burr, 1995, p. 181). Burman (1991) argues that the "reflexivity"
that is deemed significant in the research process, while adding to the strengths of the research,
may also be problematic. When, for example, the researcher acknowledges his stance/subjective
position, it may then render the research merely a "subjective" account. Burman (1991, p. 332)
states that "rather than problematizing the ideological power of truth claims, the relativism this
ushers in works to blunt the critical edge of critiques of the function of psychology".
Regarding the political slant'of the framework, Burman (1991) argues that undertaking
social constructionist research should not blind us to other methods that may be suitable for a
given set of problems . She states that certain situations demand that instead of"mull[ing] over the
discourse", it may be better to enter into the actual dispute (Burman, 1991, p. 337). It may be
argued that during the apartheid regime, it was not necessary to use discourse analysis to confirm
or elucidate that apartheid was criminal and highly oppressive. Rather, other kinds of more pro-
active measures needed to be employed in order to fight the oppressive regime.
A final point regards Burr's (1995) criticism that researchers often do not provide
sufficient detail regarding the description of the processes that were followed in conducting the
research and compiling the report. More information on how the analysis was performed, such as
how the material was coded or what criteria were used to identify bits of speech/text as similar or
different, can only add to the "flavour" of the repertoires or discourses analyzed, and offer
practical help to those who wish to attempt such studies for the first time. Burman (1991) concurs
with this argument and states that the theoretical framework elaborates an analysis which resists
generalized description and easy "how-to-do-it" rules, and makes it less accessible to those who
may be introduced to it for the first time.
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3.1.5 Social constructionism and selfbood
My goal in this section is to explore the notion of the constructed self The discussion
outlines the way that the self is conceptualized, analyzed and investigated in constructionist
psychology, and therefore frames the way in which it is dealt with in the analysis.
3.1.5.1 The constructed nature of the'self'
In today's times our talk contains numerous images that represent the individual as a
single, unified, separate and solitary entity that is captured by the idea of the person as a monad
(Burkitt, 1991). One only has to go back a couple of centuries, or to explore other cultures, to see
that people have not, and do not, necessarily conceive of themselves as "individuals" or "selves" .
The construction of the self (in the West) as we know it today, may be traced back to the
seventeenth century (Gergen, 1999; Gergen and Semin, 1990; Shotter, 1993a) . Slugoski and
Ginsberg (1989) argue that the use of the word ' identity' in reference to personality and
individuality, emerged then as well. Prior to this period, the self had been conceptualized in terms
of a 'soul' or a 'human spirit'. But what does this say about the self? Firstly, it is an indication that
common ways of speaking about individuals (or ' selves' ), do not reflect a universal or ' true'
knowledge about the individual, and have instead evolved over time with shifting historical and
political circumstances. The way that the self is constructed in today's times, represents only one
way in which individuals are, and have been, conceived. As with the nature of the constructed
world we live in, the discourses of the self or selfhood, are constructed and located in a particular
space and time (Danziger, 1990).
According to Gergen (1989) , the seeds of doubt germinate over the 'real' nature of the
notion of' self, when one steps out of one's own cultural milieu and confronts the myriad of
other ways that people of different cultures conceive of themselves. In line with this argument,
Potter and Wetherell (1987) draw upon the work of Harre (1983) and Smith (1981) in order to
describe the concept of personhood for the Maori . The Maoris believe that people are each
invested with a particular kind of power call 'mana', which is given to the person by the gods in
accordance with his/her birth circumstances and family status. The mana enables the person to be
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effective in all spheres oflife and can be enhanced or diminished by the person's day-to-day
conduct. People's social standing, their successes and failures, are therefore dependent more upon
external forces than their own motivation. Potter and Wetherell (1987) argue that people who live
in such a culture experience themselves differently, and that individuals do no represent
themselves as the centre and origin of their actions, which is in direct contrast to the western
concept of self.
It may be useful to use the traditional psychological view of the self to further illustrate the
constructed nature of the self. Burr (1995) examines some of the principles upon which traditional
views of the self are based. She states that it incorporates the notion of individual differences and
stability over time, as well as a coherent and consistent self. The self is also linked to behaviour -
there is thought to be a link between the individual's personality and their behaviour. One of the
ways in which Burr (1995) challenges this notion is by stating that the words that we use to
describe ourselves, do not have a constant meaning over time. For example, words such as
'normal' and 'abnormal' , which may be used to describe the self, are definitions that have seen
considerable shifts over time. Therefore, the concept of mental illness becomes not a
predetermined category or illness, but something that is socially constructed according to the
historical and cultural space that one occupies (Durrheim, 1997). Similiarly, one would be hard
pressed to come up with a definition of"ordinariness", without reference to the social context in
which behaviour occurs. The concept of "ordinariness" does not represent a fixed or universal
concept, but it constructed out of the available discourses in any culture, which relate to notions
of morality, and acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.
3.1.5.2 The self is constructed in social interaction
Following from the first point, social constructionism proposes that the self is constructed
in dialogue - it is in social interaction that the self is produced. As Burr (1995) states, in
attempting to understand the person we are, we can see that we are the products of social
encounters and relationships. Instead of conceiving the self, or identity, as something which exists
within an individual, the self is seen as that which is produced between people . This is illustrated
by Burr (1995) through the use of the following example: she argues that when examining
different words that are used to define the self (such as evil or hostile), these words cease to have
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meaning once they are removed from the social context within which they occur. They gain
legitimacy in the interaction between people - "once the person is removed from their relations
with others, the words become meaningless" (Burr, 1995, p. 27). Words about the self essentially
refer to behaviour towards others.
According to Shotter (1993a) the notion of the socially embedded selfis a derivative of
the social constructionist view that language has constructive and performative functions . It is
therefore through speech and dialogue that our identities are constructed. Sampson (1993) states
that language and communication are cultural practices which constitute our realities, and this
includes realities considered social, as well as those we consider as psychological, such as identity,
motivation and thinking. These various realities that locate the self (such as the political and
cultural), are constituted in talk. Potter and Wetherell (1987) argue that the very experience of
being a person and the kind of mental life that one can experience, including how one experiences
sensory information, depends upon the particular representations of selfhood and the ways for
accounting for ourselves that are available to us in our culture. Our subjective experience of
selfhood is laid down by the beliefs about being a person that are explicit in our language (Gergen,
1989; Harre, 1983) . Therefore, social constructionist scholarship which seeks to study discourses
of the' self, will look to the study of language and social interaction as its focus.
3.1.5.3 Multiple selves
Burr (1995) argues that contrary to the traditional psychological view of a unitary self,
social constructionism proposes that perhaps we each have a multiplicity of selves, which may not
necessarily be consistent with each other. Our identities are made up of a subtle weaving of many
different threads. Different identities may either ' sit well' together or may be in contradiction to
one another. The following quote illustrates this view - Bauman (1989, p. 151) states that the
holocaust perpetrators were "in no way evil. .. they had wives they loved, children they
cosseted ... " . In this example, there is a contradiction between the different 'selves' of the
perpetrators. On the one hand they perpetrated major atrocities, and on the other, they were
loving family men. Bauman's (1989) quote shows him attempting to reconcile these two 'selves'
or 'identities' of the perpetrators, while acknowledging that they are at variance with one another.
49
Our selves are therefore consisted out of multiple discourses. Class, gender, age and
ethnic origin impinge upon the kind of discourses that each individual can draw upon, and impose
restrictions upon the kind of person that we can claim to be. Different cultures allow/permit the
use of different discourses for different groups of people. Burr (1995) points out that even though
individuals may play an active part in fashioning their identities, this does not mean that all people
have equal access to discourse. Our identities are fashioned out of the discourses that are
culturally available to us (Sampson, 1993).
Harre and van Langenhove (1999) conceived the concept of 'positioning' to refer to this
process of negotiating the self discursively. According to these authors positioning does not
connote a static concept, where people occupy pre-ordained slots like coats over their selves.
Positioning refers to a dynamic entity where subjects are simultaneously produced by discourse
and manipulators of it. Harre and van Langenhove (1999) state that while each human is the seat
of one person, they have a multitude of personas (or 'selves') . Further, being positioned in a
particular way brings with it particular rights, obligations and duties . The dynamic nature of
'positioning' also means that the positions that are offered or imposed upon people, are accepted ,
claimed or resisted by them.
3.1.5.4 The role of power and ideology in shaping the self/identity
(language and identity are sites of struggle)
According to the post-structuralist view, words, phrases, sentences and other textual
material change over time, context and according to the different people that use them. The
meaning of terms and other words, are contestable, and language becomes a site of struggle. Rose
(1996) states that there are battles over truth, where truth is not only the outcome of
construction, but of contestation. Language is a site of variability, disagreement and potential
conflict, where power relations are played out (Sampson, 1993). Rose (1993) also argues that the
'economic machine' of the state which is propelled in the name of national and individual
prosperity seeks to regulate experience in ways that are constituted of as ' non-political' . The very
construct of self, according to Rose (1993), is a mechanism of social control, and the diverse
ways in which the state polices the delicate line between private and public life and regulates
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conduct is made obscure. Ultimately however, the technological apparatuses of the state work to
produce particular types of subjects in order to achieve political ends (Rose, 1992).
Among the reasons why it is important to deconstruct the notion of the "individual" and to
examine the institutions that support and promote it, is because the implications of this discourse
are far-reaching and need challenging. Rose (1996) states that one could look at the history of
psychology as embodying attempts to master people in order to better manipulate them.
Psychology became an instrument of a process of domination at the service of powerful economic
interests (Rose, 1996). For example, authors have shown how notions of individuality impact
upon the way in which people are conceptualized, and where the locus of their problems is
situated. This serves to ignore the role of power and ideology. Caplan and Nelson (1973)
reviewed psychology's understanding of black Americans. They found that over 80 percent of
studies on black Americans, attributed their problems to something about themselves rather than
their circumstances. This means that the individual is given full responsibility to correct hislher
situation, and underlying structures that thwart the opportunities of particular groups are
reproduced through these practices . Feminists have argued similiarly that by placing the burden of
responsibility on the individual to effect change in her life, there is a lack of acknowledgement of
the social forces that contribute to the oppression ofwomen.
Kitzinger (1989) explores the ways that lesbian identities have developed over time, and
this illustrates the ways in which language and identity are sites of struggle. She states that lesbian
identities emerged around the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Up until the 1970's,
lesbianism was constructed as pathology, and attempts to depathologize it and to construct it
differently were dismissed or rendered faulty by a more prestigious social scientific interpretation.
Lesbians' experience of themselves were structured in this way, and it was not until the mid
1970's that alternative discourse developed within the liberal humanistic perspective which
offered alternative texts of identity for lesbians. Kitzinger (1989, p. 94) states that "identities are
not primarily the private property of the individual, but are social constructions, suppressed and
promoted in accordance with the political interests of the dominant social order". Although
Kitzinger (1989) argues that the oppressed are actively encouraged to construct identities that
reaffirm the basic validity of the dominant moral order, this does not help to understand the ways
in which identities change even when the political circumstances remain unchanged. In this respect
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the Black Consciousness (BC) slogan "Black is beautiful" made prominent in the 1970's, and
which arose from dissatisfactions with the ways in which 'black' people were conceptualized
provides a good example. Although BC succeeded in fashioning a different identity for black
people, it did not evolve in a context where there was a shift in the local moral order.
This criticism can also be leveled at Sampson (1993) who explores the field of 'identity
politics' . Sampson (1993) states that certain groups of people have voiced their discontent with
the ways in which they have been defined and categorized, according to dominant social groups.
He states that one particularly problematic strategy employed by these dominant groups has been
the 'add-on' strategy . In research, for example, this would mean simply 'adding-on' to the
traditional study ofwhite Anglo-American culture (Sampson, 1993). This continues to serve the
interests of the dominant groups rather than being genuinely transformative. Sampson (1993)
states that it is necessary for marginalized or oppressed groups to be able to have their own
'voice' in fashioning their identities. Although he recognizes that this is a difficult task, he does
not indicate how this can be done .
Identities are open to change, and they do shift and change according to changing times,
places and circumstances. Identity, like language, becomes a site of struggle (Harre, 1989).
According to Harre and van Langenhove (1999), the courtroom situation is an excellent example
of the way in which the conceptualization of an individual is contested. Different parties attempt
to position the defendant in particular ways and to achieve particular purposes. Ultimately
however, it is the judge, acting in authority in the courtroom, who decides on the way in which
the defendant is positioned, or identified, as either a criminal or an innocent person (cf Billig,
1996). The positions that we take up also bring with them a particular set of self-narratives that
we take on as our own. This involves an emotional commitment to the different identities that we
see ourselves as belonging to . Some identities (or positions) are easy to shrug off, and some
cannot be changed (such as being a criminal on a life-sentence).
3.1.5.5 Conclusion
Social constructionism offers a critical view of language and knowledge which stems from
the notion that the world that we inhabit is constructed in various ways, and constructions of the
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world are taken as representing the facts about the world . All forms of knowledge are located in
particular historical, political and social contexts, including knowledge about the self
Conceptualizing the self as socially constructed, serves to shift the traditional psychological
emphasis from the intrapsychic domain, to the social domain where social life plays out.
Language is a site of struggle, where meaning is contested, and different accounts vie for
their version to be accepted as the truth. Identity is also a site of struggle. Our identities are made
up ofa number of different subject positions that we occupy in social interaction, and are
constructed discursively, through language. Over time identities shift and change, and different
groups of people are constructed differently. Research into the construction of self, therefore has
as its focus, language and everyday conversation where the self is produced discursively. Various
ways of constructing the self can then be examined in order to see what effects and functions
these have in the different contexts that they are used. The "ordinary man" discourse is one way in
which perpetrators are conceived. The next section of this chapter sees the deconstruction of
discourses of the "ordinary man", as elucidated in the literature, in order to assess the functions
and effects thereof
3.2 DECONSTRUCTING THE "ORDINARY MAN"
As the literature has illustrated, conceiving of perpetrators as "ordinary men" has gained
much legitimacy over time. Research has shown that most perpetrators are "normal" individuals,
who show little sign of psychopathology. One might imagine that reconciling the notion of
"ordinariness" with that of the perpetration of gross human rights violations is not an easy task .
Yet, this is exactly what authors and researchers who have promoted this conceptualization have
achieved. This section looks at how they have achieved this seemingly difficult task.
3.2.1 My political standpoint
A study of this nature would not be complete without exploring the issue of my political
standpoint. In this section I explore this, as well as my reasons for wanting to deconstruct the
"ordinary man" discourse.
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Working with this thesis has been exciting and challenging. As an individual with strong
political convictions regarding the wrongfulness of apartheid, and the deep divisions that it
created in South Africa amongst its people, I engaged with the subject matter, precisely because it
hooked some very personal cords. In reading the transcript, I was confronted with the ways in
which perpetrators who had been responsible for heinous acts, were portraying themselves as
"ordinary". The concept of the "ordinary man" is one that serves to divorce the perpetrator from
his actions, and renders notions of individual responsibility and accountability problematic. It
serves to promote the unquestioned following of orders, rather than the upholding of individual
moral values. It decriminalizes perpetrators and their actions, and normalizes them. The "ordinary
man" concept does not assist in seeking to ensure that oppression such as that which occurred
during apartheid, is not repeated, because it maintains that those that were responsible for
enforcing apartheid were "normal people, like you and me". Further, the TRC as an institution
provides the conditions of possibility for this to occur. I will argue that deconstructing the
"ordinary man" is significant for a number of reasons, especially in the context of the new South
Africa, The implicit message from the TRC, regarding perpetrators, is that they are not criminals
who deserve to be incarcerated. Rather, should perpetrators "come clean" about the gross human
rights violations that they committed, they will be absolved of responsibility and granted amnesty.
They would then be fit to be reintegrated into society because their conscience has been cleared
through "confessing" their sins.
My feelings regarding the worth and effectiveness of the TRC are mixed. I am unsure of
whether the odds were stacked against them, in their quest to 'heal the nation', or whether they
provided the context for 'normalizing' the horrors of the past. I am also aware that democracy
was born out of a negotiated settlement, and perhaps a truth commission was one of the few
possible alternatives to deal with the past. However, all this aside, my argument is not that the
TRC is wrong, but that it treads on dangerous ground. It proposes that the past be put to rest
through the uncovering of the 'truth' . While it attempts to 'heal the nation' , this is a goal that is
far beyond its reach or its scope. The issue of those who ensured the survival and continuance of
the apartheid regime, is not adequately addressed. Also, if perpetrators are constructed as
"ordinary", this, by implication, renders'ordinary' people who benefited from apartheid, also as
not responsible for a regime that they put into power, and from which they benefited and continue
to benefit to this day. The TRC, in putting forward the rhetoric of reconciliation and forgiveness,
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has not, and does not, deal with this issue. How does one reconcile the poor and the rich? How
does one reconcile millions of South Africans, for whose daily conditions have remained relatively
unchanged, with the change in political dispensation? One could argue that I am laying too much
blame at the hands of the TRC, and that the government of the day is not doing enough to change
the lives of 'ordinary' South Africans. In my view, it will take many, many years, in order to set
the balance more evenly, for the oppression of black people has been prevalent for too long to
expect that changes will occur overnight. The TRC is an institution which effectively allows for
those who benefited from the past, to continue to do so, because the real issue of redressing the
balance of apartheid's wrongs is not adequately dealt with.
The "ordinary man" discourse therefore enables an artificial bridging of the gap between
the deep divisions that were created as a result of apartheid. I will argue that the reintegration of
perpetrators into society does the new South Africa disservice. Those that upheld the oppressive
regime, are absorbed into South African society, without really accounting for their actions, and
the injustices of the past remain unresolved . The "ordinary man" discourse needs to be
deconstructed to highlight the ways in which oppression continues to manifest in different ways,
in the new South Africa.
The issue of the political implications of the "ordinary man" discourse is again dealt with
in the concluding chapter of the thesis.
* * *
It should be noted that the literature review contains work from a wide variety of authors .
They do not all construct "ordinariness" in exactly the same way, yet there are clearly similiarities
between them. Most however, have asserted the "ordinariness" of perpetrators, and in
constructing the violent acts committed by the perpetrators, they look towards the system within
which perpetrators operated for the answers, to why and how such acts occurred. The




This chapter will show how the "ordinary man" is constructed and/or supported, and gains
legitimacy. Discourses gain legitimacy and credibility through their association with other already
established or credible discourses. These latter discourses will be examined, as will the devices
that authors use to make this discourse credible or believable. Further, I will argue that one of the
reasons that the discourse of the "ordinary man" gains legitimacy is due to the fact that
perpetrators ofgross violations of human rights who commit their actions within the context of a
government or bureaucracy, are constructed differently from so-called ordinary perpetrators of
violent crime, who may be seen as sadistic or psychopathic. The former type of perpetrator is
constructed as not fitting this conventional image or role. Notions of crime and criminal activities
are made incompatible with the discourse of perpetrators who commit atrocities in the context of
a system.
3.2.2 Scientific discourse
Under this section , it is argued that discourses of science play a key role in constructing
"ordinariness". There are two parts to this section . The first examines the construction of
accounts of"ordinariness", and how, through emphasizing the use of scientific principles, they
claim legitimacy and authority. The second examines how scientific discourse lends credibility to
claims of psychiatry and psychology, and their view of the "normality" of perpetrators.
3.2.2.1 The voice of the author
When constructing an account on the "ordinariness" of perpetrators, the authors
mentioned in chapter two have emphasized the scientific nature of their accounts, especially when
compared to the contrasting opinions of lay-people. This dichotomy is presented as a result of a
couple offactors. The horrific and grossly violent nature of the acts committed by the
perpetrators, it is assumed/interpreted, elicits strong emotions by survivors/victims of atrocities as
well as other members of society . The opinions of lay people are constructed as irrational and
based on conjecture which come in the way of an "objective" view of the perpetrators. In
comparison, the authors/researchers presented represent scientific views, based on hard scientific
facts, and "objective" and learned interpretations of the psychology ofperpetrators.
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Most authors, in asserting the "normality" of perpetrators, begin by stating that the
assumption is that these perpetrators are abnormal or pathological. Implicit in the term
"assumption"» is that this is probably the view of the lay-person, whose view needs correction -
perpetrators are not abnormal. In order to explain why this assumption is incorrect, a binary
opposition is created to separate the educated/scientific author from the lay-person, where the
former is clearly constructed as being in a more informed position.
In the case of Arendt (1994), although her claim ofusing scientific principles may not be
as strong as other authors mentioned, she renders her account more worthy than those of a lay-
person . Arendt (1994) positions herself in a particular way right at the start ofher book:
I covered the Eiclunann tria l at Jerusalem in 1961 for The New Yorker, where this account, slightly abbreviated, was
originally published in February and March, 1963 (Note to the Reader) .
She is positioning herself in this sentence, as a journalist. The use of specific details such
as the dates mentioned lend the account credibility because they are based on 'factual'
information. Further, Arendt's statement that she covered the Eichmann trial during the year
1961, where she does not restrict the time frame to a few months, indicates that she covered the
trial for the entire year. Arendt (1994) is firstly, stating explicitly that she reported on the
Eichmann trial in a journalistic capacity. This lends her credibility because it is a journalist's duty
to 'uncover' the truth, and further to ensure that they remain impartial observers and
commentators on it. Arendt' s credibility is further enhanced through her statement regarding the
time frame during which she reported on the trial. She was present for a sufficiently lengthy
period, to warrant 'expert' knowledge regarding what transpired. She states that at the start of the
trial, the 'audience' consisted "chiefly of newspapermen and magazine writers who had flocked to
Jerusalem from the four corners of the earth" (p. 6). The use of the word "flocked" has reference
to sheep, who simply follow their leader, and are incapable of making informed decisions.
However, "[t]he journalists remained faithful for not much more than two weeks" (p. 8). In these
extracts, Arendt (1994) distances herself here from other journalists, who are given scant
credibility in light of their perseverance in staying at- the trial. She is indicating that her own
position, was to endure the length of the trial, in order to comment on it after having heard the
'full story' .
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Other ways in which Arendt (1994) renders her account credible, is the style that she
adopts (which may be considered a journalistic style). She uses formal language, and quotes
verbatim when possible. She mentions "evidence" that was put at the trial, and concretizes this
with her own historical research. These are among some of the devices that she uses, in addition
to those mentioned above, to indicate that hers was a scientific undertaking. She followed
scientific principles, and her results (or commentary) are therefore based on a careful observation
of the facts .
Whilst other authors quoted in chapter two, are not from the journalistic fraternity, most
come from professions of psychology, psychiatry, or are researchers. The notion of"scientific
principles" is therefore not alien to them. For example, Friedlander (1995) is a professor of
history, and uses terms such as "detailed investigations" (p. xi) and "massive documentary record"
(p. xi) in his work. Other authors such as Browning (1992, 1998) also use similiar terminology to
render their accounts as based on factual evidence, and as the product of rigorous scientific
principles. Browning (1998 , p. xviii) states that the basis of his research was the "judicial
interrogations of . .. 125 men conducted in the 1960' s" of the Reserve Police Battalion 101. He
states that the indictment contained "extensive verbatim quotations" (p. xvi) and supports his
claims by using terms such as "this document demonstrates " (p. 36) and "the document makes
clear" (p. 36) . His is also a historical account which claims credibility through its reliance on first-
hand sources , and through a 'factual' rendition of events. His reconstruction of events is often in
direct quotes of the words of those who were there, or he uses their testimonies or documentation
as a source of much of his reconstruction.
Foster (1987, p. 167) states that:
a widely held hypothesis argues that torturers must be grossly disturbed personalities. If there were substantial
evidence to support such a notion, we may perhaps have greater reason to be optimistic about the rapid demise of
torture, ...Available evidence however tends to point in an alternative direction : that torturers are not particularly
abnormal.
Foster (1987) makes a distinction between the knowledge oflay people (those that hold
the "widely held hypothesis"), and those (including himself), who, check the relevant "evidence"
before coming to a conclusion. Here there is a similar binary opposite presented between those in
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the know, social scientists and researchers who rely on and use scientific methods of enquiry, and
others whose opinion is uninformed or misplaced, and not based on factual evidence. Similiarly,
Botwinick (1996), in the preface to her book, states that it was the product of"two decades of
teaching of the holocaust" (p. xiii). Although Botwinick (1996) in this statement does not refer to
the "normality" of perpetrators, she is grounding her work as that which has derived from many,
many years of study and experience - one could refer to her as an "expert" in her field, and this
lends her work considerable credibility.
The work ofZimmler, Harrower, Ritzler and Archer (1995) is also an indication in this
respect. These authors come from the fields of psychology and psychiatry (and are all professors
in their fields), which have strong ties to the discipline of science. Their subject matter includes
"extensive psychiatric and psychological test[s] .. . performed on more than 200 Nazis in an effort
to understand the key personalities of the Third Reich" (p. xiii). They state further that their book
will also provide "a professionally responsible and scholarly interpretation of the psychological
test data of the more than 200 Nazis ... " (p. xiv), and that their text is "intended as the definitive
and comprehensive study of the psychological functioning of the Nazi war criminals" (p. xiv).
These authors are quite straight-forward regarding the position they grant themselves . They state
clearly that their opinion, based on rigorous scientific principles, can, and should be, accepted as
the authority on the psychological functioning of the perpetrators of the Nazi holocaust. The
account is presented as almost factual, which cannot be disputed.
There is a similiarity in the "voice" of the authors mentioned. This plays a key role in
constructing the "ordinariness" of perpetrators as a fact which has emerged from rigorous
scientific investigation . It is a voice that is in opposition to the lay persons' interpretation of the
"normality" of perpetrators which, it is intimated, is based on conjecture, and not an 'accurate'
account of the situation . The "scientists" presented, are able to be more "objective" in rendering
an opinion that is based on factual evidence and not swayed by emotional concerns.
3.2.2.2. Psychiatric & lay notions of 'normality'
When illustrating the "normality" of perpetrators, often one of the strongest forms of
evidence used, is that of perpetrators passing psychiatric tests of normality, or it is inferred that
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most perpetrators would pass tests of normality. The irony is that the question of the normality of
perpetrators, is an excellent example through which one could illustrate that discourses of
normality are socially constructed, for this issue begs the question of how it is possible that
perpetrators of such gross human rights violations are considered normal as adjudged by
rigorously standardized psychiatric tests?
Authors that have reconciled these two concepts, i.e. that of normality and the
perpetration ofgross human rights violations, instead of questioning the concept of"normality",
have often tried to illustrate that the system or context within which the "ordinary man"
perpetrated his crimes was criminal or abnormal. They have therefore not only quoted that
perpetrators have passed psychiatric tests of normality, but they have used this to claim weight
and substantiation for their argument. Such is the case with Hannah Arendt's (1994) book on
Eichmann where she states that "[h]alf a dozen psychiatrists had certified him as "normal" -"More
normal, at any rate, than I am after having examined him," one of them was said to have
exclaimed... " (p. 25).
The latter quip shows the irony of the situation. Being in the profession and position that
he is, it would be difficult to question the normality of the psychiatrist. Yet, he is left feeling less
normal (if that is possible), after having found Eichmann to be without a doubt normal. Although
his words do not overtly say so, they reflect an acknowledgment of the questionable validity of
psychiatric tests in assessing "normality" as Eichmann' s case had shown, or perhaps that there is
more to the assessment of"normality" than what these tests are able to detect. Similiarly, Zimmler
et al (1995), who examine the psychological test data of the Nuremberg defendants, as well as of
a sample of rank-and-file officers, are unable to find any sign of abnormality. From a
constructionist point of view, the psychiatrist's comment, and the findings of the latter authors,
are a reflection of the constructed nature of"normality". According to psychiatry, normality is a
product of scientific principles and rigorous testing, which then establish the "norms" of society.
However, there is no fixed entity of"normality". It is not just a relative concept that is different
from culture to culture. "Normality" is a concept that is constructed and defined based on
particular available discourses, such as those of psychology.
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Kren and Rappoport's (1980) assertion of the "normality" of perpetrators is not based on
actual findings of psychiatric testing, but is assumed, or derived from accounts ofvictims who
indicated that in most camps, there was one, or at most a few SS men who were known for their
outbursts of sadistic cruelty. Kren and Rappoport (1980) state instead that although most SS men
were not always decent, their behaviour was at least considered comprehensible by the prisoners,
and it is assumed that they would have easily passed psychiatric tests. Kren and Rappoport (1980)
use the opinions of lay-people - they draw on the notion that if an individual is "abnormal" , this
will be noted by those who have contact with him.
This contrasts with Arendt's account, where she clearly differentiates her opinions, and
those of psychiatrists, from those oflay people. Bergen (1998 , p. xii) states that with regards to
Eichmann, Arendt felt it was "important to [listen] to him as he appeared to her in the courtroom
.. . as a person who was conveying the meaning of his experiences to others by speaking about
himself' . Although both accounts rely on the interaction between people, and give credence to
this, Arendt (1994), indicates that she was prepared to do what others (or lay people) were not
prepared to do - they wanted to label Eichmann a "monster" and were not prepared to "listen" to
him. This account constructs "normality" as something which can be assessed or judged by those
interacting with a person, regardless of their psychological or psychiatric experience. The TRC FR
(1998) similiarly implies that upon "listening" to the perpetrators it became clear that there was no
sign of abnormality, based on the evidence. Kren and Rappoport's (1980) account indicates that
contrary to what they expected, when the victims encountered the SS, they found them to be
normal- these accounts indicate that experience is the key to assessing normality.
This contradicts the notion that experts, armed with scientific knowledge, are necessary to
assess normality, but stresses that if ordinary people are prepared to forgo their assumptions, they
can also assess the "normality" of perpetrators, by becoming objective and scientific. Key to this is
the notion ofbeing able to hold one's assumptions at bay, and not be influenced by commonly-
held understandings of perpetrators as being "sick" people. There is an indication here ofhow
notions of psychology, and psychological knowledge have been disseminated in society, which
enables lay people to render opinions on the "normality" of perpetrators, which are given
credibility in their own right.
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Kren and Rappoport's (1980) statements show another way in which "normality" is
constructed. "Normality" is an absence of sadistic or cruel behaviour. It is defined not by what
"normal behaviour" may be, but by the absence of"abnormal" behaviour such as cruelty. The
normality of perpetrators is asserted when contrasted to the expected behaviour of criminals, i.e.
sadism, cruelty or abnormality. However, there is a splitting here of the behaviour of the
perpetrators. Actions such as killing (which perpetrators engaged in), which could be conceived
as cruel, are ignored or divorced from the perpetrators. The actual atrocities may also be
constructed as being "abnormal", but are split off from the perpetrators, which permits them to be
then constructed as "normal".
Zimmler et al (1995) state that the absence of any pathology in the psychological test data
that they examine, indicates a need to perhaps search in the social, cultural or political sphere for
the answers . They maintain that their findings do not alter the integrity of the profession, and do
not question the assumptions underlying "normality". This is because they assert that their
findings are based on a "scientific" analysis, which make them perfectly credible. Their account of
the "normality" of perpetrators, also serves to split the cruel actions of the perpetrators from the
perpetrators themselves.
It has emerged that there is a reliance on utilizing scientific discourses to construct
credible accounts. Scientific discourses are also utilized by the professions of psychiatry and
psychology to give credence to their work. Discourses of science, and thereby medicine, which is
a discipline that is encompassed by science, have a long established and strong credibility in
society. Associated with scientific discourse are notions of systematic observation and objectivity.
Further, contained within scientific rhetoric are notions of rigour, accuracy and "expert"
knowledge in matters of health, illness and disease, and the treatment thereof Psychiatrists can
therefore claim "expert" knowledge, and expertise in differentiating the sane form the insane, or
the normal from the abnormal. The interpretive repertoire of scientific discourse restricts the
notion that like other discourses, science is not based on immutable facts, but on constructions
which have gained popularity and legitimacy over time.
The discourses of science are used by the authors mentioned in this section, not only to
claim authority over what is reported/stated, but to strengthen the notion of the "ordinariness" of
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perpetrators, since the scientific establishment finds them so. The assumptions underlying
"scientific" constructions of"normality" remain unquestioned. In addition, in this section, it has
been shown, that when evidence is lacking of psychological testing of perpetrators, it is assumed
that they are "normal" based on the experiences of those who interacted with them. These
experiences focus on particular expected notions of"abnormality" and ignore particular aspects of
the perpetrators' actions.
3.2.3 ·"Normal" values/morals
Another way in which the "ordinary man" is constructed is by presenting him as an
individual with "normal" characteristics, and as having normal values, such as "normal" or
"healthy" attitudes towards his family and friends. This achieves the goal of presenting him in the
same vein as others in society, or as the same as "you and me" where the "ordinary man" comes
to epitomize a universal kind of individual with universal values.
Arendt (1994) constructs "normality" using both notions of what "normality" entails, and
what "abnormality" entails . She stresses that the paradox ofwhich Eichmann was a prime
example, was that he had started as an "active worker in the rescue of Jews from Europe"
(Arendt, 1994, p. 61) . The use of the word "rescue" clearly indicates an active and altruistic
motive. It is clearly differentiated from simply doing one's job, where the perpetrator is placed in
more of a passive role. In Arendt's (1994) narrative this passive role is used to construct
Eichmann's atrocities. The construction ofEichmann's role in evacuating the Jews from Europe,
could also be conceived as a fulfillment of his duties, yet it is constructed as an active, positive
and redeeming feature ofhis person. Further, in constructing the positive attributes of
perpetrators, there is an absence of the impact of the system on these, or the context of these acts.
The context is only highlighted when there is a split between the perpetrator and his inhumane
actions, and the system is then seen as the key to the horror.
In a somewhat similiar way, Arendt states that Eichmann was law-abiding, and neither
perverted nor sadistic, nor did he have the "insatiable urge to kill" (1994, p. 26). She also quotes a
minister who stated that Eichmann was a man with "very positive ideas" (1994, p. 26). That these
ideas are presented as a justification for Eichmann's normality, indicates that Arendt (1994)
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supports these ideas. However, this way of constructing Eichmann's normality represents a
narrow view of his morals. It serves to silence or divorce him from the actions for which he is
accused, and other aspects of his life or personality. The actions for which Eichmann is on trial are
not subjected to the same moral assessment as are his other actions, and there is a clear splitting
of the two .
Thereafter, Arendt (1994) looks at the view of the minister who counseled Eichmann. The
reference to religion and religious discourse is meant to further bolster this view. In using
religious discourse she is subtly implying that the minister, and the institution of the church,
approved ofEichmann, and indeed saw him as having a healthy outlook and values. The minister
"reassured" everybody that Eichmann was not a "monster", and Arendt uses this quote to imply
that he was therefore not the "abnormal" person he was made out to be.
Bauman (1989) supports Arendt's notion of the "banality of evil" and says with specific
reference to Eichmann that "it is common knowledge.. . that initial attempts to interpret the
holocaust as an outrage committed by born criminals, sadists . ..or otherwise morally defective
individuals failed to find any confirmation in the facts of the case", and that "their refutation by
historical research is today all but final" (p. 19). It is difficult to reconcile the notions of morally
correct behaviour, and Eichmann's horrific actions. Bauman's construction of morality is based on
the idea that in Eichmann' s everyday life, and in the context of his social life, aside from his duties
as an SS officer, Eichmann never killed or hurt anyone. There is a clear split between Eichmann's
actions as an SS officer, and those which he undertook in a more individual capacity, which
enables the construction of"ordinariness". When discussing Eichmann's morality, the acts for
which he was tried are ignored. Further, Eichmann and other perpetrators are placed in a passive
role in relation to the system within which their acts were perpetrated.
Milgram (1974) stated that prior to conducting his experiment, he asked psychologists,
psychiatrists and lay people what they thought the outcome would be. They all expressed the view
that few people would inflict harm on others, and few in the experiment would proceed to the end
of the shockboard. This is an indication of the way in which cruel or inhumane actions (or
abnormality) are generally constructed - they are understood as being inherent in an individual,
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and not affected by context. However, according to Milgram (1974) his results indicated that
inhumanity is a matter ofsocial relationships .
His results, and the resulting constructions of normality and abnormality, serve ultimately
to divorce the individual from his actions. Milgram' s (1974) study shows that cruelty is not
committed by cruel individuals, but by "ordinary" men and women trying to acquit themselves of
their "ordinary" duties (Bauman, 1989). In this construction of the individual, there is a clear
indication that the individual should not be associated with being branded a "cruel individual". It is
the context which is blamed, and this enables the "ordinariness" of the individual to remain intact.
At no point is there a questioning of definitions of normality, or cruelty, and how these are
socially constructed. Instead, the participants are seen as passive, and not active receivers, of
"cruel" orders.
3.2.4 Familial discourse
Arendt's (1994) views on Eichmann' s characteristics and values are summed up in the
following. She starts offby saying that one of the other psychiatrists who assessed Eichmann
found him not only to be normal, but found that:
"his whole psychological outlook, his attitude towards his wife and children, mother and father, brothers, sisters and
friends, was 'not only normal but most desirable ' . Behind the comedy of the soul experts lay the hard fact that his
was obviously no case of moral let alone legal insanity ..." (p. 26) .
There are various ways that she constructs Eichmann's normality here. She begins by
asserting that he had "normal" family values and relationships, and similiarly "normal" attitudes
and relations with his friends. She is using familial discourse to construct his normality, which in
Eichmann's case, as with other perpetrators of gross human rights violations , becomes difficult to
reconcile with discourses surrounding the crimes or heinous deeds that he has committed.
However, the "psychological outlook" presented above, also splits Eichmann's actions - it
divorces his actions as an SS officer, from those that he engaged in socially.
Bauman (1989) also uses familial discourse to construct the "ordinary man". He states that
the holocaust perpetrators were not evil and "had wives they loved, children they cosseted, friends
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they helped and comforted in case of distress" (p. 151). In the latter quote he produces normality.
It is unthinkable says Bauman (1989), that men who had such healthy and caring attitudes
towards their families, actually "shot, gassed, or presided over the shooting and gassing of
hundreds of thousands of people including women and children" (p. 151). In the latter quote
Bauman is producing abnormality . He shows that these two constructions are incompatible, and
the only way in which they can be reconciled is if these men were indeed "normal", rather than
challenging this concept. It reflects the strength of one discourse over another. The perpetrators'
actions, because they do not fit "conventional" images of"abnormality", when placed next to the
familial discourse used, allow for the assertion of the "normality" of perpetrators.
3.2.5 Universality of the "ordinary man"
Bauman (1989) constructs the "ordinary man" as something that is and can be found in
any or all of us. He states that some authors saw Milgram 's (1974) experiments as illustrating that
perhaps there was in most people, ifnot all of us, "a little SS man waiting to come out"; or that
Milgram (1974) had discovered "the ' latent Eichmann' hidden in ordinary men" (p. 167). In this
production of the "ordinary man", Bauman attempts to show how universal the "ordinary man" is.
He can be found in all of us. He begins by linking the "ordinary man" with healthy and desirable
familial relationships, a lack of mental illness, and a lack of sadism and perversion. The discourses
that he draws upon to link to normality are persuasive in the context of the modern and civilized
society that we live in today.
However, the narrative serves to silence the heinous deeds/actions of the perpetrators. It is
like being shown only one side of a coin with which to view an individual. Bauman is trying to .
show that the "ordinary man" and each of us are the same. He asks, "How could ordinary people
like you and me do it" (p. 151)? He states that the fear that we all have, and "what frightens us
about the holocaust is not that this could be done to us, but the idea that we could do it" (p.151).
Yet this paradox is never resolved and remains unquestioned. You and I have not committed
these acts, so there is no way in which one could assess whether you or I would be capable of
them. Browning (1998 , p. xx) states that the policemen in the battalion which he studied were
"human beings. I must recognize that in the same situation, I could have been either a killer or an
evader. . ." . Tutu (1999) similiarly asserts that each individual has the capacity for evil, and that it
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is impossible to predict how we, as individuals would react provided the same circumstances.
Tutu (1995) and Browning (1998) are also intimating that anyone could easily be a perpetrator, to
indicate the "ordinariness" of the perpetrators that they encountered. Yet, like Bauman (1989),
the possibilities or impossibilities of action remain unresolved, because they cannot be resolved.
Bauman (1989), in the quote mentioned from page 151 above, uses terms such as "you an
me", "the idea that we could do it" to produce the "normality" of these perpetrators, and to bridge
the distance between these perpetrators and Bauman's readers. Bauman here is doing two things.
He is responding to conventional conservative discourses of the "abnormality" of perpetrators,
which constructs them as "monsters" or psychopaths. The latter discourses serve to create a gap
between so-called "ordinary" people and "ordinary" society, and insulate them from these
perpetrators. By bridging this gap he is responding to or challenging conservative or conventional
discourses of the "abnormality" of perpetrators. Further, he constructs perpetrators as "one of
us", or as people like "you and me", and finally as something that is inherent in all ofus (as
indicated by the term "we could do it") . Therefore perpetrators cease to be "out there", divorced
from society either in prisons or in asylums, and become one ofus, or in us.
In reviewing the experiment by Zimbardo et al (1973) (which involved a group of
prisoners and prison guards), Bauman (1989) comes to a similar conclusion regarding what is "in"
each ofus. According to Bauman (1989, p. 167), the men involved in the study are suddenly
"transmogrified" into monsters . There is a sense of the individual changing as a result of his
experiences into a different kind of being. The result of this experiment, Bauman (1989, p. 167)
states, is that its outcome is perhaps an indication that each of us has a "latent Eichmann" waiting
to emerge. Two points need to be made here. Firstly, the context is seen as that which elicits the
cruel behaviour, and secondly, by stating that "each of us" may have a latent evil waiting to be
triggered, Bauman (1989) is still asserting that all people are the essentially the same in that they
all possess this in them.
Paradoxically, it is Arendt (1994) who sums up this issue very well in the epilogue of her
book. She gives a summary of the kind of address that she felt the judges should have given
Eichmann when sentencing him. In it she deals with the issue of the possibility that any individual
in Germany, or anywhere for that matter, could have done what Eichmann did. This is in response
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to Eichmann's assertion in his defense that he was merely a "cog" in the system, and that had it
not been him, any other person could have fulfilled his role. She states that "there is an abyss
between the actuality ofwhat you did and the potentiality ofwhat others might have done" (1994,
p. 278). Here Arendt (1994) constructs Eichmann's actions as being infinitely separable from
those of"ordinary" members of society. There is a huge gulf between what he had done, and the
rest of society . Arendt (1994) constructs Eichmann' s actions here as being abnormal, or out of the
norm, while at the same time illustrating the problematic nature of the arguments provided by
Bauman (1989), Browning (1998) and Tutu (1999).
3.2.6 The force of the system
The word "system" here represents the context of the perpetration of atrocities, and
includes social systems, political organizations as well as organizations such as the security forces.
In constructing the relationship between the perpetrator and the system, the system is
sometimes constructed as a "criminal" system. Arendt (1994) states that crimes such as those that
Eichmann committed, "could only be committed under a criminal law and by a criminal state" (p.
262) . Here she distances Eichmann from his "criminal" actions by stating that it was the state that
was criminal, and that his actions would not have otherwise occurred or been possible under a
different system. She also indicates the "abnormality" of the system, when she states that under
the conditions of the Third Reich, only "exceptions" could be expected to react "normally" . Here
she is stating explicitly that the system was warped/wrong, and not the perpetrators that belonged
to it. Assertions such as the latter are corroborated by Kuper (1981) who states that genocide is
almost invariably, a crime ofgovernments, or organized groups. Here again, the government or
system is conceived of as criminal, and this serves to distance the role of individuals in enforcing
the system.
Foster (1987) examines the psychology of torturers. He states that research indicates that
torturers are "far more likely to be quite ordinary people in an extraordinary, abnormal situation"
(p. 167). The findings ofZimmler et al (1995) regarding the "normality" of the perpetrators that
they investigated, is also telling in this respect. They state that origins ofNazi genocide should be
sought for primarily in the context of social, cultural and political, rather than psychological
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factors (Zimmler et ai, 1995). These authors, upon finding that perpetrators were not
pathological, are indicating that the context or system within which they operated, was
pathological.
In discussing the SS, Bergen (1998, p. 46) refers to it as "more than a security force, it
was a vanguard for reorganizing the nation .. .". Bergen (1998) characterizes the SS as a strong
and indomitable force . Part of the way in which the system is constructed, is as a powerful and
dangerous force which could overpower individuals. This construction attributes to the system
considerable power and strength, in the face of a passive, and almost meek, perpetrator, who
obeys, and is swept along by this force . Similiarly, du Preez (1994), states that:
[t]he Nazi movement.. . intensified the prejudice against Jews as defectives and dirty disease carriers and linked this
with a theory of racial hygiene which enabled them to draw in scientists and doctors to assist in the task of purifying
the nation (p. 97).
The Nazi movement, is constructed here not only as a formidable force, but as an one that
has an almost sucking power, which draws in scientists and doctors, who are constructed as
passive in being sucked in to the movement. Bergen (1998, p. 23) states that Nazi rule was "a
means for dominating and terrorizing human beings from within". This quote further enhances the
powerful and feared way in which the Nazi moveIT.Ient was perceived . Bergen (1998, p. 45) also
attributes a similar power to the SS when he refers to it as an organization that "came to assume
control over the security apparatus of the nation, including administration of the concentration
camps, and later the death camps, as it took responsibility for planning, administering and
implementing the Final Solution". The SS is constructed as the machinery behind the ghastly acts
of the Final Solution. Although it is an organization, it is given responsibility here, where it can be
said that the SS were therefore ultimately responsible for the Final Solution. Yet this construction
of the organization, serves to silence that the SS was made up of thousands of people. It was
these people who ensured that the tasks of the SS went smoothly . These renditions not only
construct the context or system as an indomitable force, they fail to construct it as consisting of
actions of people.
Similiarly, in the TRC FR (1998, vol. 1, eh, 1), the authors state that apartheid was "evil",
and clearly a "crime against humanity". The system was illegal or criminal. In the TRC FR (1998,
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vol. 5, ch. 7), the authors quote Bishop Storey who stated that "the primary cancer will always be
apartheid" (p. 275) . Here as well, the system is constructed negatively; it has the power to attack
and infect the people. It is a force that is impossible to stem, and the people are passive recipients
of it. The authors further state that the motives of perpetrators have to be understood primarily
"in historico-political terms; that is, psychological explanations and motives, while not irrelevant,
are secondary" (TRC FR, 1998, vol. 5, ch. 7, p. 277). The political nature of the conflict, or the
nature of the context, is seen as the driving force behind the actions of perpetrators.
The system is therefore constructed in a number of ways, all ofwhich are negative. The
system is constructed as criminal, and further as a force that cannot be opposed. It sucks in the
perpetrator, who is helpless and unable to match its strength. The perpetrator is positioned as a
weak, helpless, small and easily suppressed being who is swept up by the force of the system. The
system in turn is the epitome of evil, and is a powerful, dangerous and indomitable force. This
constructs the perpetrator as "ordinary", in that it indicates that the perpetrator has no choice, but
to give in, or obey, this force. The issue of responsibility is therefore muddied, and because the
system is the epitome of all the evil, it is to be held responsible . Yet, how does one hold a system
responsible?
3.2.7 Obedience, passivity, & a lack of motivation
The issue of obedience to authority is a key issue in the way that both the individual
perpetrator and the system is constructed. It reflects that the system is seen as an active agent,
while the individual is constructed as a passive recipient of orders. There is little agency accorded
to the individual.
Arendt (1994) quotes Eichmann as saying that his, and the obedience of others like him,
was like the "obedience of corpses" (p. 135). The use of the word "corpses" indicates more than a
strong passivity in the way that Eichmann constructs his and others' behaviour - he is indicating
that they were passive to the point of not having a life outside of their duties. He further states
that his obedience was "abused" by his superiors - here again he indicates that he saw himself in a
completely passive role (Arendt, 1994, p. 175). His superiors were able to do with him as they
pleased, and they abused this. Eichmann's words indicate that he felt that he could not engage in
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any action on his own accord, and that everything that he did was dictated by his obedience to his
supenors.
The issue of obedience as the primary reason for the committing of atrocities is highlighted
by many authors. Bauman (1989, p. 90) states that "[t]horough, comprehensive, exhaustive
murder required the replacement of the mob with a bureaucracy, the replacement of shared rage
with obedience to authority". Other authors such as Browning (1992, 1998) have demonstrated
that perpetrators followed orders, and when asked to explain their behaviour, they did so by
stating that they had to obey their orders. Staub (1989), in exploring how the holocaust was
possible in Germany, states that in German culture, there was respect for, and obedience to
authority.
These explanations of the behaviour of the perpetrators serves to reinforce their passive
role, and the active role of the system. Bauman's (1989) statement indicates that the system was
engineered in particular ways that allowed and enforced the holocaust, thereby constructing the
system as the active agent in the equation. Similiarly, Staub's (1989) view is that German culture
was somewhat to blame, since the culture encouraged obedience to authority. The culture, rather
than the individual perpetrators, are constructed as having agency and enforcing such
authoritarian values .
Milgram (1974), in examining the results of his experiments, states that individuals enter
an "agentic" mode, and relinquish individual responsibility in order to act as agents of authority.
He further states that the individual relies on the definition of the situation that is provided by the
authority figure. Although Milgram (1974) does use the word "act" it is clear from his explanation
that he sees the actions of the individual as representing or embodying a passive role. As in
Eichmann's case, the act part of the word action, is not emphasized. These constructions of the
normality of perpetrators interprets their actions, as a passive activity, or render themselves
passive and submitting to the will of the system. Eugene de Kock states that "[w]e were just
doing our jobs, it was difficult to refuse ... " (Pauw, 1997, p. 320) and "[my] orders ... had come
from police generals" (Meredith, 1999, p. 52) . He places himself in a passive or receiving role.
Even though his words include the word "doing", which is an activity, through indicating that he
was following his superior's orders, which he found difficult to refuse, he places himself in this
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passive role. This reinforces the notion of the system being responsible for the actions of the
individual perpetrators.
Arendt (1994) comments that "[e]xcept for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for
his personal advancement, [Eichmann] had no motives at all. And this diligence in itself was in no
way criminal; he certainly would not have murdered his superior in order to inherit his post" (p.
287). This is yet another way in which perpetrators' actions are maintained as passive. Although
Arendt (1994) mentions that Eichmann was diligent in looking out for his personal advancement,
she undermines this when states that he had no other motives in perpetrating his crimes, and that
he would not murder his superior in order to inherit his post. Arendt is asserting Eichmann's
normality, by reiterating that murder was not an option for him. Maintaining the lack of motives
or motivation of the perpetrator, constructs him as "normal" because he has nothing to gain from
his atrocities - they are constructed as actions undertaken simply in order to obey orders .
Staub (1989) presents another alternative . He states that while obedience is an important
force, it is not the true motive for mass killing, and that rather the motivation to obey comes from
a desire to follow a leader. Staub's (1989) view that the tragedy of the holocaust is that loyalty
and obedience were exalted over individual moral responsibility. Rather, than constructing
obedience as simply where perpetrators passively followed orders, Staub's (1989) use of the
words exalted, indicates that even in the simple act of obedience there is, or may be, an active
component. The perpetrators would not have obeyed had they not valued obedience, and
therefore they actively participated in their duties. Staub (1989) is arguing that those who
willingly accept the authority of leaders are likely to have the same values espoused by these
leaders. Constructions of the "ordinary man" present him as a passive individual, while ignoring
any desire that the perpetrator may have.
Staub (1989) addresses the issue that the other narratives silence - the desire to obey is
the motive or motivation that accompany the perpetrators' actions . Although Staub (1989) also
presents the actions of the perpetrator as passive, because they follow orders, he renders the
perpetrator accountable for any atrocities because of the role that motivation plays in them.
Clearly, the depiction of the passive role of perpetrators and their corresponding lack of
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motivation, plays an integral role in constructing the "ordinariness" of perpetrators, which serves
to make the issue of responsibility problematic.
In constructing the system and the perpetrators as active and passive respectively, there is
a split between the system and the perpetrators. The former is defined in terms of evil, and the
latter as a passive channel through which it flowed . Bauman's (1989) notion of"free-floating"
responsibility is accurate in summing up the way that the discourse of the "ordinary man"
constructs the responsibility issue - it does so by blaming the system for atrocities of the
perpetrators, and in so doing renders responsibility "free-floating" in that it cannot then be pinned
down. He also states that "the organization as a whole is an instrument to obliterate
responsibility" (Bauman, 1989, p. 163), and aptly sums up the core of the problematic nature of
the "ordinary man" .
3.3 CONCLUSION
The deconstruction of the "ordinary man" has necessitated an examination of the ways in
which both the individual perpetrator and the system within which he operated, are constructed
discursively. Splitting is used to divorce the perpetrator from his atrocities, by not subjecting them
to the same moral assessment or criteria that other actions are judged by. Positive actions, such as
acts of kindness, are seen to represent those that the perpetrator undertook in an individual
capacity, and which confirm his "ordinariness". At the same time, the atrocities of the perpetrator
are rendered as separate from him, and rather constructed as actions of the system. The system is
constructed as an active agent in undertaking and enforcing atrocities, and the perpetrator is
simply a channel through which this takes place. The perpetrator is passive in obeying the orders
of the system, and is constructed as weak and ineffective in matching the powerful force of the
system. "Ordinariness" is therefore constructed using both the system and the individual
perpetrator - the system provides the space onto which all the evil/wrong committed can be split
onto (it becomes the embodiment of all evil), and therefore plays a significant role in maintaining
the psychological "normality" and integrity of the perpetrator.
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY & ANALYSIS
4.1 METHODOLOGY
As an introduction to the core of the chapter, i.e. the analysis, the methodology that was
adopted is explored . Under the methodology section, various pertinent issues are raised, such as
sampling and ethics, which play an integral role in any research undertaking. This is followed by
an examination of the research process - which looks at what was done and why it was done.
4.1.1 The research question
I chose to contextualize my study in the work of the TRC because the issue of dealing
with South Africa's past was concretized in, and by, it. In choosing the focus, or unit of study,
those who had served in the security forces in enforcing and upholding the apartheid regime, and
their re/integration into South African society, was of particular interest to me. With the change in
dispensation, and the recognition that apartheid was a crime against humanity, how would South
Africans deal with, or confront, those whose job it had been to ensure the survival of apartheid?
The research question therefore became one of how perpetrators would account for themselves
and their actions.
4.1.2 The transcript/data
The focus was therefore clearly on the accounts of perpetrators as opposed to the
victims/survivors. Having chosen the amnesty hearing ofBiko's case as the focus, led to the
purchase of the transcript of the amnesty hearing into Biko' s death from Veritas, a transcription
company. Obtaining the transcripts thus, meant that I had in hand an already transcribed source of
data. It saved me much time and effort. Having had prior experience with transcription, I was
aware ofwhat a long and tedious process it was. However, obtaining a transcript in such a
manner had its drawbacks . Firstly, the method of transcription was already decided, and I had no
input into how the transcription would be conducted (there are a variety of methods of
transcription which may be employed in transcribing audio material).
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The transcript provided is similar to a transcript that emerges out of a court hearing, and
therefore does not contain information such as pauses, or their lengths . This kind of transcript
would not allow for example, in-depth analysis into the functions of laughter and gaps in the
conversation (which are not transcribed). As the material under study was not the technical
analysis of a small piece of data, and was more concerned with the discourses at work in the
production of"ordinariness", this transcript proved highly appropriate. According to Potter and
Wetherell (1987) for many kinds of research questions, fine details of timing and intonation are
not crucial, and may instead interfere with the readability of the transcript. Secondly, it meant that
I had not interacted at all with the subjects of study. Although this meant that there was a certain
distance between myself and the object of study, there was no intervention on my part, and the
subjects could be studied in a "naturalistic" setting. Ultimately, there was no researcher
interference. The question then arises, regarding whether the transcript was suitable to the
research question.
The use of this particular data, i.e. the transcript of an amnesty hearing, proved
appropriate to the research question for a number of reasons. Firstly, the amnesty hearings
were/are representative of a process whereby perpetrators are required to account for their
actions. They are required to contextualize the specific acts for which they have applied for
amnesty. It became clear that the perpetrators were also implicitly accounting for being a part of
the apartheid regime - this issue was key to the thesis, and was dealt with in the hearings. Further,
the fact that the applicants would be questioned by their own attorneys, and then by the
prosecuting attorney, meant that the latter would try to expose the inconsistencies (or variation)
in the accounts of the applicants. Because the attorney for the victim (as Steve Biko is referred to
in the hearings) would challenge the story of the applicant, it meant that the issue ofvariation
could be more than adequately assessed from the transcripts. The aims of the research proved in
sufficient concordance with the aim of the TRC amnesty proceedings to warrant the use of an
amnesty hearing as the data of the thesis.
4.1.3 Sampling
I have already illustrated how the subject matter of the thesis was chosen. Having done so,
I had the task of reading and re-reading the transcripts . Included in the transcripts were the
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testimonies of all five applicants, as well as the testimony ofPeter Jones, a fellow activist of
Biko's who had been arrested with him in August 1977. The testimony of Jones was considered
necessary/applicable on the grounds that the detention ofBiko and Jones had occurred within
sufficient time proximity of each other to conclude that they had been treated similiarly whilst in
detention. With the transcript totaling more than 1000 pages, it became clear that it was too large
for the scope of a master's thesis. Therefore it was necessary to choose one applicant as the focus
of the study.
There was unanimous agreement in the transcript that only three of the five applicants had
engaged in the actual "scuffle" that led to Biko' s death . This was the first point of elimination, and
those that had not been involved in the "scuffle" were excluded on the grounds that the thesis was
about perpetrators of gross human rights violations. The three applicants involved in the "scuffle"
were Siebert, Niewoudt and Beneke. The two former applicants were part of the investigative
team whose job it had been to interrogate Biko. Beneke had been working in an office next door
to the interrogation room, and, according to him, had entered the fray, when he observed that
Biko had acted aggressively.
Siebert was chosen as the applicant whose testimony would be used on a couple of
grounds. Firstly, he had been involved in the "scuffle" that led to Biko 's death. He had also jointly
(with Snyman) been in charge of the interrogation ofBiko, had rank and authority, and therefore
had some degree of responsibility in its operation. This was an important differentiating point for
the literature review and the transcripts showed that the issue of responsibility was a significant
one. A last point on the choice of Siebert's testimony, especially as compared to that of
Niewoudt, regarded the issue ofPeter Jones' testimony . Jones testified that Niewoudt in
particular had been heavily involved in his torture. Niewoudt's own testimony therefore dealt
quite extensively in responding to Jones' testimony. Since the focus of the research was on the
amnesty applications regarding the death ofBiko, Niewoudt's testimony which dealt with Jones'
testimony quite extensively was rejected .
The choice regarding which applicant's testimony to use as the focus of the study, could
easily have been a random one, and produced similar results. Having acquainted myself
sufficiently with the testimony of all five applicants, there is much simiIiarity between them. The
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themes that developed could easily have come from examining the testimony of any of the other
four applicants. The testimony of the other four applicants was useful in that it informed my
reading of Siebert's testimony.
4.1.4 Ethical issues
The thesis did not provide me with many ethical dilemmas, as I had no intervention in this
'naturalistic' setting. One ethical question had to do with naming the actual perpetrators. In this
regard it has to be noted that the TRC amnesty hearings into the death of Steve Biko were public
hearings and therefore available and open to the general public. They had been reported on
extensively in the media, and were by no means confidential. The transcripts of the amnesty
hearings were therefore also public documents. At no stage of the amnesty process was there any
attempt to conceal the identities of the perpetrators. As with most of the other amnesty hearings
brought before the TRC, it was necessary for the hearings to be public, to facilitate the search for
the "truth", and in so doing, facilitate nation building and healing.
The other way in which ethical issues formed a part of the research process, was in the
actual way that the research was conducted and reported. There was always an adherence to
ethical principles in ensuring that guidelines such as those provided by the American
Psychological Association (APA ethical guidelines) were followed in all areas of the research
process.
4.1.5 Methodology of Analyses
As is evident, a dual analysis was undertaken in this thesis. The first was the analysis of the
literature review, and the second, the analysis of the transcript of the TRC amnesty hearing of
Daniel Siebert into the death of Steve Biko. The texts used in the different analyses are quite
different in a number of respects. The literature review is an amalgamation of a number of
different works by a number of different authors , and represents their opinions and findings. While
there were different emphases to the works of these authors, they shared the view that
perpetrators were "ordinary" men. The literature review therefore represents a bringing together
of all these strands. The transcript was of a court proceeding, and as such, a recording of the
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verbatim account given by the actual perpetrator. It was essentially the "voice" of one individual,
whereas the literature review was a combination of different voices, drawn together under one
umbrella.
But what does this mean for the methodology of analysis that was adopted? The
methodology that is outlined in this section is that which was essentially adopted for both
analyses. The main differentiation between the two analyses, is that Positioning Theory (which is
explored towards the end of this section), and Parker's three auxiliary criteria relating to discourse
work (which follows this), are used in the transcript analysis and not in the literature review
analysis. There are a number of reasons for this difference in treatment. With regards to the use of
Positioning Theory, the latter is not suited to the literature review because of the many different
authors and the different slants to each of their work. Parker's three auxiliary criteria (which
essentially relate to issues of power, ideology and the role of institutions) are not applied to the
analysis of the literature review, on the grounds that the literature is extracted from a variety of
different social and political contexts. It would therefore be impossible in this thesis, to explore
the role of the "ordinary man" discourse in the literature, in relation to Parker's three auxiliary
criteria, adequately. However, with regards to the local context, exploring the political
implications of the "ordinary man" discourse is an essential component of the thesis. Lastly, it
should be noted that for reasons of expediency, in the remainder of this methodology section, the
word 'text' is used to denote either the transcript or the literature review.
According to Durrheim (1999) in constructionist analysis the different phases of the
research process shade into each other and the analysis is not conducted independently of the data
collection. This was the case in this thesis - the multiple readings of the transcripts, and
investigating the "ordinariness" of perpetrators in the literature, was done whilst examining the
theories that informed these readings . However, for the purposes of outlining the steps
undertaken, I would say that after multiple readings of the transcript, it became clear that the
perpetrators were essentially arguing that they were "ordinary" men. A review of the literature
that saw perpetrators from this perspective was undertaken. Having explored this literature and
the transcripts, it was decided that discourse analysis would be used to analyze the "ordinary
man" discourse. This was undertaken in order to see how "ordinariness" is constructed in the
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context of the perpetration of atrocities, and to see the functions and effects thereof in the local
political context.
4.1.5.1 Multiple readings
Work in the initial stages involved multiple readings of the text (with the transcript, this
meant the amnesty hearings of all five perpetrators at this stage) . The multiple readings involved
immersing myself in the data in order to reflect on it. This was necessary to the process of
becoming familiar with the text, and saw the start of the process of developing ideas or theories of
what different discourses were at work in the production of "ordinariness" .
In line with the theoretical framework that underpinned the study, the text was not treated
as a realistic or factual account. Potter and Wetherell (1987) state that discourse analysis, in
tuning in to the functional/constructive nature of talk, suspends the realistic approach, and focuses
on discourse as a topic in its own right. Therefore, with the transcript for example, my aim was
not to look at whether the talk was an indicator of some internal state of the perpetrator, but to
focus on how the account was manufactured . The text was treated as a narrative or an account,
and the focus of the analysis was to unravel the pieces or structures of the account, in order to see
how they worked together and what function they served.
Parker's (1992, p. 5) definition of discourse as "a system of statements which constructs
an object", has already been mentioned in the theory section. Burr (1995) elaborates upon this
definition by stating that a discourse refers to a set of meanings, images, stories, statements, that
in some way together produce-a particular version of events. The "ordinary man" discourse in the
literature review is built up using discourses of, for example, psychological ' normality' and
'abnormality' . These and other discourses such as familial discourse, and discourses of
conventional criminality, together produce the discourse of the "ordinary man". This draws on
Parker's (1992) notion that a discourse refers to other discourses. The next step involved picking
out where in the text, the "ordinary man" discourse was at work.
Each respective discourse that builds the "ordinary man" discourse, brings with it a
different slant or angle to the "ordinary man". As Burr (1995) states, there are a multitude of
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different ways in which an object may be constructed in language, therefore there may be a
number of different discourses which tell a different story about the object in question, which
represent it in a different way to the world. The things that people say or write, can be thought of
as instances of discourse, where particular discourses are given the opportunity to construct an
event in one way rather than another. The different discourses that may be used in constructing an
object, may be useful in showing the variation in the discourse, and in the text.
Wetherell and Potter (1988, p. 172) put forward the concept of interpretive repertoires,
which they take to mean the "building blocks speakers use for constructions of actions . . .any
particular repertoire consists of a restricted range of terms used in a specific stylistic and
grammatical fashion" . Interpretive repertoires may be thought of as tool kits of resources from
which people can construct events and entities for their own purposes, and are textual. They
function to enable people to justify their versions of events, to excuse or validate their behaviour
and fend off criticism, or otherwise allow them to maintain credibility in interaction. For example,
in the TRC, those who came forward regarding the abuses that they suffered at the hands of the
apartheid government or the liberation movements, were called either 'victims' or 'survivors' .
These people could conceive of their identity in the context of the TRC in one of these ways. The
former term stresses the passive role of the individual, while the latter, is more pro-active and
positive, and suggests that the individual overcame the experience.
As the multiple readings progressed, these were done by paying attention to a few key
features of the text. These are identified by Terre Blanche and Durrheim (1999) as useful tools
that help to reflect on the text. They include the search for binary oppositions in the text.
Examples of these include oppositions such as weak-powerful, active-passive and masculine-
feminine. These authors also state that oppositions are often implicit in texts, and only one side
may be explicitly mentioned. For example, in the literature review, there was a binary opposition
between the perpetrators of atrocities, and conventional criminals. The latter were conceived as
criminal, evil or pathological, and the former, as normal and "ordinary". One side of the
opposition may be silenced (in this case discourses of the conventional criminal) , and the reading
of the text therefore involves tuning in to the text to be able to make explicit this binary
opposition (Burr, 1995). Another way in which the text may be read, is by identifying recurrent
themes, phrases and metaphors (Terre Blanche and Durrheim, 1999) . Therefore, this step
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involved highlighting terms and phrases in the text which referred to particular discourses which
constructed "ordinariness".
4.1.5.2 The subject and agency
In the context of the analysis, Wetherell and Potter's (1988) notion of interpretive
repertoires provides a useful conceptual tool in dealing with the issue of the subject's agency.
Using interpretive repertoires as a conceptual tool, means that the person is given agency in
constructing accounts and themselves which serve particular purposes. The individual is seen as
actively selecting appropriate devices to negotiate a position within the local moral order.
Wetherell and Potter (1988) state that although the individual is an active player in drawing upon
particular repertoires, this process goes beyond the immediate social situation that they are
engaged in, and the implications and consequences of using particular repertoires may be
unintended by the speakers themselves . They further state that efforts to construct events in
particular ways may be done at a non-conscious or non-intentional level, and does not mean that
people are necessarily acting in a machiavellian fashion.
Similiarly, Harre and van Langenhove (1999) state that a strength of the post-structuralist
research paradigm is that it recognizes the constitutive force of discourse and discursive practices,
and recognizes that people are capable of exercising choice with regards to those practices . With
regards to personhood, who one is, is an open question, depending upon the positions made
available within particular discursive practices, and stories through which we make sense of our
lives. In the context of the transcript, the perpetrator is seen as actively selecting particular
discourses with which to construct his argument . However, the discourses do not originate in the
perpetrator; they are already existing in his culture.
4.1.5.3 Coding
According to Potter and Wetherell (1987) the coding process essentially involves taking
an unwieldy body of discourse and converting it into manageable chunks. Coding therefore
involved marking offbits or sections of the text (e.g. terms, sentences, or paragraphs) that
pertained to a particular theme or discourse. In the analysis of the transcript for example, any and
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all references to the government and police, were therefore coded, since these formed part of the
construction of the "ordinary man" discourse. A particular paragraph or sentence, was coded
more than once if it contained material which could be placed under more than one theme. The
cut-and-paste function of the word processor was invaluable here. In undertaking the coding
process, I coded, read and recoded until I found there was nothing new or significant which had
been omitted.
I have explained the method of sampling that was used, i.e. that it was purposive, and that
eventually it led to the choice of using the transcript of one perpetrator as the focus of study. The
hearings of all five perpetrators were used initially, and multiple readings elicited many themes
from this text. This process was intensified and conducted much more vigorously upon the smaller
transcript that was chosen as the focus of study (i.e. the hearing of the applicant Siebert), and was
followed by coding the latter transcript.
4.1.5.4 How was the text analyzed?
According to Potter and Wetherell (1987) analysis involves trying to make sense of the
text through identifying the organizational features in it. The latter authors also state that key to
this process is much careful reading and re-reading, and much struggling with the data before a
systematic pattern emerges . The coding process was followed by much reading, and paying
attention to function and variation in the text. The issue of the 'function' of talk, i.e. that language
does things, has already been dealt with in the theory section. The application of this concept in
the analysis, involved paying attention to the implicit and explicit functions of pieces of text. In a
courtroom situation for example, a defendant may take the witness stand, and defend the actions
that he is accused of, through placing himself in a passive role, as one who was merely obeying
orders. This functions to render him less responsible for his actions.
Potter and Wetherell (1987) also state that talk is orientated to many different functions,
and that an examination oflanguage over time will reveal variation in the talk - i.e. "a person's
account will vary according to its function". Therefore, in the same example, the defendant may
draw upon particular discourses to construct his account in the courtroom, and give a different
account of his actions to his friends and family. This is because each account is serving a different
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function. Variation in the text was therefore explored to investigate how this was related to
function, and why the variation occurred at particular points in the text.
Yet another facet of the analysis concerns the 'effects' of texts. Terre Blanche and
Durrheim (1999) state that constructionist analyses aim to link accounts to actions. Therefore
there is a focus not really on what texts say, but on what they do (i.e. their effects). The authors
further state that texts attempt to do a number of things simultaneously, e.g. to convince the
reader that the account is reliable, to advance a particular ideology, or to motivate the reader to
act in a particular way. The analysis therefore involved tuning in to the explicit and implicit
'effects' of pieces of text.
While the framework as outline already was used in the analysis of both the literature
review and the transcript, the analysis of the transcript took these step further through the use of
Positioning Theory as outlined by Harre and van Langenhove (1999) .
4.1.5.5 An introduction to Positioning Theory
As a theory that is situated under the social constructionist umbrella, and one which is
geared towards the analysis of conversational activity, Positioning Theory was used in the analysis
of the transcript. According to Harre and van Langenhove (1999) the theory may be framed as a
possible apparatus for social constructionist theorizing based on a dynamic analysis of
conversations and discourses. According to this theory, conversation and conversation-like
activities are the ' place' where psychological and social phenomena are jointly created .
Positioning Theory was also used because it meant that there was a concordance between the
framework that grounded the analysis, and the methodology that was used.
The central component ofPositioning Theory, is the notion of a 'position' . In the social
sciences, this concept was first introduced by Hollway (1984) in her study of the construction of
subjectivity in heterosexual relations. In her analysis, Hollway (1984) illustrated how 'positions'
were 'taken up', and how people positioned themselves. She also stated that "[d]iscourses make
available positions for subjects to take up [which] are in relation to other people" (p. 236). The
concept of positioning in Positioning Theory is used in line with Hollway's (1984)
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conceptualization. Harre and van Langenhove (1999) elaborate upon it by stating that a position
involves a complex cluster ofpersonal attributes, which impinge on the possibilities of
interpersonal, intergroup and intrapersonal action that an individual can engage in. In the analysis,
the perpetrator and others were therefore seen as 'positioning' themselves in the context of the
narrative.
Inherent in the notion of positions are also that they are contested, constantly shifting, and
impact upon rights, duties and obligations of speaking and acting. For example, the position of a
judge, may involve rights to decide on the guilt/innocence of an accused , and also involves
particular obligations to be fair and just in making judgements. Positions are relational, in that
they do not occur in isolation. For example, judges and witnesses have asymmetrical positions
(Edwards, 1997; Stygall, 1994). The judge therefore is more powerful in determining the outcome
of a case than is a witness . In this context it is easy to illustrate that discourses make available
positions for subjects to take up (it is judicial discourse that permits the taking up of the different
positions ofjudge and witness) . Positioning also relies on issues of the 'investment' that different
subjects have in their positions, which accounts for why particular positions produce or reproduce
specific power dynamics. Hollway's (1984) concept of ' investment' illustrates that for example,
gender-differentiated positions , are not fixed, and that there is room for shifts in power, depending
upon whether there is sufficient investment to take up an alternate position. In the analysis, I
examined how the individual's investment in a particular position, impacted upon the positioning
that took place.
In contextualizing conversational activity, Positioning Theory draws on the work of'Harre
and Secord (1972). The latter authors conceived of the notion of ' episodes' . These are defined as
a sequence of occurrences in which humans engage in, arid which have some principle of unity.
Episodes shape what participants can say or do, while simultaneously being shaped by their
participants. Episodes may be formal (where they are shaped by explicit rules which govern the
sequence of events), or they may be informal (where the rules that govern them are less strict, and
more a function of the biographical background of the participants) . The amnesty hearings into
the death ofBiko are an excellent example of formal episodes, in that they are governed by
specific rules regarding the sequence and nature of the talk permitted. An example of an informal
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episode, may be a 'social' gathering of friends, where they will jointly determine the sequence and
outcome of events based on the interaction of the people involved.
4.1.5.6 The position/act-action/storyline triad
Before exploring this triad, it needs to be located in what Harre and van Langenhove
(1999) refer to as the persons/conversations referential grid. According to these authors, this grid
is used instead of the Newtonian-Euclidian space/time grid of the natural world, where people are
treated in the same way as natural entities and phenomena . In so doing, the social world is too
often pictured as deterministic in a Humean sense, and where space and time are independent
(Harre and van Langenhove, 1999). These authors propose the persons/conversations referential
grid as an alternative, for Humean aspects of the social sciences have been much criticized. The
grid that they propose is in line with new assumptions about the 'substance' of social and
psychological realities. As speech-acts, and conversation, are taken as the 'matter' of social
reality, a grid can be constructed in which "people are seen as the location of social acts" (Harre
and van Langenhove, 1999, p. 15).
Within this grid, positioning is then understood as "the discursive construction of personal
stories that make a person's actions intelligible and relatively determinate as social acts and within
which the members of the conversation have specific locations" (Harre and van Langenhove,
1999, p. 16). People can either position themselves, or be positioned by others. The way in which
a person's contributions are heard in a conversation, depends on the individual's personal
attributes and the context of their actions/speech. Therefore, an individual who appears in court
on a murder charge will be positioned in a particular way if the act occurred in self-defense, as
compared to an individual who has a previous murder conviction . Whilst in both cases the context
of the act plays a role, so too does the attributes, or previous actions of the individual.
Positionings can and do change, and are 'fluid' in nature , as they are used to cope with situations
that people find themselves in.
In the analysis I paid attention to the way that people were positioned in the narrative, and
the rights and obligations of the different speakers. I also investigated how the actions of the
individual were construed in light of the change in the political dispensation. This was significant
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because under the previous dispensation which provided a different context, the actions of the
perpetrator were seen differently. Other significant aspects of the analysis involved exploring the
storylines that were running through the narrative.
Conversations have storylines, and the positions that are taken up in any given
conversation will be linked to these storylines. In a storyline ofvictimization for example, a
defendant may position himself as the victim of another individual, and his attorney will be
positioned as an empathic listener. This example also illustrates how an individual positions
himself and others simultaneously in a conversation. The analysis therefore explored the different
storylines, and in so doing also examined the positions that these storylines opened up for the
different individuals in the narrative. Positions are intrinsically linked to actions. In a particular
storyline, an individual in a particular position, is able to act in accordance with that position and
storyline. In a courtroom, the position ofjudge allows the judge to find a defendant guilty and
sentence him to time in prison. Positions may be put forward, and thereafter challenged, so that
repositioning occurs. Ultimately however, positions moderate as conversations unfold. The
analysis involved conceiving of conversations as joint activities, as for the most part, they involved
both the perpetrator and an attorney. Positioning has a dynamic character, and conversations
often contain a braided development of different storylines , which in the context of analysis were
teased out in order to assess the effects and implications thereof The lasts steps in the analysis
paid attention to the work ofParker (1992) where he explored significant features of any
discourse analytic work.
4.1.5.7 Parker's three auxiliary criteria
(Discourse in relation to institutions, power and ideology)
Parker (1992) outlined seven criteria that deals with the different levels of discourse
analysis, some ofwhich have been mentioned in the theory and methodology sections already. In
addition Parker (1992) proposes a further three auxiliary criteria. He states that ignoring the role
of institutions, power and ideology, in discourse analysis, results in work that is "worse than
useless" as it rests on the assumptions of an amoral/apolitical psychology (Parker, 1992, p. 1).
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Parker's (1992) first criteria, 'discourses support institutions', in essence concerns
examining which institutions are reinforced or supported through the use of a particular discourse,
as well as which are attacked or subverted through the use of that discourse. Parker (1992) states
that institutions are reproduced through, amongst other things, discursive practices . 'Discursive
practices' oflegal discourse might include drawing up a subpoena or filing for a dismissal in a
case. These practices serve to sustain legal discourse. In the analysis therefore, I examined the link
between the 'ordinary man' discourse, and which institutions were reinforced or subverted by it.
The second criteria, 'discourses reproduce power relations', is linked to the first.
According to Parker (1992), institutions are structured around, and reproduce power relations. In
terms of legal discourse, the asymmetrical power relations between a judge, lawyer, and witness,
is an example of how the discourse is linked to powers to speak in a courtroom situation.
Therefore, judges, and lawyers, would serve to benefit from the powers that legal discourse grants
them. In line with Parker's proposed 'steps', I therefore examined what categories of people
served to gain or lose through the employment of the 'ordinary man' discourse, as well as who
would want to promote and/or dissolve the discourse.
Lastly, Parker (1992, p. 20) links the first two criteria to ideology. Parker (1992)
conceives of ideology as a "description of relationships and effects, [where] the category should
be employed to describe relationships at a particular place and historical period". The last 'steps'
that Parker (1992) proposes include showing the connectedness of a discourse to other discourses
that sanction oppression, as well as showing how a discourse permits dominant groups to give
their narratives about the past, in order to justify the present, and prevent the oppressed from
making history. Parker (1992) elaborates on this by stating that the three auxiliary criteria and
associated 'steps' that he proposes, need to be undertaken with the elaboration of the researcher's
political motives/standpoint. In the context of this thesis, I put forward my political standpoint at
the start of chapter three. In the analysis I linked the 'ordinary man' discourse with other
discourses in South Africa, in order to see how it may be connected to oppression and domination
in the present political climate.
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4.1.6 Conclusion to methodology
As I have stated already, the methodology adopted was concordant with the paradigm that
grounds the thesis. While I have attempted to give an outline of the different 'steps' that were
involved, the actual working of the analysis, and the thesis as a whole, was undertaken in a much
less orderly manner. Where necessary for example, certain 'steps' were repeated, and the analysis
was then reworked accordingly. Potter and Wetherell's (1987) analogy of discourse analysis being
more like riding a bicycle (in comparison to qualitative analysis which they liken to baking a cake
from a recipe) , is an apt illustration of how the analysis was undertaken. The next section in this
chapter deals with the analysis of the transcript.
4.2 INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS
The analysis of the transcript explores how the applicant, Daniel Petrus Siebert, constructs
his narrative using the discourse of the"ordinary man" in the context of perpetrating gross human
rights violations . In his narrative, he uses this discourse in order to frame his actions, opinions and
positions, in connection with the assault and death of Stephen Bantu Biko, for which he applied
for amnesty to the TRC. Having stated that, I need to clarify that the construction of
"ordinariness" by Siebert represents my reading or interpretation of the transcript. Through
quoting various extracts, I build up my argument that this is an implicit construction.
There are three main storylines which are explored . The first titled "Doing my job"
examines extracts where Siebert frames his actions as being intrinsically linked to his occupational
duties. I explore the variation in this storyline which elucidates the different ways in which
"ordinariness" is constructed. This is followed by the storyline entitled "Cops and criminals"
where there is an examination of the use of racist discourse in Siebert's narrative. He and Biko are
positioned essentially as good cop and insane criminal respectively. The last storyline titled
"Passivity in the face of influence and persuasion" is in simplistic terms a contradiction of the first
two storylines . Here the extracts reviewed show how Siebert constructs his ordinariness through
positioning himself as one who was wrongly influenced by others around him.
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To clarify some of the people in the narrative: Goosen was the head of the police unit (and
is deceased), Snyman was the commanding officer (of the investigation/interrogation), Siebert
was the second-in-command; the other officers involved in the interrogation were Niewoudt and
Mane Beneke had been involved in some work adjacent to the interrogation office, when he heard
some commotion and subsequently rushed into the fray. The attorneys include Bizos (who
represents the Biko family), Mpshe, who is his eo-counsel, and Booyens, who represents Siebert.
4.3 "DOING MY JOB" STORYLINE
This storyline as it is explored in this section, is not a straightforward or simplistic one.
Contained in this section are various ways in which Siebert and others in his narrative are
positioned through different the angles of this storyline. For example, one way in which this is
interpreted is, where Siebert places himself in a passive role - I was merely doing my job . Another
way in which this is interpreted, is when Siebert places himself in an active role - I was doing my
job because I believed in what I was doing (i.e. I was working for a good cause) . Each different
angle/interpretation, positions Siebert and the others in his narrative differently. Ultimately, the
argument that will be made, is that in positioning himself and others in these different narratives,
Siebert constructs his own "ordinariness" in different ways. Therefore, while there is a difference
between his being passive and active, both construct him as an "ordinary man".
Under this section, various themes which relate to the ways in which Siebert constructs his
actions as relating to his job, and often, as being dictated by his job, are explored. Included here,
are different linguistic tools that Siebert employs to construct his actions very specifically as
occupational, and not personal. In so doing, Siebert distances himself from the police system; his
narrative indicates that it was the system which "ordered" his actions, and it is therefore
responsible for them. However, the issue of personal actions and motivations is also linked in his
narrative, to his occupational work. Siebert at other stages, shows that he was personally
motivated in conducting his occupational activities (which is at variance with the first notion of
simply following orders). In this way of constructing his "ordinariness" he situates himself as
working within a just, fair, and right system whose responsibility it was to police and control
criminal elements in society such as "freedom fighters" in order to protect society. His motives are
clearly presented, he is an active and willing agent in fighting for the rights of his people, and
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other South Africans. This narrative is based upon nationalistic principles, and it is through
conveying these that he constructs his "ordinariness".
4.3.1 The "ordinary" career
One of the first ways in which "ordinariness" is introduced in his narrative, is when Siebert
outlines the "ordinary" career path which he followed in the South African Police Security
Branch:
1 MR BOOYENS: You were attested in the police on the 25th of January 1962?
2 MR SIEBERT: That is correct.
3 MR BOOYENS: At Uitenhage?
4 MR SIEBERT: That is also correct.
4 MR. BOOYENS: You then provide, on page two of your application, that would be
5 13B of the bundle, an explanation of your career in the police?
7 MR SIEBERT: Yes, your Honour.
8 MR BOOYENS: According to this, you joined the Security Branch in 19677
9 MR SIEBERT: Yes, your Honour.
10 MR BOOYENS: What would your rank have been at that time?
11 MR SIEBERT : Sergeant.
12 MR BOOYENS: In what section of the Security Branch did you initially work?
13 MR SIEBERT: I worked in the section that dealt with White, Coloured and Asian
14 affairs.
15 MR BOOYENS : As what?
16 MR SIEBERT: As a field worker.
17 MR BOOYENS: That would have been right from the beginning?
18 MR SIEBERT: Yes, your Honour.
19 MR BOOYENS: I note, in addition, or rather, until when were you a member of
20 the Security Branch?
21 MR SIEBERT: Until 1989 .
22 MR BOOYENS: In 1989 what occurred? You became Regional Head of Crime
23 Combating and Investigation which would previously have been the Detective
24 Branch in the Eastern Transvaal?
25 MR SIEBERT: That is correct.
26 MR BOOYENS : And in 1992 you retired with the rank of Brigadier or rather
27 1995, my apologies? In addition, you mention the various courses that you did
28 while in service of the police?
29 MR SIEBERT: Yes, your Honour. (extract 1, p.2-3)
Firstly, it is apparent that the extract shows the 'joint activity' of Siebert and Booyens.
The narrative reveals that Siebert worked for the police in different capacities over a period of33
years. This line of questions and answers serves to highlight a few things. Firstly, it sets up Siebert
as someone who knew the extent and gravity of the security situation in the country, because he
was at one stage a "field worker" (L. 16). Siebert, having worked in the field, can claim to be
knowledgeable about what was going on "on the ground". This kind of narration which draws
upon his personal experiences, serves to legitimize his rendition of the security situation in the
country.
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More importantly, the extract shows that like any "ordinary man", Siebert started at the
bottom, and through hard work, was successful in working his way up the ranks of the police
force. This account draws upon notions of the "ordinary" career. Siebert's having worked himself
up the ladder in such a manner (which is rated highly in terms of societal values), serves as a
reflection of his normality. Even though it is not explicitly stated, Siebert is orientating himself to
success and "ordinariness".
The narrative reinforces the idea that Siebert did not commit his acts in an individual
capacity. He was firmly and successfully entrenched in the police force, and promoted as well.
This means that he performed his job well and was an asset to the police force, and, one could
argue, this illustrates that he was adept at obeying his superiors and conducting his duties, else he
could not have gotten as far as he did. The implicit message is that had he been unfit to be a
policeman and incapable of carrying out his duties well, he would not have gotten that far. He was
able to fit in to the police force, did his job, and did it well.
Siebert and Booyen's narrative attempts to show that belonging to the police force
involved maintaining the laws of the country, and was an honourable job. This is achieved by
stating that Siebert joined the "police" (L. 1), was part of the "security" establishment (L. 8, 12,
20), was responsible for "crime combating" (L. 22-23), and attained the rank of "brigadier" (L.
26). The use of such terms in the narrative connotes belonging to the "right" side, which was
responsible for apprehending the "criminal" elements of society. Siebert's career was dedicated to
maintaining "ordinary" values and norms in society, and he was therefore himself an "ordinary"
man.
4.3.2 Language of instruction
One of the strongest ways in which Siebert conveys that he was "ordinary" and merely
following orders, is by continually reiterating that in his capacity as a police officer, and
specifically in dealing with Biko, he was merely following the orders of his superior/so His
attorney supports this, by asking at different stages whether Siebert had instructions to act in
particular ways, and Siebert always replies in the affirmative. The word "instruction" and
"instructed" appear frequently throughout his testimony (e.g. p. 10, 17, 26, 27, 29), as do other
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terms which reiterate that his actions were undertaken in an occupational rather than in an
individual capacity. The following is a simple example which typifies his responses as to why
particular actions were undertaken. When questioned about why Biko, who was clearly badly
injured, was transferred to Pretoria in a Land Rover rather than an ambulance, Siebert states :
I MR SIEBERT : I did not enquire about that, Colonel Goosen made the enqu iries,
2 he made the necessary arrangements or negotiations and that was the instruction .
(extract 2 , p . 78 ) .
His insistence on using language of instruction conveys that he had little control over how
things transpired, or were to transpire, because he was merely following orders. His job was to
await instructions. This is further illustrated through his use of the term "he informed me", and
such similiar terms. For example, he states that:
I When I was a t the office in the a fternoon on the eighth, Colonel Goosen informed me
2 that the deceased was to be trans ferred to a Noordeinde prison for cont inued
3 attent ion ... (ex t ract 3, p . 26)
This reflects that he was "in the dark" , so to speak, of what he would be instructed to.do,
as this was left up to Colonel Goosen to decide . He is positioned as one who was merely
following orders, and doing the job that he was instructed to do. In the context of the way in
which Biko was treated, this narrative implies that Siebert's actions were not undertaken in his
personal capacity, but only influenced by what was required from him in his job. The system here
is used as a background which serves to foreground Siebert's "ordinariness". It is the system
which is given agency, intentionality and a sense of purpose (in the above extract the system is
represented by Colonel Goosen). Siebert , in comparison, is a passive recipient and follower of
orders. Constructing the system in this way serves to make Siebert almost like a "cog" within the
machinery of the system. His actions seem divorced from him; they represent the will and purpose
ofthe system, and not Siebert's. The narrative conveys a sense that Siebert's role could have
easily been undertaken by anyone else in the system. There is nothing here to indicate that it was
anything about Siebert per se, which had to do with the actions which he undertook.
I MR BOOYENS : Prior to th is date, did you have any personal contact with Mr
2 Biko?
3 MR SIEBERT: No , your Honour.
4 MR BOOYENS: Did you, to the best of your memory, ever meet with him before
5 you collected him at New Brighton?
6 MR SIEBERT: No, your Honour .
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7 MR BOOYENS : Did you have anything to do, my apologies, this was Walmer
8 police Station where you collected him .
9 MR SIEBERT: Yes, your Honour.
10 MR BOOYENS: Did you have anything to do with his detention or the manner of
11 his detention?
12 MR SIEBERT: No, your Honour. (extract 4, p. 13)
The above extract provides support for Siebert's claims that his interaction with Biko was
purely that which was required of him in terms of his job. Firstly, there is a clear sense of the
functional division of labour in the police system. Each officer had his own tasks to accomplish -
in the above extract it was Siebert's duty to collect Biko from Walmer police station. Siebert, or
any other officer, could have been asked to undertake any of these tasks. Siebert did not therefore
interact with Biko in a personal capacity.
Further, according to the narrative, when Siebert collected Biko at Walmer police station,
it was the first time he ever saw Biko, and he had not been involved in Biko' s detention (or
capture). Because he had never encountered Biko before, this is meant to illustrate that Siebert
had no ill-feeling towards Biko. This notion of no ill-feeling or hatred towards Biko, draws on the
implicit contrast of discourses of conventional criminals. In the case of conventional crimes of
gross human rights violations (i.e. those which do not occur within the context of a system), the
perpetrator usually displays strong emotions towards his victim/s, as well as intention to harm
them. In the above extract, through illustrating that this was absent in this case, and through
showing that Siebert was merely doing his job, he is constructed as an "ordinary man", who was
clearly not a criminal.
Bizos challenges and attempts to show that contrary to what Siebert implies, his personal














MR BIZOS : And how did you feel having in your absolute power a man so
opposed to aparthe id that he would actually claim the right to sit i f he wanted to,
even though the powerful Wh ite man, like yourself, ordered him to stand? How
did you feel about that?
MR SIEBERT : It was not about racial differences or colour of skin. As I said
earlier, what i t was about was the relatio nship between the interrogator and the
detainee and, obv iously, to this day, the person who is doing the interrogating
must be in a controlling position.
MR BIZOS: And I am going to put to you that Mr Biko's death was as a direct
r~sult of your attitu~e ~o him as a Black person, as a person who stood up for his
r i g h t s, that you, be l i evi ng that you were a superior White being, were not
prepared to respect him at all, which, and that you assaulted him, inj u r e d his
head and his brain, which led to his death . .
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14 MR SIEBERT: Mr Bizos is entitled to his opinion and he is ent itled to express
15 his opinion, but I do not think he has the ability to see inside my mind and to
16 interpret what is in my head . So, I never said that, anywhere, that I, as a White
17 person, was a Black person's superior and I would like to know where he gets
18 that from, where I said that. That is a lie.
19 MR BIZOS : I do not have to look into your head , Sir, your actions speak for
20 themselves . (extract 5, p . 75)
Siebert denies that he responded to Biko in any manner other than that required from him
as a police officer and interrogator. In this instance, he does not admit to any personal feelings or
opinions with regards to Biko, yet at other stages in his narrative he has strong opinions ofBiko
which involve seeing him in a totally negative and criminal light (discussed under section 4.4). The
extract above gives an indication ofwhat is at stake in constructions of "ordinariness". Bizos
indicates that Siebert's actions reflected his personal attitude to Biko, and black people in general.
Instead of an "ordinary man" who was only obeying his superior, Bizos suggests that this is a case
of a culpable racist. In the above extract, Siebert is positioned in clearly racial terms by Bizos,
(e.g. "the powerful White man", L. 3, "a superior White being", L. 11), and Bizos suggests that
Siebert similiarly positioned Biko purely in racial terms, i.e. as a "Black person" (L. 10). In
changing the positioning in this way from Siebert 's preferred positioning of "the interrogator and
the detainee", to racial terms, Bizos highlights what "ordinariness" in the context of South African
perpetrators, attempts to hide/silence. He proposes that black people such as Biko, were treated
in grossly inhumane ways because they were black, and considered inferior. Arid, Siebert's actions
therefore, were not a result of his merely following orders, but a manifestation of racism. In terms
ofBizos preferred positioning, Siebert is no longer "ordinary", and instead very culpable.
MR MPSHE : ... Colonel , are we to believe , really , that in the whole of Port Elizabeth ,
Uitenhage and the neighbouring areas there was no hospital th at could house this man
and give him medi cal care?
2 MR SIEBERT: I cannot comment on that , because it concerns negotiations
3 between Colonel Goosen and the doctors and head office and I h ad no say in
4 those .
5 MR MPSHE: Colonel, are you saying to this Committee that you were just acting
6 as a robot, even if you we re told that, take this man , fl y him to the moon , you
7 would go to the moon without questioning ?
8 MR SIEBERT : No . (extract 6 , p . 78)
In the above extract, Mpshe essentially questions the limits of Siebert' s obedience .
Contrary to the narrative that Siebert gives regarding his obedience to his superior, Siebert did not
act as a robot. Mpshe shows the limits of the "ordinariness" construction which is based on
notions of merely following orders. He indicates that the discourse leaves unanswered the
question of how far obedience will/can go. Mpshe highlights that if orders from superiors are
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sufficiently contrary to an individual's capabilities or even wishes/morals, the individual would not
undertake them. Therefore Siebert is positioned as one who did not have any qualms about what
he undertook, because he had no problems with his orders. In other words, Siebert was in
agreement with the actions of the system in which he worked, and therefore culpable.
4.3.3 Collective language
The use of collective language is yet another means through which Siebert concretizes his
actions as those which were undertaken within the context of a system, or within a team of police
officers. He links their "work" to the legal system, and further to the broader political system, i.e.
the apartheid government. He reiterates that his actions were not undertaken in an individual
capacity; rather they were conducted within the context of a team of officers, and further, this
team formed part of a larger system, i.e. the machinery of the state. Booyens supports this by
selectively using the terms "the police force", or "police officers", instead of referring to Siebert in
an individual capacity, especially when he questions Siebert about the "incident" that led to Biko's
death, and the events that followed it. Construing the interaction with Biko in collective terms,
serves to muddy the issue of responsibility, as it becomes difficult to say who is responsible for a
particular action . An example of when Siebert does this is the following:
1 MR SIEBERT : Upon our arrival in the office the hand-cuffs were removed from
2 the deceased. We were all standing at that time . Mr Snyman introduced us to
3 him as the interrogation team . The deceased, without any invitat ion, slammed
4 himself down on a chair. I instructed him to rise, I told him that this was our office,
5 that we were in control of this office and that we would tell him when he was
6 allowed to sit down .
7 MR BOOYENS : I apologise for interrupting you, but why this? Why was it so
8 important that he had to sit when you were sitting and that he had to do what you
9 told him and so forth?
10 MR SIEBERT: The general principle was that we were in control of the
11 interrogation. As the interrogator you must maintain control. The person being
12 interrogated could not decide on his own what he wanted to do. (extract 7, p . 19)
In this extract, Siebert is distinctly positioned as one of a team. The words "we" (L. 2, 5,
5, 10) "us" (L. 2), "our" (L. 4) and "interrogation team" (L. 3), all serve to convey that the
interrogation was carried out by a team of officers, who acted together as a unit. Even when
Siebert uses the word "I" (L. 4), to indicate what he stated, his words are followed by a shift to
collective language, where he states that, " . .. this was our office... " (L. 4, emphasis added). In the
above extract he positions himself in two ways which serve to construct his ordinariness. Firstly,
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he is positioned as one of an interrogation team. This conveys an absence of Siebert's
individuality, and instead forces us to see him, and his actions, as divorced from him as an
individual. His actions therefore cease to be tied to, or a part of, him as a person. This enables him
to keep his humanity intact and diffuses the responsibility for any actions undertaken. Secondly,
the storyline of a police officer doing his job, is also evident - the other positioning that occurs in
the extract, is one of Siebert as interrogator, and Biko as detainee. Siebert's individuality in
interacting with Biko is silenced. It reinforces that Siebert's actions were purely those of a police
officer, and he did not in an individual capacity.
I MR BOOYENS : If you look at page eight of your application, please . The
2 Saturday after his death, that is Mr Biko's death, what happened then ?
3 MR SIEBERT : We were called to Colonel Goosen's office to try and compile the
4 necessary statements regarding this matter.
5 MR BOOYENS: What, if at all, was suggested that you say about these
6 declarations? Were they supposed to contain the full truth, the whole truth or
7 what?
8 MR SIEBERT : As it was explained to us , the whole matter was a great
9 embarrassment, not only for the securit y branch , the police, but also for the State
10 and that our statements should be adapted in such a way that we should deal with
II the whole matter by omitting to mention certain facts so that it would not be
12 prejudicial for the security branch or the police or the State. (extract 8, p. 33)
There is a corresponding lack of personalized language in this extract, as Siebert instead
uses collective language when narrating this incident. The implication here is that Siebert was not
acting on his own accord, but as a member of the security police, and further, as a representative
of the State. His narrative forces us to see him as a representative of these organizations, rather
than in his individual capacity.
I MR SIEBERT: The purpose of the questioning was to find out more about his
2 [Biko's] participation in a planning for the riots and the distribution of
3 pamphlets in Port Elizabeth and the Eastern Cape . We wanted to ascertain what
4 his role was and in so doing we wanted to protect the political dispensation of
5 the day and we also wanted to charge him and to bring him before a court.
6 (extract 9, p . 34)
In extracts eight and nine Siebert uses collective language and further emphasizes his role
in the broader political context. He was not only part of the police system, but through working
with the courts, or the legal system, his actions are tied to those of the government. Therefore, he
is positioned as part of the machinery of the apartheid government. The word "we" appears
numerous times in both extracts. In extract nine, he is positioned as a part of the system whose
job it was to curb violence and maintain order and stability. In addition to emphasizing that he was
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not acting in an individual capacity, Siebert shows that he was on the side of maintaining good
values. Extract nine also sees him position the system for which he was working, and ofwhich he
was a part . In positioning Biko as one who was involved in riots and such activities, Siebert and
the system are on the opposite and "right" side; they are responsible for curbing and controlling
criminal activities in order to protect society. Siebert and the system are responsible for
maintaining and protecting good and "ordinary" values. He is therefore on the side of "ordinary
people", and is therefore situated amongst such "ordinariness" .
This positioning is immediately attacked, when Bizos starts questioning him:
1 MR BIZOS : Mr Siebert, did you assault Mr Biko?
2 MR SIEBERT: No, I did not.
3 MR BIZOS : No .
4 MR SIEBERT : No .
5 MR BIZOS : Did you cause his death?
6 MR SIEBERT: His death was caused by the incident whi ch took pla ce .
7 MR BIZOS: I asked you a s imple question. Did you cause his death ?
8 CHAIRPERSON: You , personally?
9 MR SIEB ERT : I would not be able to sa y i f it was my own , i f I was responsible .
10 There were a few of us present there.
11 MR BIZOS: Were you either responsible or partly responsible, which would
12 make you responsible, for hi s death ? Do you admit or den y you r re s pons ib i l i t y
13 for Mr Biko's death ?
14 MR SIEBERT: My particip ation in the inc ident, by implication , ye s . ( ext ra ct 10,
p. 35)
In his questioning, Bizos continues to position Siebert as an individual (he insists on using
the word "you" in his questions, e.g. L. 5, 7, 11, 12, 12). Siebert refuses this positioning and
instead attempts to convey that he was not acting in an individual capacity, through couching his
answers in collective terms . He denies outright any responsibility for Bike's death, yet he is
applying for amnesty in this regard . He instead states that Biko's death occurred as a result of an
"incident", and grudgingly admits participation in it. In questioning Siebert in this manner, Bizos
illustrates what the "ordinary man" discourse attempts to convey and why it is problematic . By
couching the actions of the individual as those which are integrally tied to the system, this
essentially serves to remove or diffuse responsibility; therefore the individual is not responsible for
his/her own actions. The narrative reflects a splitting where the actions of the individual are
instead construed as those essentially of the system.
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4.3.4 Formal language
The continual focus and emphasis on Siebert's actions as being dictated by his job, is
reiterated through his use of formal language or formal terms to describe the events surrounding
the death ofBiko. For example, he refers to Biko as either "Mr. Biko" (e.g. p. 17,28,30) or as
"the deceased" (e.g. p, 9, 23, 31) . These terms emphasize that Biko was related to only in a
formal and professional manner, i.e. as a detainee. In using such terms, Siebert also indicates that
he respected Biko as a human being, and treated him as such as well. It reiterates that Siebert's
own actions with regards to Biko were undertaken in a humane and professional capacity. The
following statements are further examples of his use of formal language . When questioned about
the interrogation ofBiko, Siebert's statements include:
" .. . before the interrogat ion we had final consultations with Colonel Goosen" (p. 17).
"Upon our arrival in the office the hand-cuffs were removed from the deceased" (p, 19).
"We were investigating his part in the drafting and distribution .. . of the pamphlet" (p. 19).
"Myself and major Snyman .. . were excused. We were instructed to continue with our other
activities .. . as soon as the situat ion would change, we would be informed and then we had to
resume the interrogation" (p. 26)
In the above example, Siebert uses using formal terms or formal language to reiterate that
he was operating only in his occupational capacity, and therefore merely conducting his job.
Formal language use serves to distance the individual from what he is saying. For example, if one
were to look at other contexts where such formal language is used, such as when a presenter is
reading the news on television, or when news is reported in a newspaper, it becomes apparent that
this type oflanguage not only appears to represent an objective view of reality, but it serves to
shift the focus from who is saying something to what is being said. The significance of the speaker
(or presenter or journalist), is diminished, and the language conveys that anyone in that position
would give a similar account.
In Siebert 's case his use of formal language not only indicates that he conducted himself in
a professional capacity when dealing with Biko, but emphasizes this. It also reinforces the idea
that he was "ordinary". By de-emphasizing the speaker, in this case Siebert, it implies that any
police officer would have, and could have, conducted himself in the same professional way. It
indicates a uniformity and normality in the police force that is typified by Siebert. In other words,
it is implied that Siebert was "ordinary" because his job could have been done by anybody in the
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force. His individuality played no role in his actions . Rather, he was acting as an "ordinary" police
officer, or as any police officer would have done.
The use of formal language by Siebert attempts to put forward that what he is narrating is
factual, and not an/his interpretation ofwhat transpired . He tries to indicate that he is impartial
and unbiased, and merely narrating what was actually transpiring at the time. Essentially he is
using the language of the police system, and thereby distancing himself from his words - his
"ordinariness" is therefore conveyed in his showing that his actions were part of the system, and
had little to do with his own character.
Siebert also conveys that his account is "factual" by backing up his statements. Therefore
he states that it was not just his opinion for example, that the security situation was deteriorating
rapidly in the country in 1977, but that it was the opinion of prominent leaders of the country. The
next extract is an apt illustration :
1 MR BOOYENS : With a view to the value that one might attach to the public
2 rhetoric of politicians , what would , generally , have been proclaimed with regard
3 to the security situation and the methods to be used by Government?
4 MR SIEBERT: It was said that the security situat ion during that time damaged
5 the image of the country and that, therefore, the necessary actions would have to
6 be taken in terms of legislation available to us, to restrain the situation ...
7
8 MR BOOYENS : What would the nature have been of this pressure and of the
9 information conveyed to you?
10 MR SIEBERT: The regular national overviews of the situation in the country,
11 which we rece ived on a weekly basis, indicated, also in terms of instructions from
12 head office, circular letters that we recei ved, that very serious efforts had to be
13 made to get to the core of the unrest and to control it. (extract 11, p . 5)
In drawing on a number of sources, Siebert backs up his narrative and conveys that what
he is stating was actually what was transpiring at the time, and not simply his own opinion. He is
using a similar method as researchers do when they are putting forward particular claims. They
draw on credible sources to back-up or substantiate what they are stating, and, they do so using
formal, rather than informal, language. This is meant to indicate that what they are putting
forward is logical, unbiased and even factual. Siebert's use of formal language here constructs his
"ordinariness" differently from the previous example. Siebert shows in the above extract that
"ordinariness" is the correspondence between the self and the system - there is a concordance
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between the opinions of those around him, and Siebert's own view. He is part and parcel of the
system.
4.3.5 Personalized language
Siebert uses personalized language-for.spec~-purposes . When "I" language, and other
.~ '::-,.
language which indicates that Siebert is drawing on his own experiences is used, it is done so to
convey his humanity. One example of this is when Booyens asks Siebert to read from his personal
overview. He states:
1 During my service on the border I visited a variety of scenes and did investigations
2 where members of the local population were robbed, kidnapped, murdered or
3 mutilated by members of the Swapo Liberation Movement. These persons also
4 experienced the loss or destruction of their property and I visited several scenes
5 where members of'the security forces were shot and killed or injured in traps . I was
6 present when the bodies of these people had to be removed and I was also present in
7 a particular incident when fi ve members of the defence force were shot dead and
8 another incident where seven members of the defence force were seriously injured
9 and mutilated in similar incidents in ambushes . These experiences created in me, a
10 very deep horror of the so-called freedom fighters and persons who pretended that
11 they were fighting against an unjust Government system . (extract 12, p . 6-7)
Whereas in the previous sections on formal and collective language Siebert uses
personalized language selectively, here he it is used in abundance in order to construct his
"ordinariness" in a different way. He draws on personal and eye-witnessed accounts to
substantiate his claims. The word "I" appears frequently (L. 1,4, 5, 6), and he also uses the words
"my" (L. 1) and "me" (L. 9). This is a very personal account of his experiences. In the previous
sections "ordinariness" was defined in terms of Siebert's role in the system, but here it is defined
in terms of humanity and empathy, and there is little sense of him as one of a team or as part of a
system. Even when he discusses the defence or security forces, he does so as though he is not
really a part of them. For example, he states" . .. the bodies of these people" (L. 6, emphasis
added), which does not place him as one of them. The "local population" are referred to as
"[t]hese persons" (L. 3), and Siebert distances himself from them as well. He is positioned as an
unbiased onlooker to these atrocities, and one who is horrified at witnessing them.
Although he was working there in his occupational capacity, this particular extract
switches from focussing on him as one of a team of police officers and as part of a system, to an
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individual who first-hand witnessed the gruesome "crimes" that the "so-called freedom fighters"
were committing. The graphic nature ofhis narrative is meant to elicit in the reader/listener the
same horror that Siebert felt when he was confronted with these scenes, and to elicit the same
feelings about Swapo. It serves to position him as part of humanity through this narration,
because he is positioned as one who would respond in the same way as any "ordinary" or humane
person to such violence.
In the above extract through his use of personalized language, Siebert indicates that there
was a concordance between what he was told/ordered to do, and what he witnessed first-hand
and experienced for himself. So, in addition to being instructed and taught about the security
situation, Siebert witnessed and confirmed these things for himself, and this strengthened his
resolve and determination to do his job well. The issue ofpersonal motivation/convictions as
playing a role in Siebert's job is summed up in the following extract:
I MR BOOYENS : This polit ic al background of yours, did this make you feel at home
2 in the security community?
3 MR SIEBERT: Yes , your Honour.
4 MR BOOYENS : Did thi s pl ay any role in your ac tions as a security poli ceman ? Did
5 you experience coherence between your convict ions and actions?
6 MR SIEBERT : Yes , your Honour.
7 MR BOOYENS: Was your personal convictions or faith also coherent with the
8 inst r ucti ons you received as a security police officer?
9 MR SIEBERT: Yes, your Honour. (extract 13, p . 12)
The political background that Booyens is referring to is in reference to an earlier question
where Siebert was asked about his political affiliation. He replied that he was a member and
supporter of the National Party. At times Siebert indicates that he was "influenced" or
"convinced" that apartheid was necessary (discussed under section 4.5), and at other times, such
as reflected in the extract above, he indicates that his "personal convictions" were concordant
with those of the system. The above extract brings together the two different constructions of
"ordinariness" . Siebert is stating here that his personal convictions were coherent with those of
the system within which he worked. In setting up his humanity in extract 12, and then in the above
extract positioning himself in concordance with the system, he resolves the dilemma of his role
within the system, by indicating that both he and the system were on the side ofjustice and
humanity.
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Other places where Siebert uses personal language to show that he acted in a humane
manner occur for example when he narrates an incident where a Dr. Tucker was attending to
Biko, which took place on the n" of September, 1977. He states that: " . .. he was being
inspected or attended to by Dr. Tucker. I asked Dr. Tucker what was wrong with the deceased
and he told me that he did not know ..." (p. 29). On more than one occasion he uses personalized
language in order to convey that when he did act in an individual capacity, his actions/words
revealed him to be humane, and even caring, for Biko's welfare . This issue is also explored further
under section 4.4, where through the use ofexamples, it is illustrated that Siebert depicts himself
as a good, caring and humane person, which is in contrast to Biko, who is implicitly blamed for
murder, arson and similiar activities, in Siebert's narrative.
4.3.6 Conclusion
In the introduction to this section, I mentioned that even though the various extracts
reviewed here are all placed under the umbrella of the "doing my job" storyline, they do not
represent a uniform view in terms of the way that ordinariness is constructed using this storyline.
Having reviewed the extracts, it becomes clear that ordinariness is constructed in a variety of
ways by Siebert. At times he is positioned as a passive recipient of orders, and lacking in agency,
and at others he positions himself as being on the side of humanity and good and decent values,
and the protector of society. The exploration of the next storyline sees an abundance of this latter
positioning .
4.4 COPS & CRIMINALS STORYLINE AND RACIST DISCOURSE
In constructing his narrative, Siebert uses racial stereotypes and racist discourse to
construct his ordinariness through aligning himself, and situating himself within the bounds of
humanity and normal/ordinary values. Siebert splits his world . There are two clearly differentiated
poles/sides which are in complete opposition to each other. On the one side stands Siebert, and all
that he represents - this includes the police system, the apartheid system, as well as white people.
This side is constructed as the embodiment of good, decent and normal values. In direct contrast
to this positioning of himself, is the way that Biko is positioned in the narrative. Biko is depicted
as an insane and an out-of-control criminal. Various other activities and occurrences are aligned
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to Biko all ofwhich have similar criminal and insane connotations - this includes destructive and,
murderous activities by black people upon one another, the "total onslaught" strategy, as well as
the liberation movements and their actions. The narrative frames Biko and all he stood for in the
mildest sense, as being difficult and rebellious, and in stronger ways, as inciting violence, murder,
kidnapping and the destruction of property. According to Siebert's narrative, Biko was the leader
of these violent activities. The use of binary oppositions, between good and bad, white and black,
and Siebert and Biko, serves to reinforce the two poles, and all they stand for because they are
constructed as vastly and strikingly different to each other.
There are also places in the narrative where Siebert contradicts these positionings he has
set up. These variations will be explored in order to examine the function they serve. Often they
occur at places in the narrative where Siebert is pushed into a corner, and has no way out but to
contradict some ofwhat he has already stated - this is evident when he is cross-examined by
Bizos, who challenges these oppositions that Siebert creates . Setting up these binary oppositions
serves two important functions in terms of the actions that it promotes. Siebert , by aligning
himself with good and decent values, situates himself amongst ordinary people . Further, the
actions taken against Biko are constructed as correct and good law enforcement, and therefore
justified, because Biko is framed as a criminal. Ultimately, this section focuses more on "bad
blackness" than "good whiteness" . Siebert 's ordinariness is achieved mostly through the
juxtaposition of his and Biko's actions.
The underlying narrative in the "cops and criminals" storyline is a racist one - Siebert, a
"white" man according to the apartheid system, is aligned to whiteness, which symbolizes purity,
innocence and goodness. Biko, a "black" man under apartheid, is aligned to blackness,
representing evil, wickedness, death and sinister doings.
4.4.1 Good whiteness and bad blackness
In this storyline, Biko is constructed as the criminal and Siebert the good cop whose duty
it was to protect society from such criminals. The extracts reviewed show the way in which
Siebert positions himself as the protector and defender of ordinary people, and ordinary values.
The word "protector" or "protection" is used generally in relation to harm or danger, which is
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embodied by Biko in Siebert's narrative. The actual physical interaction between Siebert and
Biko, where Siebert continually emphasizes that his actions were defensive, and Biko's aggressive
and violent, can be therefore considered a metaphor for the broader way in which Siebert and
Biko's roles are conceived of in the narrative.
Before Biko's name is really mentioned in Siebert's narrative, he is implicitly positioned
and constructed in particular ways. For example, early on in his testimony, Booyens asks him to
read from his personal overview:
1 MR SIEBERT: During my period of serv ice in the South African Police, I, at all
2 t imes, acted in good faith in the service of the South African or in the interest of the
3 South African Police and the Government of the day . I served on the border in
4 Ovambo1and during 1976 during which time I was exposed to guerrilla warfare and
5 terrorism .
6 During my service on the border I visited a variety of scenes and did investigations
7 where members of the local population were robbed, kidnapped, murdered or
8 mutilated by members ·of the Swapo Liberation Movement. These persons also
9 experienced the loss or destruction of their property and I visited several scenes
10 where members of the security forces were shot and killed or injured in traps . I was
11 present when the bodies of these people had to be removed and I was also present in
12 a particular incident when fi ve members of the defence force were shot dead and
13 another incident where seven members of the defence force were seriously injured
14 and mutilated in similar incidents in ambushes .
15 These experiences created in me , a very deep horror of the so-called freedom fighters
16 and persons who pretended that they were fighting against an unjust Government
17 system. At the same time I was of the opinion that the situation required of us that I
18 would be the first to act , otherwise I would experience the same fate . (extract 14 , p .
6)
In this extract Siebert begins to draw clear distinctions between himself and Biko, and how
each of them is constructed in his narrative. Although Biko's name is not mentioned here, he is
implicitly positioned when Siebert makes reference to "so-called freedom fighters" (L. 15). In
portraying himself; Siebert uses words such as "good faith" (L. 2) and "service" (L. 1). He is
stating that he was a loyal and hard-working servant of the state. He is positioned as a good,
decent individual with normal and ordinary goals and aspirations. He wanted to be a faithful
servant of his country and his people. Through showing aspirations to these goals, and conveying
that he held these values highly, he positions himself within the realm of normal, good and decent
individuals. Key to this positioning and narrative, is the conveyed meaning that he was ordinary,
and on the side ofgood.
The sense of Siebert as epitomizing normality is also achieved in the latter part of the
extract where he describes what all that he stood for was up against. In the second paragraph, we
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are introduced to "so-called freedom fighters" and what they stood for. Siebert states explicitly
that the freedom fighters were actually terrorists and criminals who were responsible for robbery,
kidnapping, murder, mutilation and the destruction of property. The sense of crime and criminal
and evil deeds is achieved through his use ofwords such as "terrorism" (L. 15), "killed" (L. 10),
"shot" (L. 10), "mutilated" (L. 14), and "bodies of these people" (L. 11). Further, the words
"traps" (L. 10) and "ambushes" (L. 14) convey that the criminals who perpetrated these actions
were cunning and devious in carrying out their murderous actions . This adds to the sense of them
being vile and horrible human beings and constructs them as pathological and criminal. This is in
direct contrast to what Siebert represents in the first few lines of the extract.
A sense of violence and criminality is also achieved when Siebert, who has already
positioned himself in the first paragraph as a good and loyal servant, states that the experiences
created in him "a very deep horror" (L. 15). By positioning himself as one who reacted in this
"normal" way to what he saw, he again positions the perpetrators of the deeds he witnessed as
insane, inhumane and criminal. His use of the term mentioned, invokes a sense of an almost
physical reaction that he had to what he witnessed - "how could people do such a horrible thing?"
he asks. It invokes a sense of the inhumanity of what he witnessed, and again, joins him with
humanity, and therefore ordinariness. His ordinariness is achieved through his "normal" and
humane reaction to the inhumanity that was perpetrated by the freedom fighters, and through the
oppositional positions here where he is on the side ofgood and decent values.
There are clearly drawn battle lines in this narrative . Siebert is portrayed as a decent and
hard-working person who was loyal and faithful to his country. He is also positioned as in
opposition to the insane criminals, and is instead a normal and ordinary man because of these
values.
4.4.2 Biko the instigator
The following extract provides a good summary of the way that Biko, and all that he
stood for, is portrayed in Siebert's narrative.
I MR BOOYENS: Particularly during the years 1976, 77 , up unto the death of Mr
2 Biko, the rioting cont inued?
3 MR SIEBERT: Yes, your Honour, until December of 1978 .
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4 MR BOOYENS: Out of these interrogations, out of police information available to
5 you, which organisations would, in your view, have played a prominent role in
6 fomulgating [sic] this unrest?
7 MR SIEBERT: Your Honour, the black power movements in that time would have
8 been the most acti ve since the ANC and the PAC would have been banned
9 organisations, they would have been in exile and their front organisations, at that
10 time, had not yet been well organised, not as well organised as the Black power
11 movements. In addition, the deceased was a leader, a prominent figure in the Black
12 power movements and his position as President of the Black Consciousness
13 Movement, he would, in addition, he would also have had a tremendous influence on
14 the Black youth and he was idolised as a leader. He was a very prominent leader, not
15 only in the Eastern Cape, but nationally and also outside the country.
16 MR BOOYENS: I have asked a question to one of your colleagues, but if you were to
17 place Mr Biko, if you were to place Mr Biko on a level, not taking into account those
18 political leaders that were, at that time, in prison, where would you rank Mr Biko in
19 the country?
20 MR SIEBERT: I would rank him as number one, as one of the most prominent
21 leaders.
22 MR BOOYENS: During the interrogations, and I suppose you also received
23 information and study material on the Black power movements?
24 MR SIEBERT: Yes, your Honour.
25 MR BOOYENS: What would your impression have been, what would the eventual
26 goal or purpose of organisations such as the BPC had been, the organisation of which
27 Biko was the President?
28 MR SIEBERT: It was opposed to White people. If I understand the approach of the
29 Black power movements, it was intended to combat the apartheid policy and, as such,
30 White people, White power, White domination.
31 MR BOOYENS: What would their eventual goal have been? Were they able to,
32 successfully, combat the apartheid Government?
33 MR SIEBERT: To bring about a Black power controlled Government.
34 MR BOOYENS: In your perception and in the perception of the security branch, as
35 then described in study documents and so forth, did you consider this to be a threat?
36 MR SIEBERT: Yes, your Honour.
37 MR BOOYENS : Would you have considered it to have been a serious threat?
38 MR SIEBERT: Yes, your Honour. The entire White population would be touched by
39 this, would be affected by this . Also, the established western Government structure,
40 which was then the status quo, and also the perception which would ha ve, that a, the
41 established capitalist system would be lost as a consequence. In comparison with
42 other African countries, which had been under colonial Government and had,
43 subsequently, obtained Black independent Governments and which, at that time, were
44 deteriorating into poverty, that would ha ve been our perception. (extract 15, p. 9-10)
In the above extract, there is a positioning of Siebert and Biko, as white and black
respectively, and being on completely opposing sides ofwhat is akin to a war situation. In the
extract, the association ofBiko with criminality is achieved with Booyens first question . By
asking/suggesting that the rioting continued up until the death ofBiko, Booyens is suggesting that
once Biko had died, the rioting stopped, and Biko was therefore responsible for it. Biko is linked
to "rioting" (L. 2), and then in Booyens' next question to "unrest" (L. 6), both of which have
strong criminal connotations, if are not clearly criminal activities. Whereas here Siebert states that
it was most likely that the Black Power movements were responsible for the violence, in other
parts of the transcript he states that there was evidence that this was so.
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The underlying narrative is that Biko, who was the leader of the Black Consciousness
Movement, and who had tremendous influence amongst black people, was responsible for these
criminal activities. Siebert's use of the term "he was idolized as a leader" (L. 14), has racist
connotations. He indicates that Biko was followed blindly by black people, who were perhaps
ignorant and uneducated, and did not know what he was really up to . He does not give any credit
to the people who followed Biko, in that he likens their following to blindness - being in the dark
and not really knowing what was transpiring . Biko is also constructed as an extremely powerful
individual in this narrative. He is accredited with having strong and tremendous influence with the
black youth and black people in general. He is almost likened to a very strong and dangerous
force that could easily have upset the balance and stability that the white people had maintained in
the country.
In addition, Siebert' s use of the term "not as well organized" (L. 10), indicates that Biko
and his organization were well organized and deliberate in their acts of terrorism. It reflects an
element of planning and deliberation in committing criminal activities, and further reinforces their
culpability. The theme of Siebert as a protector from such deliberate and heinous acts, is also
evident in the extract. Siebert affirms that Biko and his organization were a serious threat to the
white population, and constructs himself and the police force, as the protectors of the people, in
this case, white people. They were the protectors of civilized, decent and ordinary people, and
such values, who were not involved and needed to be kept far from any of this criminality. Siebert
is the protector of the innocent. His narrative does not attach any real blame to white people, or
the apartheid government.
Biko is positioned as one who was "opposed" to white people, and held white people as
the enemy, and was therefore racist. The narrative silences any notion that Biko engaged in his
activities in order to fight oppression and apartheid, and rather paints a picture where Biko,
without provocation or good reason, was opposed to white people, and prepared to combat them.
It lays the initiative and action of any violent actions undertaken at Biko' s door. Booyens asks
what Biko stood for, but never asks why he stood for and fought for such causes. In stating what
Biko's organization stood for, Siebert constructs Biko as a power hungry man, who wanted the
power that white people had in the country. Again, in this way, instead of being seen as an
individual who fought for the rights of his people, he is seen in a negative light, here as someone
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who was power hungry. Biko wanted to control white people and bring about a black power
controlled government.
Black leadership is also positioned in this extract. In line 18, Booyens uses the term
"political leaders" in reference to the black leadership in the country at the time . However, he
follows this by adding, "not taking into account those political leaders that were, ... in prison" (L.
17-18), and thereby positions black leadership in a completely negative light - as criminals who
were incarcerated. The narrative again aligns criminality and pathology to black people, and in this
case, to black leadership.
According to Siebert, the implications of a black government would be chaos, anarchy and
poverty. By comparing South Africa to other African countries, he is again polarizing. South
Africa represents the white, civilized, western government structure, and other African countries
are represented as uncivilized, incompetent and backward. He is using racist stereotypes here - he
is implying that black people do not know how to govern a country, and that it would spell
disaster for South Africa should they come into power. The police force, and Siebert, had a grave
responsibility to ensure that South Africa did not become like the rest of Africa - they were the
protectors of the stability and civilized values that white people had achieved in South Africa.
4.4.3 The "total onslaught"
In the last extract reviewed, the liberation movements, and specifically the organization
which Biko headed, are considered a "serious threat" to the stability of the country. The narrative
constructs Biko' s actions as using the tremendous power and influence that he had, in order to
destroy the stability that the apartheid government had established. He is constructed as a power
hungry man, who instigated violence, at the same time, he is also represented as an insane
criminal. Siebert' s ordinariness is constructed through the juxtaposition of his and Biko's actions.
Because Biko's actions are those of an insane criminal, and Siebert is on the opposing side,
Siebert is constructed and positioned as one who was situated within the bounds of normality,
civilized individuals, decency and good values.
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The extract reviewed deals with the "total onslaught" that was perpetrated by the
liberation movements:
I MR BOOYENS : What would the perceptions have been concerning the situation at
2 that t ime?
3 MR SIEBERT: Your Honour, the general concept ion and interpretation, at tha t time ,
4 had been with reference already to the total onslaught against South Africa, at that
5 time .
6 MR BOOYENS : You know this was the rhetoric of P W Botha at a later time, was
7 tha t specific term used?
8 MR SIEBERT: Yes, in the intelligence community it was mentioned by name . We
9 must remember that before this, the South African Police performed border service in
10 Rhodesia, the now Zimbabwe, in order to support them as one of the last colonial
11 powers adjoining South Afr ica, bordering on South Africa. I think of the support
12 offered to or by liberation or freedom fighters from South Africa in that situat ion .
13 The efforts of the South African Defence Force in Namibia into Angola at that time,
14 the combating of terrorism by the South African Police in the then So uth West, now
15 Namibia, since already 1962, the then attacks, terror, acts of terror of 1966 ,
16 particularly during the month of November at the border gate when two MK members
17 of the ANC were arrested and two police officers were injured . I believe they died
18 but I am not sure whether they in fact died in consequence of that event. I think of
19 the explosion at the Carlton Centre in Johannesburg , also during November and then
20 in December , the Solomon Mahlangu attack in Johannesburg where people were, in
21 fact, shot dead .
22 With this in the background and in view of the unrest, the foreign opposition already
23 growing at that time, this would be considered to have been a total onslaught at that
24 time and it was referred to as such from head office and in our ranks . (e xtract 16 , p .
25 10-11 )
This extract emphasizes the "criminal" and "terrorist" activities of the liberation
movements. It shows them to be violent and dangerous and resulting in the deaths of people.
Words such as "died" (L. 17), "acts of terror" (L. 15), and "explosion" (L. 19) convey the serious
and grave danger that the "total onslaught" represented. It positions the liberation movements as a
real danger to society, because the attacks were unpredictable, and therefore difficult to control.
The "total onslaught" is constructed as a powerful and unrelenting force. It represents an out-of-
control, all out attack by the liberation movements. Further, it has connotations ofmercilessness
in the face of opposition. Those fighting in the liberation struggle are therefore positioned as
merciless criminals who will stop at nothing to achieve their goals . Siebert on the other hand, is
positioned as one of a "community" (L. 8), i.e. the intelligence community . The use of the word
"community", is glaringly different to the way in which the liberation movements are constructed;
it evokes a sense of mutual support, partnership, good values and togetherness. These are all
positive values that are ascribed to police officers such as Siebert. It was their job to deal with the
violence of the "total onslaught". They are positioned as being on the defensive, and the
protectors of society from such criminals.
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In linking the unrest to the growing foreign oppos ition, Siebert indicates that the foreign
opposition occurred as a result of it. He therefore apportions blame to the liberation movements
for negatively affecting and impacting on foreign investment and opportunities for the country.
According to this narrative the liberation movements inflicted damage on the country and were a
threat to its stability. This negative connotation attached to their actions reinforces other extracts
where the liberation movements, and freedom fighters, are positioned as criminals, and a danger
to all South Africans. It also serves to reinforce Siebert'sposition as being on the "right" side of
this battle; the side ofgood, decent and "ordinary" values.
The issues explored under the above section are also brought to bear on the individual
interaction between Siebert and Biko. Siebert's narrative takes us through the information
obtained before Biko was interrogated and the debriefing that took place before the interrogation,
through to the actual interrogation, and its aftermath. During each of these episodes, both Siebert
and Biko are positioned in similiar ways as those mentioned in the above section. Siebert places
himself in a defensive position, and as a protector of society, and Biko is positioned as an out-of-
control man, who is aggressive, violent, uncooperative, and even a liar. These positionings serve
to reinforce the binary opposition of the two individuals, as well as confirm the "ordinariness" of
Siebert . An example of this is the following extract:
1 ADV POTGIETER : ... you explain the situation which occurred at the
2 time and you also referred to the chair and you say a couple of lines further
3 down into the paragraph, "I had to bend forwards to stop this chair after
4 which Biko made a sudden sweeping motion in my direction. It seemed as if
5 he wanted to strike me ." Is that correct?
6 MR SIEBERT: Yes .
7 ADV POTGIETER : So, he made some movement, but you are not entirely sure
8 what it was?
9 MR SIEBERT : Yes, yes.
10 ADV POTGIETER : All right. Then you sa y he did not actually strike you?
11 MR SIEBERT: Yes.
12 ADV POTGIETER: You then pushed him in front of his chest and then you
13 say, "Whilst I wanted to speak to him . . . ". In other words, after this little scuffle
14 or incident with the chair and a movement which he made , you then wanted to
15 talk to him? So , there was not a fight between the two of you?
16 MR SIEBERT: No . A lot of things have been mentioned here, a lot of sentences
17 have been referred to, but it is difficult to explain wha t happened in a fraction of
18 a second. All these things happened virtually simult aneously. (extract 17, p. 80-
81)
In this extract, Biko is positioned as the aggressor, and Siebert is the defensive recipient of
his aggression. It is Biko who is the first to act violently, while Siebert reiterates that his aim was
merely to talk to Biko . The individual interaction between Biko and Siebert is therefore a
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metaphor for the broader way in which each are positioned in the transcript - Biko as the out-of-
control criminal, and Siebert as the "ordinary" police officer who was on the defensive, and whose
job it was to apprehend and control such criminality for the sake of the safety of ordinary South
Africans.
The storyline reviewed so far in this section, reflects that the construction of ordinariness
is a function of the binary oppositions in Siebert's narrative, where he is on the side of law and"
justice, and Biko is a criminal who posed a serious danger to the safety of all South Africans. For
the most part, the extracts reviewed illustrate these positionings . Contrary evidence will be
examined next in order to see when and why it occurs . The first issue that will be dealt with here,
is where Siebert is questioned by Bizos regarding the illegal methods that were used in
interrogations:
1 MR BIZOS : Right. Did any officer in the police , any senior officer tell you that
2 you could assault , torture, hand-cuff, leg-iron , ill-treat helpless detainees ?
3 MR SIEBERT : No .
4 MR BIZOS: You said that you, in your application, that you considered that a
5 war was going on? Is that correct?
6 MR SIEBERT: Yes .
7 MR BIZOS : But now do you, did you ever bother to find out as to how prisoners
8 are to be treated even in a state of war ?
10 MR SIEBERT : That is true , the circumstances of that time and all the things that
11 Mr Bizos has asked motivated one to act in the interests of the State dispensation
12 and in the interest of the community of South Africa and not only the White
13 community, but also in the interests of these people who are sitting here today,
14 that is the Black community, because they suffered the most as a result of all the
15 murders, the burning of their vehicles and businesses and houses . It was done in
16 order to protect them. One took a risk of interrogating these people and this was
17 done as a result of the motivation of the organisations that I mentioned, because
18 I believed that the policy of that time, namely apartheid, was an interim measure
19 until it would develop to such an extent or that the politicians of the day come
20 up with better solutions for South Africa. (extract 18, p. 52)
Bizos attempts to show that Siebert and his fellow police officers were engaged in illegal
activities, and cannot therefore claim to be on the side of the law. Although Siebert concedes that
such activities were not directly "instructed" from superiors, he justifies these actions by instead
focusing on the motivation behind them and the results they produced, rather than the actions
themselves. He reiterates that he acted in the interests of the state, and white and black
communities. He focuses on the ways that black people were affected by the violence, and
positions himself as a protector of all South Africans (which is in contrast to other areas of the
transcript where he is the protector of only white people). He is constructing his own illegal
actions, as those that he was forced to undertake in order to deal with the powerful force of the
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unrest and violence. He apportions blame to the context, and to the liberation movements, whom
he had stated previously were responsible for all the violence. In so doing, he continues to resist
any move by Bizos to position him as responsible and culpable for his actions.
In the next extract he follows on from this idea, while still reiterating that he was acting in
the interests of the community at large :
1 MR BIZOS : No, no, not that you had any control, why did you not behave in the
2 manner in which your leaders spoke? That is the question .
3 MR SIEBERT: There were many other persons that we detained with whom we
4 had no problem s .
5 MR BIZOS: The question is not whether you had problems with other persons,
6 the que stion is why did you not give heed to what the leaders were saying in
7 1977? They wer e saying tlra t South Africa is a civilised country that does not ill -
8 treat people and only communists and their fellow travellers make these false
9 allegat ions against us . Is that not what they were saying?
10 MR SI EBER T: I cannot remember the details of those statements, but then we
11 must al so look at the time factor in this s pec i f ic interrogation . As I sa id, murder
12 was propagated and demanded from the community in New Brighton, KwaZakele ,
13 which already suffered under gruesome unrests and extended unrests and the
14 interests of the individual had to be weighed up against the interests of the
15 broader community and th at was one of the reasons or why I am applying for
16 amnest y . ( ex t ra ct 19 , p . 54)
In his response to Bizos' question, Siebert states that not all detainees were problematic.
He is positioning Biko as a difficult and uncooperative individual, who forced the hand of the
security police into using violence to deal with him. Again here he uses motives and results as the
over-riding criterion by which his actions need to be judged. He also uses the interests of the
community as the motivation behind his actions. Through focusing on his benevolent motives,
Siebert tries to maintain his "ordinariness" . By reiterating that he had this as his first and most
important priority, he emphasizes that he was "ordinary" because he aimed to protect ordinary
values and principles, and ordinary people, black and white . Here again he aligns himself with
humanity, and good humanitarian motives , even when he is confronted with the inhumanity of his
actions. Biko is further positioned as responsible for the violence , and therefore in need of
incarceration. Even in the face of contradiction, this construction of Siebert's attempts to keeps
the binary oppositions intact in order to maintain his "ordinariness".
When dealing with the contradictions in his narrative, Siebert uses the defence of
motivation and results to justify his actions and maintain his "ordinariness". He situates himself as
part of humanity, through illustrating that he had humanitarian motives at heart, and was trying to
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protect the black and white communities from the danger that Biko posed. Biko and other
detainees are clearly still positioned as being a threat to society and to the safety of all South
Africans.
4.5 PASSIVITY IN THE FACE OF PERSUASION & INFLUENCE
In the certain areas of the first two sections, Siebert constructs his "ordinariness" through
aligning himselfwith the police and apartheid system within which he worked, and shows these to
be just systems and on the "right" side. In contrast, this section deals with the ways in which
Siebert distances himself from the police system, and other significant influences on his life. The
extracts reviewed -~ that he felt he was persuaded to believe in apartheid, and with the change
in dispensation, he has come to see the error/s in apartheid, and feels he was led astray by
significant others. The storyline explores the ways in which Siebert maintains his "ordinariness"
through giving others agency and indicating that they influenced him wrongly. In constructing his
actions in this way, he is less responsible, as he is an almost passive recipient of their influence.
The significant others, or those that have led him astray, include political leaders, his church, and
his superior Colonel Goosen.
1 MR BOOYENS : Let us pay attention, now, to the personal overview and personal
2 circumstances. You mention or rather , maybe, you can read from personal
3 overview or "persoonlike oorsig" .
4 MR SIEBERT: "I am currently 51 years in age , I was born on the 20th of
5 September 1945 in Bloemfontein. I am the youngest of four children. I grew up
6 in a conservative and Christian home. I am a member of the Dutch Reformed
7 Church and had been actively involved in the Dutch Reformed Church since my
8 childhood and have, for the past 26 years, served on the local Church Council. I
9 grew up, during my formative years, in the apartheid era . The apartheid policy
10 would , as a consequence, have been acceptable and justifiable to me since I was
11 of the opinion, at that time, that this policy was necessary for the continued
12 . survival of the Wh ite and South African at the southern end of Africa .
13 This po int of view, in subsequent years , was additionally influenced and
14 strengthened by the policy expressions or statements of politica l leaders
15 as well as cultural and church leaders .
16 As a result of these statements and rhetoric, I was convinced th at the White
17 Afr ikaans-speaking person would have to fight for the right of survival and for
18 the right to continue to live as our an cestors did, with part icular reference to our
19 heritage, background, culture and political way of life." (extract 20, p . 3)
Between lines one and twelve, Siebert provides a brief summary of his early life. This
narrative stresses the contextual factors in Siebert' s life and silences his own personal involvement
in his actions as a police officer maintaining apartheid. First he uses familial and religious
discourse to support this argument. Stating that he grew up in a "conservative" home (L. 6),
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stresses the role of his family in influencing him and shaping his life. This is followed by
statements relating to religious influences. Not only did he grow up in a Christian home, but he
belonged to the Church Council. Even though Siebert uses the term "actively involved" (L. 7),
which may be considered as reflecting action on his part, the overall effect is that in essence, the
church approved of him and his actions . Siebert uses the words "served on the local Church
Council" (L. 8), which echoes his sentiments regarding his being a faithful servant to this country.
In a similiar way, the church is positioned as an authoritative figure, who has the power to
influence and persuade its followers . The word "servant" connotes being a faithful and loyal
subject. It also positions Siebert as one who followed, rather than one who took action. Therefore
the church is given agency and responsibility for the actions of its members. Siebert is thus
positioned as a follower, and in this case, as an "ordinary" man who was led to believe in what the
church espoused (in this case, apartheid).
This is enhanced by the line, "I grew up, during myformative years, in the apartheid era"
(L. 8-9). The word "formative" alludes to the fashioning of, or the shaping of, his character -
Siebert is here indicating that in his early years he was molded into an individual who believed that
apartheid was justifiable. One of the strongest statements regarding how he was influenced, is
when Siebert claims that he was "convinced" that apartheid was necessary because of the
statements and rhetoric, of political, church and cultural leaders (L. 16). He places himself in a
passive position, one where he was an innocent and ordinary individual who was led astray by
these significant people in his life. Everywhere he looked , those in authority were telling him that
apartheid was the only way that he and his people could survive. He distances himself from these
opinions and his own opinion, "at that time", through the latter phrase . He indicates that his
opinion has changed as he has learnt differently now.
The issue of the survival of the Afrikaner heritage, background, culture and way of life,
reflects the local nuance on the theme of the "ordinariness" of perpetrators. This may be
considered the goal of an "ordinary" man in terms of Afrikaner ideology, as well as that of other
groups in society. It draws on the notion ofwanting to maintain one's culture and way oflife, and
serves as a reflection of the good and decent values that Siebert aspired and worked towards.
Siebert indicates that his opinion has changed regarding the necessity of apartheid. But he asserts
his "ordinariness" through indicating that he wanted to preserve his heritage and culture.
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This extract is immediately followed by Booyens' questions regarding how Siebert was
"influenced" by the political leaders that he met at the time:
I MR BOOYENS : And I want to ask you not to give us or repeat to us any political
2 speeches, but in a nutshell, what did Mr Vorster communicate to you with regard
3 to his beliefs regarding the security situation and so forth?
4 MR SIEBERT : That the security situation was becoming far more intense and that
5 serious attention would have to be paid to it to control it and, perhaps, entirely to
6 eliminate it, since this damaged the image of the Republic, particularly with the
7 view to sanctions, which was operative at that time, with regard to development
8 and foreign investment.
9 MR BOOYENS: Were you influenced by your contact with Mr Vorster? Did you
10 believe what he said to you, did it have any influence on you?
11 MR SIEBERT: Yes, your Honour .
12 MR BOOYENS : Would you have considered yourself a very loyal supporter?
13 MR SIEBERT: Yes, your Honour . (extract 21, p . 4)
Siebert in this extract is positioned as one who was "influenced" (L. 9), and who was a
"very loyal supporter" (L. 12). The latter term resonates with his use of the term "servant" in the
previous extract, where he is positioned as a faithful follower - he is positioned as a passive
recipient of Vorster' s influence. It is Vorster's opinions that Siebert follows; they do not originate
from Siebert. In a similiar vein, Siebert does the same in the following extract:
1 MR BOOYENS : You were in your earl y 30' s, in terms of age?
2 MR SIEBERT: Yes, your Honour.
3 MR BOOYENS : Colonel Goosen , as we have heard, was the Commanding Officer
4 of the branch, and had been the Commanding Officer since 1969?
5 MR SIEBERT: That is correct, your Honour.
5 MR BOOYENS: Could you describe, for us, or give us a thumbnail sketch of the
6 man, Colonel Goosen, his approach, his attitude towards his work and so forth?
7 MR SIEBERT: Your Honour, he was a very dedicated person with regard to his
8 work circumstances . He believed in the politics of the day , with regard to the
9 apartheid policy. At all times he would take the lead , even in very serious unrest
10 and rioting situations . He would never stay back at the office and he was an
11 example to us in this regard . In addition , he was a father figure for us, as
12 younger people, parti cularl y because we could see that he was willing to put
13 himself in the firing line. In add ition , he did not allow an yone to act in an
14 undisciplined manner. He would deal with such a person and he would remove
15 such a person from the Security Branch .
16 MR BOOYENS: Would you have considered him to have been a strong leader?
17 MR SIEBERT: Yes, he was a strong leader.
17 MR BOOYENS : Did he have any or did he allow any latitude to, for younger
18 officers to oppose him with regard to his viewpoints?
19 MR SIEBERT: No .
20 MR BOOYENS: And did he enforce these viewpoints?
21 MR SIEBERT: Yes . (extract 22 , p . 6)
In the above extract, Siebert is again positioned as one who is on the receiving end - he is
a junior officer to the imposing figure of Colonel Goosen. The latter is constructed as a powerful
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leader who not only believed in apartheid, but did not allow any latitude to anyone who opposed
his viewpoints . Siebert is positioned as a "young" person (L . 12), and one who followed this
"strong leader" (L. 16, 17). The implication of this positioning is that Siebert is the weak one in
this relationship, one who simply obeys orders. There is a sense that it was not possible to go
against Goosen, as he enforced his viewpoints and did not allow any opposition in this regard .
This extract differs slightly from the preceding extracts regarding how Siebert was "led
astray". The positioning here, while according Siebert a passive role, positions him also as one
who had little choice in following Goosen. Siebert is "influenced" by Goosen, who was looked up
to as a father figure (Siebert is a "young" officer and therefore positioned as almost child-like),
and he is not allowed to disagree with Goosen's point of view. The use of familial discourse here,
where Goosen is positioned as father, and Siebert and the other officers, as similiar to children,
conveys an innocence on Siebert's part . He simply did what he was told to do, by this
authoritative and commanding figure. Siebert's positioning as one who was innocent constructs
him as "ordinary" here.
I MR SIEBERT : "At that time I was of the opinion that the continued survival of
2 Wh i te people in South Afr ica could be directl y linked to the then Government
3 remaining in power. I was of the opinion that should the organisations such as the
4 ANC ... " and I would like to add to this the PAC and the Black power organisations ,
5 ".. . should they become the Government in South Africa, that this would lead to total
6 anarchy and chaos which would no longer allow me to maintain my way of life that I
7 had become use to . I was, as a consequence of the opinion that the security branch
8 had the responsibility to assist in ensuring that the then Government order could be
9 maintained in order to help mainta in the common civilised Western standards to
10 which people in South Africa had become use (sic) .
II In view of the fact that we were engaged in an undeclared war with the so-called
12 liberation movements or organisations and in view of the support offered to the
13 security branch from both political, church and cultural circles , I was convinced that
14 the th en Government status quo had to be maintained at all costs ." (extract 23 , p. 11)
In extract 24 above, Siebert uses strategic ambiguity to distance himself from his
position/opinion with the term "At that time" (L. 1), which indicates that his opinion may have
subsequently changed. He again reiterates that he was influenced or convinced by political, church
and cultural leaders into believing that his job was necessary and correct in helping to support the
apartheid government, and fight the liberation movements in order to ensure the maintenance of
the status quo. In putting forward that he was "convinced", Siebert is once again placed in a
passive position, and the church, political and cultural leaders are those that have led him astray.
In this narrative, they are therefore ultimately responsible for Siebert's actions . The local nuance
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on "ordinariness" pertaining to the maintenance or survival of his people, is again quoted here by
Siebert (but here it is in reference to white people, and not white Afrikaner people). However, he
links his job to maintaining civility and Western standards. This implicitly positions black people
as being uncivilized, and positions Siebert as being a part of civilized and "ordinary" values.
The contradiction of his role as passive and active is evident in this extract. Siebert is a
passive recipient of the influence or teachings of authority figures such as the church. In
positioning himself as passive, he is constructed as an "ordinary" man who was led astray.
However, there is also a different positioning occurring, where he is part of civilized and decent
standards/values, and an active part of the apartheid structure. This also positions him as
"ordinary" as he wanted to ensure the survival of his people, and that "ordinary" values were
maintained. The device that allows him to do both of these, is the phrase "At that time, I was of
the opinion . .. " (L. 1), which allows him to distance himself from the system which he supported,
and allows him to use the principle of motive to position himself as one who was noble.
How does this positioning of Siebert as a passive recipient of authority render him
"ordinary"? Essentially, it serves to distance him from the inhumanity of apartheid. By rendering
himself as passive in the face of such overwhelming influence, Siebert becomes less responsible
for his actions. Most importantly, Siebert's role is solidified as an "ordinary" individual who was
led astray by all these forces - everywhere he looked, those in authority were telling him that
apartheid was correct and justified, and the way to maintain and preserve his way of life and his
cultural heritage. The latter represent the local nuance in Siebert's construction of ordinariness.
Siebert had noble and pure motives - he wanted to maintain his heritage, a sure sign of his
normality .
In essence this storyline is contradicted in extracts where Siebert aligns himself to the
system, i.e. the police system and the apartheid system as a whole. Whereas in this section, he
distances himself from the system, much of the material reviewed under section 4.3 and 4.4,




There are two contrasting constructions of"ordinariness". The first sees Siebert as
divorced from the system, and merely doing his job without questioning his orders - i.e. there was
nothing about the individual character of Siebert that was involved. The second sees him as a part
of the system, where the system is defined in positive terms. In the second construction, Siebert
and the system are aligned with humanity.
Does Siebert see apartheid and the police system of which he was a part, and which
maintained apartheid as correct and justifiable, or does he distance himself from both to indicate
that with the change in dispensation, he has seen the error in the old regime, and is remorseful for
his role in it? The evidence that answers this question is reflected in the second storyline -
Siebert's narrative is overwhelmingly based using racist discourse . His opinions and the way in
which he conceives of his past actions are clearly influenced by racist ideas. While his narrative
attempts to put forward that he was humane, and "ordinary", he shows little remorse for his
actions, and according to many authors (e.g. Bizos, 1998, Meredith, 1999), although the hearings
were meant to elicit the truth about what transpired that led to the death ofBiko, little new was
revealed or admitted. The perpetrators did not really bring forward much new information which
could shed light on how Biko died, and who was responsible .
The narrative as has been analyzed, shows that the storylines reviewed, essentially
constructs/positions Siebert as "ordinary" in different ways. These different constructions even
though they are at variance with each other at different stages, in terms of the overall picture,
serve to shift the responsibi lity of the death ofBiko onto others. These storylines reveal that
Siebert uses the "ordinary man" construction in order to position himself in ways which serve to
make him less culpable, and to reiterate that it was either the system or the political context, or
the liberation movements, or the church, which were ultimately responsible for what happened to
Biko. These storylines reveal that there is little in the narrative to indicate that Siebert
comprehends his own role in taking the life of another human being. The "ordinary man" rhetoric
is fundamentally one of a denial of guilt. Siebert' s rhetoric aims to place the responsibility of his
actions on the system, and also on those who fought in the freedom struggle . In so doing, it also
shows how the old regime is alive in the rhetoric of those who upheld it. There is a denial of
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apartheid, and the harm it inflicted upon the lives of millions of South Africans. And it shows that
racism has taken on somewhat more subtle forms, but it is still there, in the rhetoric of people who
attempt to make sense of their lives and their actions .
The TRC is an institution whose task was an attempt to deal with the atrocities of the past
to build a better future for all South Africans. However, using such amnesty hearings to do so, is
treading on dangerous ground. While it has provided opportunities for perpetrators of atrocities
during apartheid to "tell the truth", this does not really deal with the issue of responsibility, or
what follows when perpetrators do not fulfill the objectives of the Commission . Amnesty was
denied to Siebert, yet the question of how this is followed up remains unclear and unanswered.
Perpetrators such as Siebert have not really answered for, or been held accountable for the
actions that they perpetrated, and from which they benefited. They have been integrated into the
new South African society, the rainbow nation, where it seems all is forgiven . In many ways the
status quo remains the same. This is evident in the fact that police officers like Siebert, could
actually maintain the jobs that they held during apartheid, and thereby ensure that the vestiges of
the old regime continue to live and breed in South Africa. Institutions such as the TRC ensure that
those that benefited from the previous regime may continue to live their lives relatively untouched
by the change in dispensation. And, similiarly, those oppressed by the previous regime do not see
any real change in their lives with the dawn of the new democracy.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS, CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 RESULTS
5.1.1 ContextuaIizing this study
Discourses of the "ordinariness" of perpetrators of gross human rights violations find their
roots in Hannah Arendt's articles on the trial ofAdolfEichmann. Although there had been
documented psychological investigations into the "normality" of the war criminals tried at
Nuremberg, this information did not come to light until well after Arendt's book was published.
Subsequently, this theory has been espoused by many psychologists, psychiatrists, historians and
sociologists, who have all similiarly argued that perpetrators of gross human rights violations,
who commit their acts within the context of a system, are "ordinary" men.
While one could argue that the contradictions between psychiatric "normality" and the
perpetration of atrocities is an excellent way to demonstrate the dubious nature of "normality",
and "abnormality", this thesis has been more concerned with exploring this discourse to
investigate the functions and effects thereof in present day South Africa. As a study falling under
the social constructionist paradigm, it was concerned with deconstructing the "ordinary man",
rather than treating "ordinariness" as a psychological reality, as have other authorslresearchers
who have examined the "ordinariness" of perpetrators.
Before moving on to the results, the decision of the Amnesty Committee into hearing of
the death of Steve Biko needs to be stated briefly. The Amnesty Committee denied amnesty to all
five applicants in this case, including Siebert. This was on the grounds that they claimed that their
actions were not intentional, as they were applying for amnesty for deeds for which they stated
occurred 'by accident'. As a result, the case is now left to the district attorney to decide whether
to prosecute these applicants.
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5.1.2 Results of the transcript analysis
The analysis of the transcript has elucidated that "ordinariness" is constructed in ways that
attempt to keep intact the humanity of the perpetrator. To achieve this goal, the perpetrator
positions himselfin different ways, i.e. sometimes as an active participant, and other times as a
passive recipient, of orders and influence. As his own positioning in the narrative shifts, others
such as the Biko, as well as past political and church leaders, and black and white people in
general, are also positioned differently. The ways in which "ordinariness" is produced, hinges on
the relationship between the individual and the system within which he worked or ofwhich he was
a part . In areas of the transcript where the individual distances himself from the system, the
system functions as a backdrop to "ordinariness", where it is positioned as epitomizing agency
and intent, and the perpetrator is a passive recipient of orders. The responsibility for the actions of
the perpetrator are therefore placed squarely at the hands of the system. Construction of the
system thus allows for a free-floating responsibility, as it becomes difficult to pinpoint who is
responsible for what. Whereas individuals may be held responsible for particular actions, it is
almost impossible to hold a system responsible. As such, the construction of the system enables
the "ordinariness" of perpetrators to be given coherence, through facilitating the foregrounding of
"ordinariness" .
When the individual is positioned as an active agent, he and the system are aligned
together as the protectors of society. They are therefore responsible for ensuring that the
humanity of society is not affected or eroded, by groups such as freedom fighters. The latter are
clearly positioned in negative ways, as pathological and self-serving criminals, which reveals the
underlying racist narrative that grounds this construction of"ordinariness". The construction of
the freedom fighters in negative ways, implicitly and explicitly positions the perpetrator as
"ordinary" in protecting society from such inhumanity.
5.1.3 Comparing the two analyses conducted
There are many similiarities in the construction of"ordinariness" as shown in the literature
review and that of the analysis of the transcript. Both reflect the integral relationship between the
system and perpetrator as essential to grounding the "ordinariness" of perpetrators. The literature
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reviewed from the German holocaust, reveals similiarities in the use of anti-semitic rhetoric in
constructing "ordinariness", which echoes the way in which a racist narrative is used in the
transcript to contextualize the actions of the perpetrator in this case. While the literature review
elucidated the use of familial discourse to a larger extent than the transcript analyzed, it could be
argued that the setting or context of the courtroom, restricted the use of such discourse in the
case of the perpetrator in question. Had the transcript been of a television interview for example;
where the aim was to provide an 'all-round' picture of perpetrators, the use of this discourse may
have played a more significant role. Similiarly, in the transcript analyzed there was no reference to
the psychological/psychiatric normality of perpetrators (which had been quoted often in the
literature), which is also a function of the context. As the amnesty hearing was not a criminal trial,
and there was little indication of any psychological abnormality of the perpetrator, this issue was
not raised, as it was assumed that he was "normal". Lastly, the use of nationalistic ideology to
contextualize the actions of perpetrators has been noted in both the transcript and the literature
reviewed. In the case of the transcript, the construction of "ordinariness" saw the use of the aims
of maintaining Afrikaner heritage and culture , as reflecting the local nuance of"ordinariness" in
the South African context.
5.1.4 Implications of the "ordinary man" discourse in present day South Africa
What are the effects and implications of this discourse? Firstly, the "ordinary man"
discourse is contextualized in the TRC in South Africa. As an institution whose aim is the
uncovering of the 'truth' about the past, the TRC, because it is not a criminal court, allows for
perpetrators to be decriminalized. The decriminalization of perpetrators means that those who
upheld and enforced the previous regime, are not really held accountable for their actions. It
means that the National Party, its members and supporters, are treated the in the same way as
other South Africans in society, and integrated into South African society . It means that there is
no differentiation between the perpetrators, and the people whom they helped to oppress.
Ultimately, it is 'ordinary' white South Africans who benefited from apartheid, who
continue to do so, and who are the biggest beneficiaries of the work of the TRC. The "ordinary
man" discourse serves to support the re/integration of perpetrators into South African society,
through rendering them "ordinary", and not pathological or criminal. In using the amnesty
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hearings to deal with the atrocities of the past, this does not address an adequate transformation
of South African society. With perpetrators being conceived as "ordinary", and less responsible
for their act ions, this also serves to make the white minority that kept the National Party in power,
just as blameless. They played an active role in maintaining a privileged and superior role in
society, and ensuring that black South Africans were regarded as 'inferior' beings , and treated as
such . It is the system which is constructed as criminal, and therefore the "ordinary" person is not
responsible. The work of the TRC does not address the issue of the gross imbalances that were
created by apartheid, and which are still manifest clearly in today's times .
The victims, or survivors, of apartheid are undermined through the "ordinary man"
discourse. The gross inhumanity that black people in South Africa were subjected to is
"normalized", and the voices of black people continue to be oppressed through this discourse.
While the TRC has been involved in providing a space for black people who were victims of
atrocities of the past regime to tell their stories, research suggests that the TRC was inadequate in
helping the victims cope with their tragedies, and helping them to deal with the ongoing personal
and social difficulties created by their victimization (Hamber, Nageng & 0' Malley, 2000).
According to the latter authors, few of the people who came forward with their stories of
victimization to the TRC , expressed a sense of closure, and instead showed a palpable
disappointment.
Lastly, the construction of the "ordinary man" discourse may provide useful a way to
differentiate the accounts of those who fought in the struggle against apartheid, and those who
worked to maintain it. One can argue that those who fought for the liberation of the oppressed
would use very different discourses to account for their actions. Further, in terms of the way in
which the word 'perpetrator' has been outlined by the TRC, there is no distinction between those
acts committed in the name of the apartheid state, and those that were committed in fighting the
oppressive regime. The criminal actions of those who upheld apartheid are placed on an equal
footing with those who placed their lives at risk to fight oppression. Therefore the TRC also does
injustice to freedom fighters in essentially conceiving their actions, as on an equal par, to those of
the upholders of apartheid.
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5.2 AN EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH
This process would not be complete without evaluating whether the research conclusions
are sound. The research will be assessed with regards to a few key factors. The first is the issue of
transferability. According to Durrheim and Wassenaar (1999), constructionist researchers argue
that because meanings are variable across contexts of human interaction, instead of being
generalizable, research findings should be transferable. Transferability refers to the extent to
which the research provides a rich and detailed description of the context of the research in order
to account for the structures of meaning in the study. This then ensures that the understandings
can be transferred to new contexts (Durrheim and Wassenaar, 1999). While being a huge
undertaking, the construction of"ordinariness" and gross human rights violations in the context of
a system have been dealt with in sufficient depth, and across different contexts, to facilitate the
transferability of this study to other contexts. The issue of coherence, which Potter and Wetherell
(1987) identify as a key technique to validate any research finding, also needs assessment. These
authors state that one 's analytic claims should give coherence to a body of discourse - i.e. to
elucidate how the discourse fits together, and how it produces particular effects and functions. In
assessing this issue, I believe that the analysis was able to cover t~ broader way in which
"ordinariness" was constructed, while paying attention to, and accounting for the micro-
sequences of the transcript.
One of the new problems that is raised in the study, [another ofPotter and Wetherell's
(1987) techniques for assessing research], is that of how perpetrators account for their actions
which were perpetrated within a regime that is subsequently found to be a crime against humanity.
This is reflected in the way in which the perpetrator in the analysis continually shifts from
constructing his actions as active, and then at other stages, as passive. However, linguistic devices
such as "I was of the opinion at that time... ", are clearly useful in attempts to convey a shift in the
positioning of the perpetrator, with the change in the political climate. Yet another technique that
Potter and Wetherell (1987) outline, is that of the fruitfulness of the study. In conducting the
literature review, I found that there was a scarcity of research on the "ordinariness" of
perpetrators, aside from that conducted after the German holocaust. The literature on South
African perpetrators has.only begun to emerge with the change in political circumstances. With
regards to the use of a social constructionist approach in analyzing the "ordinariness" of
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perpetrators of atrocities, there is little evidence to indicate that this has previously been
conducted. Therefore this study aims to add to the South African literature on perpetrators of
atrocities, and in using a social constructionist approach, it also attempts to highlight the way in
"ordinariness" in the context of the perpetration of atrocities in the South African context, has
specific political implications for the transformation of South African society.
A criticism that may be leveled at this study is that it deals with the account of only one
perpetrator. However, the accounts of four other applicants were used to inform this study. There
were clear similiarities in these accounts. Further, using the account of one perpetrator allowed
for an in-depth and rigorous analysis of the transcript, which would have been undermined if the
accounts of all the perpetrators were used .
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), qualitative research designs cannot be given in
advance, but must emerge, develop and unfold with the research process. This quote is useful in
conceptualizing this research as a whole. One of the problems with this research undertaking was
that at various stages it became clear that the scope of the study proved too large for a master's
mini-dissertation. While acknowledging that in the case of such a study it was, and would have
been, difficult to assess its scope in the early stages, this made it difficult as the research
progressed to cut down the scope to a suitable size for which it was intended .
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
The way in which issues of transformation have been addressed in South African society
needs to be challenged. This may be facilitated by further work on the discourse of "ordinariness"
in relation to perpetrators, especially as the TRC completes its amnesty work, and there are more
answers regarding the ways in which those who have been denied amnesty, are dealt with.
5.4 CONCLUSION
This thesis aimed to analyze the discourse of the "ordinary man" in the local context and
link this to the broader literature on the "ordinariness" of perpetrators. It also aimed to investigate
the function and effects of the "ordinary man" discourse. There were clearly links between the
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local and international literature with "ordinariness" being constructed using similar discourses of
normality and humanity . This discourse functions to make the issue of responsibility problematic,
as it becomes difficult to say who is responsible for what. Effects of this discourse in the context
of the TRC include maintaining the unaccountability of those who upheld the previous regime.
The racist narrative to define past actions was used quite extensively, and is an indication of the
way/s in which racism continues to play a dominant role in South African society .
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